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Preamble
 

In August of 1998 the Collaborative Agent Design (CAD) Research Center of the California 
Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo, approached the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) with the proposal for an annual workshop focusing on emerging concepts in decision-
support systems for military applications. The proposal was considered timely by the ONR 
Logistics Program Office for at least two reasons. First, rapid advances in information systems 
technology over the past decade had produced distributed, collaborative computer-assistance 
capabilities with profound potential for providing meaningful support to military decision 
makers. Indeed, some systems based on these new capabilities such as the Integrated Marine 
Multi-Agent Command and Control System (IMMACCS) and the Integrated Computerized 
Deployment System (ICODES) had already reached the field testing and final product stages, 
respectively. 
Second, over the past two decades the US Navy and Marine Corps have been increasingly 
challenged by missions demanding the rapid deployment of forces into hostile or devastated 
territories with minimum or non-existent indigenous support capabilities. Under these conditions 
Marine Corps forces have to rely mostly, if not entirely, on sea-based support and sustainment 
operations. Operational strategies such as Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) and 
Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM) are very much in need of intelligent, real-time and 
adaptive decision-support tools to assist military commanders and their staff under conditions of 
rapid change and overwhelming data loads. 
In the light of these developments the Logistics Program Office of ONR considered it timely to 
provide an annual forum for the interchange of ideas, needs and concepts that would address the 
decision-support requirements and opportunities in combined Navy and Marine Corps sea-based 
warfare and humanitarian relief operations. The first ONR Workshop was held April 20-22, 
1999 and focused on advances in technology with particular emphasis on an emerging family of 
powerful computer-based tools. The workshop concluded that the most able members of this 
family of tools appear to be computer-based agents that are capable of communicating within a 
virtual environment of objects and relationships representing the real world of sea-based 
operations. In this shared reality of the real world the agents reason collaboratively and 
interactively as they assist the users in the formulation of plans and the execution of resupply 
sequences. It was found that in particular such agents are useful for monitoring events, tracking 
the movement of cargo and transportation conveyances, alerting the users of supply shortages, 
generating mission and sortie schedules, and reporting on the current and projected future status 
of the sea-based logistics situation. 
Following the success of the 1999 ‘Decision-Making Tools Workshop’ the proposal for the 
theme and structure of the second ONR Workshop to be held on May 2-4, 2000, was seen as an 
opportunity for formalizing the concept of an annual ONR Decision-Support Workshop Series 
through the establishment of a set of objectives to serve as guiding principles for all future 
Workshops. 
1.	 Subject to the availability of funding the ONR Decision-Support Workshops
 
should be held annually, and should endeavor through their structure, format and
 
content to be of approximately equal value to ONR, the contributors or presenters,
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and the participants. ONR should be seen as the catalyst for bringing together 
experts and decision makers for an exchange of: user needs; technical approaches 
for satisfying these needs; and, new technical trends and state-of-the-art 
capabilities. Authors should be able to contribute their refereed papers within a 
stimulating intellectual environment that is on the one hand of the highest 
technical quality, and on the other hand sensitive to user needs and interests. 
Participants should be presented with an overview of the latest trends in the 
design, development and implementation of decision-support systems, at a 
technical level that is understandable by intelligent laypersons with either 
experience in or knowledge of military operations. 
2.	 The Workshops should gradually evolve into a vehicle for establishing needs,
 
directions, and opportunities that will be available to ONR as guidelines for the
 
formulation of future funding policies and priorities.
 
3.	 The final product of each Workshop should be a document, in printed and/or
 
electronic format, that will include not only the presented papers but also some
 
useful record of forums and discussions held during the workshop.
 
4.	 The Workshop contributors should be required to abide by a process of paper 
submission and presentation that is clearly defined and disseminated in a timely 
manner. 
In the context of the above guiding principles the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center 
proposed that the second annual ONR Workshop should convey the dual themes of evolving 
collaborative agent technology and end-user needs through the workshop title: 
‘The Human-Computer Partnership in Decision-Support’ 
It was further proposed that the Workshop be structured in two parts: a relatively small number 
of selected formal presentations (i.e., technical papers) followed each afternoon by four 
concurrent open forum discussion seminars. To stimulate the open forum discussions it was 
suggested that the formal presentations should cover the Workshop theme conveyed by its title, 
from the following perspectives: 
The Human Perspective 
The Military Command and Control Perspective 
The Military Logistics Perspective 
The Military Intelligence Perspective 
The Local Government and Commercial Perspective 
The Research and Experimentation Perspective 
The Technical Implementation Perspective 
In concert with these formal presentations the following four open forum themes were 
identified for two afternoons followed by a summary session on the third and last day of 
the Workshop. 
iv 
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Theme A:  Expeditionary Command and Control (C2) Users  -  focusing on differing 
user group requirements; customization of the user-interface; free format text 
and voice recognition; formalization of the data objectification process; 
rapid objectification of infrastructure data; and, human decision making skills 
and the role of training. 
Theme B: Appropriate R&D Directions  - integrating simulation and optimization 
techniques; integrating external applications; and, assessing uncertainty, risk 
and opportunity costs. 
Theme C: System Design Requirements  - broad system design guidelines; 
standardization and agent languages; the knowledge acquisition bottleneck; 
object-serving communication facilities; and, effective agent collaboration 
and planning. 
Theme D: Communication Infrastructure  - reliable data feeds; redundancy and 
graceful degradation; alternatives for the ‘last mile’; and, access 
authentication and security. 
During the actual Workshop each open forum seminar was led by a Marine Corps officer taking 
the role of facilitator. A summary of these forum discussions which took place on the first two 
days of the Workshop are included in these proceedings. 
The proceedings are divided into two sections. Section One contains the formal presentations that 
were scheduled on the three mornings of the Workshop. Only some of these contributions are in 
the standard format of a scientific paper. The majority of the formal contributions were presented 
by past, present and potential future users of decision-support systems who preferred a slide 
format that more accurately reflects their primarily operational comments and concerns.
       Jens Pohl, Ph.D. Anthony Wood (Col. USMC Ret.)
                    Executive Director               Vice President 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center        CDM Technologies, Inc. 
San Luis Obispo, California
 

September, 2000
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Foreword to the 2nd Annual ONR Workshop 
Foreword 
The Decision Support Workshop of May 2-4, 2000 held in San Luis Obispo, Cal., 
was the second in a series that was started one year earlier as a joint project of the 
Office of Naval Research and the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center of 
Cal Poly. 
The goal of this series of Workshops is to provide a forum where connections can 
be established on one hand between developers and proponents of decision 
support tools, with potential users such as managers of  large, complex 
organizations/systems on the other.  Clearly, the military belong to this class of 
users and it is therefore not surprising that ONR has a vested interest in promoting 
research in this particular field. It is also clear that the class of potential users is 
not restricted to the military  - in fact civilian government bodies as well as 
business and industry entities should be strongly interested in adopting these tools 
(and their future refinements) for their own specific purposes.  The list of the 
speakers and the topics presented during the Workshop does indeed attest to the 
variety of areas where decision support systems are already in use. 
This Workshop has concentrated on the human-computer interaction.  Although 
computers are after all man-made devices, there is a peculiarity in the way humans 
interact with a computer that has no parallel in human-human interactions.  This 
was brought out in an interesting talk by Dr. Ron DeMarco.  Other areas where 
computers play a major role included the topic of how information is handled, 
secured, and assured. Since the basis of all decision making is accurate , 
uncontaminated information, this is a very important topic that was excellently 
treated by Mr. Steve York and Ms. Virginia Wiggins in their presentations.  Other 
highlights included a thought-provoking talk by RADM  C. L. Munns that raised 
many questions concerning decision support  in the Fleet.  An interesting 
description of the risks of misusing information technology was given, with his 
usual verve, by Dr. Gary Klein.  The reader of these Proceedings will find other 
excellent discussions of decision support systems, in particular the agent-based 
ones described by the senior staff of CADRC. 
It is a pleasure to thank, on behalf of ONR, the distinguished speakers, 
demonstrators and attendees, who have contributed greatly to the success of the 
vii 
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Workshop and have provided new insights into the complex interplay between
 

humans, computers, information technology, and decision making.
 

Last, but not least, particular thanks are due to Prof. Jens Pohl and Col. Tony
 

Wood, and their respective staffs at Cal Poly and CDM Technologies, Inc.
 

Through their efforts they created a very pleasant atmosphere that helped the
 

Workshop in becoming a success.
 

I look forward to the third Workshop in this series that will take place in May
 

2001.
 

Phillip B. Abraham
 

Logistics Program Officer
 

Office of Naval Research
 

October 2000
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ONR / CADRC Decision-Support Workshop   
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The Office of Naval Research and the   
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center,   
California Polytechnic State University,   
San Luis Obispo  
OFFICE OF 
NAVAL RESEARC
H 
USN 
Tuesday, May 2nd   
TIME ACTIVITY 
7:30  Registration Begins 
Registration desk open from 7:30 AM until 5:00 PM. 
8:00 - 8:10  Welcome by Anthony A. Wood (Col. USMC, Ret.), Director of Applied 
Research, Collaborative Agent Design (CAD) Research Center. 
8:15 - 8:45  “The Human-Computer Partnership” 
Ronald A. DeMarco, Ph.D. (Keynote Speaker) 
Associate Technical Director, Office of Naval Research. 
8:45 - 9:30  “The Role of Decision Ranges in Enhancing Human Decision Making” 
James A. Lasswell, Senior Analyst, GAMA Corporation. 
9:30 - 10:15  “The Present and Future Impact of Information Security on National 
Infrastructure Assurance Issues” 
Steve York , Intelligence Operations Specialist, National Infrastructure 
Protection Center, FBI. 
10:15 - 10:30  Break 
10:30 - 11:05   “The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory:  Experiments in Progress” 
John Allison, Director, Program Integration, Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory. 
11:05 - 11:40   “Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD: Speeding Technology to the 
WARFIGHTER” 
Ray Cole, Demonstration/Program Manager, Extending the Littoral Battlespace 
ACTD. 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center   
California Polytechnic State University  
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407  
www.cadrc.calpoly.edu   
xi  
 Tuesday, May 2nd  ~ continued   
TIME ACTIVITY 
11:40 - 12:15 “IMMACCS and the Experience of the SPMAGTF(X)” 
Col. Robert Schmidle, Commanding Officer, Special Purpose Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (Experimental). 
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1:30 - 3:00 First Afternoon Session 
3:00 - 3:15 Break 
3:15 - 4:45 Second Afternoon Session 
4:45 Afternoon Sessions Conclude 
Wednesday, May 3rd   
TIME ACTIVITY 
7:30  Registration desk open from 7:30 AM until 5:00 PM. 
8:00 - 8:45  “Decision-Support and the Fleet” 
RDML Charles L. Munns, USN (Keynote Speaker) 
Deputy Chief of Staff for C4I, Resources, Requirements and Assessments, 
CINCPACFLT (Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet) (N6N8). 
8:45 - 9:30  “Measurement: The Human Dimension in Information Superiority” 
Richard E. Hayes, Ph.D., President, Evidence Based Research, Inc.  Senior 
Scientist, C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (CCRP) at the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I. 
9:30 - 10:15  “Tactical Communications and Networking:  The Last Mile Challenge” 
Jeffrey Ribel, Systems Analyst, Adroit Systems, Inc. 
10:15 - 10:30  Break 
10:30 - 11:05   “The Information Representation Basis of Decision-Support Systems” 
Russell Leighton, Senior Software Engineer, Collaborative Agent Design 
Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. 
11:05 - 11:40   “Generation of Agent-Based, Decision-Support Systems Based On Ontological 
Systems” 
Kym Pohl, Senior Software Engineer, Collaborative Agent Design Research 
Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. 
xii 
Wednesday, May 3rd  ~ continued   
TIME ACTIVITY 
11:40 - 12:15 “Object-Based Communication Services in Support of Decision-Support 
Systems” 
Thomas McVittie, Ph.D., Principal Software Engineer, Mission Software 
Systems, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. 
12:15 - 1:15 Luncheon 
1:30 - 3:00 First Afternoon Session 
3:00 - 3:15 Break 
3:15 - 4:45 Second Afternoon Session 
4:45 Afternoon Sessions Conclude 
5:00 - 7:00 Reception 
Thursday, May 4th   
TIME ACTIVITY 
7:30 Registration desk open from 7:30 AM until noon. 
8:00 - 9:00  “Some Risks of Misusing Information Technology” 
Gary Klein, Ph.D.  (Keynote Speaker) 
Chief Scientist, Klein Associates, Inc. 
9:00 - 9:45  “The Role of Decision-Support in Logistics Command and Control” 
Michael Badger, Logistics Command and Control Advanced Technology 
Demonstration Manager for the Command and Control Directorate; Research, 
Development, and Engineering Center; and, the Communications and 
Electronics Command (of the US Army). 
9:45 - 10:00  Break 
10:00 - 10:45  “Information Assurance for the Joint Theater Distribution Environment” 
Virginia Wiggins, Study Director, Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center.  Located 
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence (OASDC31). Owned by the Senior Steering 
Group: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD AT&L), OASDC31 and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(VCJCS). 
xiii 
Thursday, May 4th  ~ continued   
TIME ACTIVITY 
10:45 - 11:15   “Computational Intelligence for Decision Support” 
Russell C. Eberhart, Ph.D., Associate Dean for Research, Purdue School of 
Engineering and Technology, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis 
(IUPUI). 
11:15 - 12:15  Summary Plenary Session 
12:15 - 1:15  Concluding Luncheon 
ACTIVITY LOCATIONS 
Registration Desk Atrium Foyer ~ May 2nd 
Edna Foyer ~ May 3rd and 4th 
Presentations San Luis Obispo Room North ~ May 3rd, 4th, 5th 
Afternoon Sessions There are four breakout rooms for the afternoon sessions of May 2nd and 
3rd. These rooms are color coded. Please match the color code on your 
name tag to the room listed below: 
Room Color 
Del Mar ......................... Blue 
Edna East ....................... Yellow 
Los Osos North ............. Red 
Los Osos South .............. Green 
Luncheons Atrium ~ May 3rd, 4th, 5th 
Reception Atrium ~ May 3rd 
xiv 
         
    
   
 
  
   
  
   
 
 
  
     
 
   
     
 
    
  
 
  
  
 
    
     
  
      
       
  
      
       
    
   
 
   
  
 
About the Speakers
 

David Alberts, Ph.D. 
Dr. Alberts is the Director of Research, OASD (C3I).  Previously, he served as the Director of Information Systems 
Engineering at the Mitre Corporation, a federally funded research and development center.  Prior to this, he worked 
as the Director of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies (ACTIS), Deputy Director of the 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the Executive Agent for DoD’s Command and Control Research 
Program. This included responsibility for the Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT) and the School 
of Information Warfare and Strategy (SIWS) at the National Defense University.  He has more than 25 years 
experience developing and introducing leading-edge technology into private and public sector organizations.  This 
extensive applied experience is augmented by a distinguished academic career in Computer Science and Operations 
Research and Government service in senior policy and management positions. 
Dr. Alberts’ experience includes serving as a CEO for a high-technology firm specializing in the design and 
development of large, state-of-the-art computer systems (including expert, investigative, intelligence, information, 
and command and control systems) in both government and industry.  He has also led organizations engaged in 
research and analysis of command and control system performance and related contributions to operational 
missions. Dr. Alberts has had policy responsibility for corporate computer and telecommunications capabilities, 
facilities, and experimental laboratories.  His responsibilities have also included management of research aimed at 
enhancing the usefulness of systems, extending their productive life, and developing improved methods for 
evaluating the contributions that systems make to organizational functions.  Dr. Alberts frequently contributes to 
government task forces and workshops on systems acquisition, command and control, and systems evaluation. 
Dr. Alberts’ academic career has included serving as first Director of the Computer Science Program at NYU. He 
has held professional rank posts at NYU Graduate School of Business and at the CUNY as well as chaired numerous 
sessions at both international and national conferences.  In addition, he has many publications, some of which are 
included in tutorials given by the IEEE and other professional societies.  He earned his Ph.D. in Operations Research 
at the University of Pennsylvania in 1969. 
John Allison 
Director of Program Integration 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 
Lieutenant Colonel Allison was born in Jefferson City, Missouri and joined the Marine Corps Platoon Leaders 
Commissioning Program in January of 1976.  He received his commission in 1979.  He holds a Bachelor of Science 
Degree from Southwest Missouri State University and is a graduate of the US Army’s Armor Officer Advance 
Course Ft Knox, Kentucky and their Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. In May of 
1995, he graduated from the US Marine Corps School of Advance Warfighting Marine Corps University in 
Quantico, Virginia. 
During the early phase of the Tanker Wars in the Persian Gulf, he served as the Executive and Guard Officer of the 
Marine Detachment of the USS Kitty Hawk, CV-63.  In 1985, he commanded the first line company of Light 
Armored Vehicles for the 1st  Marine Division.  In 1990, he returned to the Persian Gulf and served with Task Force 
Pappa Bear, 1st Marine Division (Rein) supporting the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) as the OIC of Obstacle 
Clearing Detachment II. He became the 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion Operations Officer upon his return from 
the Gulf War. 
In February of 1992, he was assigned as the Assistant G-3 Operations Officer for the 1st Marine Division.  He 
served as the G-3 Operations Officer for Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Los Angeles during the 
LA riots in May 1992.  In December 1992, he deployed to Somalia and served on the Marine Forces Somalia Staff 
as a G-3 planner, operations officer, and force protection specialist.  Furthermore, in January 1995, he returned to 
Somalia as a member of the C-3 Future Operations and Current Operations Sections, Combined Task Force United 
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Shield.  After his return from Somalia, he served on the staff of the Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training 
Program working as the joint and component branch head. 
Prior to his retirement, Lieutenant Colonel Allison served as the Director of the Experimental Operations Division 
for the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Quantico, Virginia during the Urban Warrior series of experiments. 
His decorations and awards include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star with “V”, Purple Heart, Meritorious Service 
Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, and Combat 
Action Ribbon. 
Lieutenant Colonel Allison is married to the former Susan O’Donnell of St. Louis, Missouri.  They have three 
children, Amanda, Stephanie, and John, Jr.  He is currently an IPA from Pennsylvania State University serving as 
the Director of Program Integration for the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. 
Michael Badger 
Log C2 ATD Manager 
C2D, RDEC, CECOM 
Michael Badger is the Logistics Command and Control Advanced Technology Demonstration (Log C2 ATD) 
Manager for the Command and Control Directorate (C2D); Research, Development, and Engineering Center 
(RTEC); and, the Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) (of the US Army).  During the workshop, 
he will discuss the role of decision support in logistics command and control. 
Ray Cole 
Demonstration/Program Manager 
Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD 
Raymond Cole was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  He enlisted in the Marine Corps and was commissioned in 
November 1971 after graduating with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Economics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia. 
Mr. Cole served in a variety of command and staff positions with the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions for almost 
eleven years. Subsequent tours included:  Executive Officer, Marine Detachment, USS Saratoga, Instructor 
Amphibious Warfare School, and Executive Officer of Basic School Classes 5-79 and 3-80. 
From July 1980 to July 1983, Mr. Cole served with the 2nd Marine Division, initially with 2nd Battalion, 8th 
Marines as a Rifle Company Commander and Battalion Operations Officer, and then, as the Regimental Operations 
Officer, 8th Marines.  He twice deployed to the Mediterranean and participated in operations to evacuate the 
Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon and in the subsequent peacekeeping mission. 
Mr. Cole served as a Ground Combat Analyst at Headquarters Marine Corps from July 1984 to July 1987.  He 
transferred to the Basic school in July 1987 and served as the Tactics Group Chief until July 1989. 
In August 1990, Mr. Cole began his second tour with the 1st Marine Division, serving as the Division Operations 
Officer during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. After the war, he commanded the 1st Light Armored Infantry 
Battalion and served as a Battalion Commander in Los Angeles during the 1992 Riots. He assumed duties as the 
Division G-3 in 1992 and deployed to Somalia in December 1992 in support of Operation Restore Hope.  Then, 
Colonel Cole commanded 1st Marine Regiment from July 1993 until January 1995 when he assumed interim duties 
as the Chief of Staff, I Marine Expeditionary Force. 
Mr. Cole returned to Washington DC in June of 1995 and served as the Chief, Land and Littoral Warfare Joint 
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Division, J-8, the Joint Staff.  During this tour, Mr. Cole served as the Co-
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Executive Secretary for the 1996 Defense Science Board and the Modernization Panel Chief for the 1996 
Quadrennial Defense Review. 
During his active service, Mr. Cole attended the Marine Corps’ Amphibious Warfare School and Command and 
Staff College and the National War College at Fort McNair during academic year 1989-1990.  Mr. Cole received 
personal decorations that include the Defense Superior Service Award, Legion of Merit with Gold Star and Combat 
Distinguishing Device, Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement 
Medal, and Combat Action Ribbon.  In 1991, Mr. Cole was awarded the Navy League’s “Holland M. Smith Award” 
for Operational Competence. 
Mr. Cole retired from the Marine Corps in 1997 and joined Booz Allen & Hamilton where he worked as a 
Consultant to both the ELB ACTD and the Urban Warrior AWE.  In June 1999, Mr. Cole assumed his present 
responsibilities as the Program/Demonstration Manager for the ELB ACTD.  Mr. Cole serves in his present position 
as an IPA from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. 
Mr. Cole is married to the former Dianne Casteel of Virginia Beach, Virginia.  They have one daughter, Adrian, and 
three sons:  Brian, Adam, and Mark. 
Ronald A. DeMarco, Ph.D. 
Associate Technical Director 
Office of Naval Research 
Dr. DeMarco is a native of New Jersey.  He completed a Masters Degree in Synthetic Organic Chemistry and a 
Ph.D. in Synthetic Fluorine Chemistry at the University of Idaho. 
In 1972, he began his Naval career at the Naval Research Laboratory in the Chemistry Division where he worked on 
the synthesis and chemistry of compounds ranging from high-density gyro fluids, advanced oxidizers, electrically 
conducting polymers, and non-linear optical polymers to IR countermeasures and chemically-generated oxygen for 
emergency breathing devices. While at NRL, he headed the Inorganic Chemistry and Advanced Materials sections. 
In 1984, he took a one-year rotational assignment to the Naval Sea Systems Command’s R&D office where he 
directed research in ship and submarine Hull, Machinery, and Electrical systems as well as ship and submarine 
environmental programs.  After returning to NRL, the NAVSEA effort continued on a part-time basis until 1990. 
In 1990, he joined the Office of Naval Research as the Director of Chemistry.  Since then, he has held the positions 
of Director of Physical Sciences and Head of Engineering, Materials, and Physical Sciences which encompasses 
physical and materials sciences, environmental programs, logistics, undersea weaponry, fluid dynamics, energetic 
materials, and ship and submarine systems.  Since September 1999, he has served as Associate Technical Director at 
ONR. In addition, he has authored over 30 published scientific papers, over 40 technical reports, and over 50 
technical presentations based on his research. 
Russell C. Eberhart, Ph.D. 
Associate Dean for Research 
Purdue School of Engineering and Technology 
Russell C. Eberhart is the Associate Dean for Research at the Purdue School of Engineering and Technology, 
Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI).  He is also Director of the Biomedical Research and 
Development Center and Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering. He received his Ph.D. from Kansas 
State University in electrical engineering.  In addition, he is co-editor of a book on neural networks, now in its fifth 
printing and co-author of Computational Intelligence PC Tools, published in 1996 by Academic Press.  Currently, he 
is finishing revisions to a book with Jim Kennedy and Yuhui Shi entitled Swarm Intelligence, to be published by 
Morgan Kaufmann/Academic Press, in October 2000.  Furthermore, he is Associate Editor of the IEEE Transactions 
on Evolutionary Computation and was recently awarded the IEEE Third Millenium Medal. 
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Richard Hayes, Ph.D.
 

President
 

Evidence Based Research, Inc.
 

As President and founder of Evidence Based Research, Inc. (EBR), Dr. Hayes specializes in multidisciplinary 
analyses of intelligence and national security issues; the identification of opportunities to improve support to 
decision makers in the defense and intelligence communities; the design and development of support systems; and, 
the criticism, testing, and evaluation of systems and procedures that provide such support. 
His areas of expertise include crisis management; political-military issues; research methods; simulation and 
modeling; test and evaluation; military command, control communication, and intelligence (C3I); and decision 
aiding systems. Since coming to Washington in 1974, Dr. Hayes has established himself as a leader in bringing the 
systematic use of evidence and the knowledge base of the social sciences into play in support of decision makers in 
the national security community, domestic agencies, and major corporations.  He has initiated several programs of 
research and lines of business that achieved national attention and many others that directly influenced policy 
development in client organizations.  Dr. Hayes serves as the Senior Scientist to the C4ISR Cooperative Research 
Program (CCRP) at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I. 
Gary Klein, Ph.D.
 

Chief Scientist
 

Klein Associates, Inc.
 

Gary Klein, Ph.D., is Chief Scientist of Klein Associates Inc., a company he founded in 1978 to better understand 
how to improve decision making in individuals and teams.  The company has 25 employees working on projects for 
government (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, NASA, NIH) and commercial clients (e.g., Mead Johnson, 
Kodak, McKinsey, and Procter & Gamble). Dr. Klein is one of the founders of the field of Naturalistic Decision 
Making. His work on recognitional decision-making has been influential for the design of new systems and 
interfaces, and for the development of decision training programs.  He has extended his work on decision making to 
describe problem detection, option generation, and planning.  In order to perform research on decision-making in 
field settings, Dr. Klein and his colleagues have developed new methods of Cognitive Task Analysis. Then for 
improving performance, Klein Associates has used Cognitive Task Analysis methods to study decision making in 
more than 60 domains, including firefighting, command and control, software troubleshooting, healthcare, and 
consumer purchasing.  Dr. Klein has presented workshops on Cognitive Task Analysis to more than 300 
professionals in the U.S. and abroad and has presented seminars on Naturalistic Decision Making to a wide variety 
of groups such as the Smithsonian Associates program. 
Dr. Klein received his Ph.D. in experimental psychology from the University of Pittsburgh in 1969. He taught at 
Oakland University (1970-1974) and worked as a research psychologist for the U.S. Air Force (1974-1978).  He has 
written more than 70 papers and edited two books (with a third in press).  He is the author of Sources of Power: 
How People Make Decisions (1998, MIT Press), which has sold more than 8,000 copies and is being translated into 
two languages.  The book has been favorably reviewed in a wide variety of publications, including Nature, the Wall 
Street Journal, and the Marine Corps Gazette. 
James A. Lasswell 
Senior Analyst 
GAMA Corporation 
James A. Lasswell has been the senior analyst for GAMA Corporation since June 1998.  In this capacity, he has 
been responsible for a series of advanced concept wargaming as well as supporting the development of the Collin’s 
Combat Decision Range under contract for the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). 
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A retired U.S. Marine Corps Colonel, he was the Head of Experimental Operations at MCWL and served as 
Experiment Control for the seminal Hunter Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment during March 1997. In 
addition, he has over 10 years military experience in political, military, and strategic plans positions including 
serving as the Head of the Commandant’s Staff Group, as well as additional duties that included serving as Co-
chairman of two Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored Revolution in Military Affairs Task Forces. Mr. 
Lasswell was the Marine Corps author for the Naval Services’ strategic concept document titled Forward . . . From 
the Sea and is a frequent contributor to professional journals on future technology and conceptual issues. 
Russell Leighton 
Senior Software Engineer 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center 
Russell Leighton is a software engineer at the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center (CADRC), Cal Poly in 
San Luis Obispo.  He has a Bachelor degree in Aeronautical Engineering from Cal Poly and a Master degree in 
Engineering Mechanics from the University of Texas at Austin.  He was employed at the Phillips Laboratory, 
Edwards Air Force Base, California (1981-1997) as a Materials Research Engineer assigned to assess and develop 
computational tools for the analysis of solid rocket motor structural integrity.  His current responsibilities at the 
CADRC include technical leader for the Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control System 
(IMMACCS) team and co-technical leader for the Integrated-Cooperative Decision Model (ICDM) Toolkit 
development project. 
Thomas McVittie 
Principal Software Engineer 
NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Thomas McVittie is a principal software engineer at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. His research interests 
include highly reliable object-based distributed systems and fault tolerant system architectures. 
McVittie has a Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the University of California at Santa Barbara. 
He is the systems architect for the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE) 
Kernel and the principal designer of the Shared Net, which is an object-based information sharing system designed 
for the USMC. 
RDML Charles L. Munns, USN 
Deputy Chief of Staff for C4I, Resources, Requirements, and Assessments 
Rear Admiral Munns assumed his current duty as Deputy Chief of Staff for C4I, Resources, Requirements, and 
Assessments, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet on 1 April 1998.  As N6N8, he acts as Chief Financial Officer 
and Chief Information Officer for CINCPACFLT. 
Rear Admiral Munns began his Naval career at the U.S. Naval Academy graduating with distinction in 1973 with a 
Bachelor of Science Degree, majoring in Physics.  Subsequently, he earned a Master of Science in Computer 
Science from the University of Colorado. 
During his military service, he has served on five submarines.  His first command assignment was as Commanding 
Officer of USS RICHARD B. RUSSELL (SSN 687), and his second was a major command as Commander 
Submarine Development Squadron TWELVE. 
Rear Admiral Munns has served duty in the Pentagon working in International Negotiations and was selected for a 
one-year fellowship on Navy’s Strategic Studies Group where his task was to create innovative operational concepts 
for Naval Operations in 2025 and beyond. 
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Kym Pohl 
Senior Software Engineer 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center 
Kym Pohl is a Senior Software Engineer at the Cal Poly CADRC (Collaborative Agent Design Research Center). In 
addition to providing technical consultation on a number of projects, Kym currently provides technical leadership 
for the SEAWAY maritime logistics project, the FCADS Command and Control System, and the ICDM project. 
Kym holds Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in Computer Science and a Master of Science degree 
in Architecture.  His research interests are in the application of agent-based decision-support theory. 
Jeffrey Ribel 
Systems Analyst 
Adroit Systems, Inc. 
Jeffrey Ribel is currently a Systems Analyst with Adroit Systems, Inc. in Alexandria, Virginia.  He is a 
Communications and Data Systems officer in the Marine Corps Reserve, and most recently, served on active duty as 
a C4I Systems Project Officer in the C4ISR Branch of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.  His previous 
billets include Marine Communications Detachment Officer-in-Charge and Technical Control Officer on an LHD 
class ship and S-6/Communications Platoon Commander at a Tank Battalion.  His interests include all aspects of 
technology and their application to business, government, and military practices and organizations. 
Col. Robert E. Schmidle 
Commanding Officer 
Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 
Colonel Schmidle is a native of Newtown, Connecticut.  He graduated from Drew University in 1975 with a B.A. 
degree in History. He is a Distinguished Graduate of both the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1992, and 
the Marine Corps War College, 1996. 
Colonel Schmidle’s command positions include Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 and 
Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115.  Currently, he is the Commanding Officer of the 
Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (Experimental) of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. 
His other assignments include Operations Officer and Air Officer of 1st Battalion 9th Marines; Maintenance Officer, 
Operations Officer and Executive Officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 333; Operations Officer and Executive 
Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 31; and, Second in Command of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(Experimental). Colonel Schmidle has also served as a facility advisor at the Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College. 
His personal awards include the Distinguished Flying Cross with Combat ‘V”, Meritorious Service Medal, Air 
Medal with numeral 6, and the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one gold star in lieu of second 
award. 
Colonel Schmidle is married to the former Pamela Jutkus of Westfield, MA.  They have two sons, Nicholas and 
Christian. 
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Virginia Wiggins 
Study Director 
Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center 
Ms. Virginia Wiggins is a Study Director for the Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center.  She has experience in both 
private industry and DoD.  She began her career as an RF design engineer with Boeing Aerospace, focusing on 
missile system design, testing, and integration.  In the course of her work in private industry, she dealt with both Air 
and Land missile systems such as Patriot, HAWK, Pershing, Army TACMS, and the Multiple Launch Rocket 
System.  After 10 years of experience in design and systems integration, she joined the DoD in the Software 
Engineering Directorate of the US Army Missile Command, in Huntsville, Alabama.  There, she specialized in Air 
Defense Command and Control hardware and software integration.  In early 1991, she was detailed to Saudi Arabia, 
where she headed a joint team of military and civilian personnel in integrating the Patriot system into the Royal 
Saudi Air Defense Forces.  Subsequent to this assignment, she moved to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, 
where she headed a joint team developing operational and technical architectures for air and missile defense. 
In 1997, she joined the Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center.  She has completed two major studies successfully, 
one focused on evaluating the military utility of SATCOM and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the role of 
communications relay platforms.  Futhermore, she completed a Logistics Information Assurance study for the Joint 
Theater Distribution System and plans to brief the results of this latest effort during the workshop. 
Steve York 
Intelligence Operations Specialist 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI) 
Steve York joined the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in 1998 as a senior professional 
support staffer, filling the position of an Intelligence Operations Specialist.  He manages the FBI’s Key Asset 
Initiative, a new National Security program implemented under Presidential Decision Directive 63.  Under this 
effort, FBI Headquarters and each of the 56 field offices are working with the owners and operators of business 
enterprises and utilities as well as officials responsible for public safety to ensure the ability of those entities to 
reliably deliver essential services in the face of a cyber attack that has either national, regional, or local implications. 
Prior to joining the FBI’s NIPC, from 1997 through 1998, Mr. York served as a senior policy analyst for the 
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP).  In 1996, Mr. York retired after nearly 25 
years of active duty with the US Marine Corps, where as a Marine aviator he served with distinction. He led and 
commanded Marines in the Fleet Marine Force and served on the Joint Staff during the tenure of General Colin 
Powell.  Mr. York is no stranger to the West Coast, having served two tours at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, 
flying EA-6B Prowler aircraft out of the upper Puget Sound airfield. 
Mr. York’s wife, Debra, DePauw ’74, is the Director of recruiting for the Navy Federal Credit Union.  The Yorks 
have two daughters.  The eldest, Vanessa, a ’99 Virginia Tech grad, presently works for the American Bankruptcy 
Institute in Alexandria VA. The youngest, Alexis, is successfully finishing her freshman year at the University of 
Oregon. 
In addition, Mr. York graduated from Wabash College in 1972, the Naval War College, and holds several graduate 
degrees, most notably a Masters degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.  Finally, he earned a 
Masters degree in Education and is certified to teach in the states of Virginia and Washington. 
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The HUMAN-COMPUTER PARTNERSHIP 
Ronald A. DeMarco, Ph.D.
 

Associate Technical Director, ONR
 

Good morning, and thank you for inviting me to this workshop.  Being a chemist, trying to 
define a “human-computer partnership” so I would know what to talk about, was a challenge.  So 
I went to our experts for guidance.  I spoke to our Human Systems folks and well, I had the 
impression that computers are tools for humans.  You don’t really “partner” with tools.  We have 
to ‘harness their power’ and ensure that they serve us.  I spoke with our computer people to see 
their perspective, and walked away with the impression that computers are more like an 
extension of us; having the ability to do things we can’t do but, much more along the lines of 
being part of the team rather than apart from the team. 
I’m still not sure I understand the “partnership”.  What I’d like to do is to provide you with an 
S&T perspective of my sense of how I see humans and computers working and with a focus on 
the DD-21, then look at some specifics relating to one of our “Future Naval Capabilities”, 
Decision Support Systems.  I think it’s the easiest way to see how we have “partnered” with the 
computer and finish-up with some myths and issues we still have to be concerned with during 
this partnership. 
First of all, how the Navy “partners”, “interacts” or uses computers and the how naval personnel 
relate to their computers is crucial to making tomorrow’s sailors and marines tactically smarter 
than any future enemy will be.  As Secretary of the Navy, Richard Danzig has said…”We need 
21st century platforms doing 21st century things.”  The ability of computers to enable information 
technology and decision aids to accomplish that goal is crucial. 
As I see the future mission for the Naval Forces, it will focus on influencing events near the 
shore rather than in the open sea.  We will be operating under a concept that we call “Network 
Centric Warfare”.   Simply, from a platform perspective that means that platforms will serve as 
critical nodes in a larger network composed of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
assets, and weapon delivery systems.  Every operator serving within the network will have 
access to the same critical information at the same time to maximize their situational awareness. 
To bring this goal about, the Navy plans to equip its people and its platforms with the tools, 
technologies and knowledge needed to fight and win in the 21st century. 
The Navy’s next-generation destroyer, the DD-21, is being designed from the very beginning 
with the human—computer relationship in mind.  There is the opportunity for this land-attack 
destroyer to revolutionize many aspects of going to sea.  Technologies that can be available for 
the DD-21 include: 
Electric Drive
 

Integrated Power Systems
 

Extended Range Guided Munitions to support the Marine Corps
 

Multifunctional radar tailored for the littoral areas
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Armed helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles
 

Organic mine-avoidance systems to detect and disarm undersea mines
 

An unprecedented degree of stealth technology for ships, and
 

A fully distributed total ship computing architecture
 

Many of these advances are enabled through computers and computer technologies. 
The DD-21 will also be highly automated.  The degree of automation on the DD-21 means the 
ship will be operated by crew of 95 sailors instead of hundreds.  A smaller crew will reduce 
operating costs and put fewer men and women in harm’s way; but, there is a trade-off.   Yes, the 
crew will be technically and tactically proficient, have a higher degree of computer literacy and 
be skilled in all disciplines of surface warfare.  But, each crewmember will direct more tasks and 
oversee a wider range of ship systems. We must ensure that the computer and information 
systems aboard this ship serve our sailors; not frustrate, confuse or intimidate them, and 
certainly, not fail them. 
Fewer operators controlling complex systems mean an increase in the decision-making demands 
on those operators, particularly in crisis situations.  Therefore, we must take full advantage of 
human perceptual and cognitive capabilities.  Computer systems must also allow integration of 
information from multiple sources. 
In the past, technical systems often were developed with little regard for the humans who would 
operate and maintain the systems.  The Naval Forces of the 21st century cannot afford to do that. 
It would leave us technologically vulnerable and have a significant impact on our ability to 
recruit, train and retain quality people in a very competitive market.  The desire to save costs and 
take advantage of the latest automation and information technologies means we must rethink our 
approach to the way our warfighters work, live and fight in tomorrow’s world. 
At ONR, we are supporting a number of system-interaction technologies.  They are intended to: 
Relieve operators from monotonous tasks such as monitoring radar screens, which leave 
them unfocused and inattentive 
Focus operators attention on pertinent displays and information 
Reduce the need for operators to remember how to operate systems 
The DD-21 program will improve the way the Navy does its business.  It will take full advantage 
of both the Navy’s scientific community and private industry.  This streamlined approach will 
maximize our innovation and design flexibility and lower costs through the use of commercial 
off the shelf products and open-systems architectures.  It will also allow the Navy-industry 
partnership to treat the human operator as an integral part of the design solution, which is 
essential to our success. 
So, in the development of the DD-21; our partnership, interaction or dependence on computers 
will provide us with the ability to work smarter, have fewer people doing the all the jobs and 
save a considerable amount of resources in the process. 
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One question is, how will computers help us work smarter; I think the Decision Support Systems 
Future Naval Capability provides an example of that.  Two cornerstones of the concept of 
Network Centric Warfare are embodied in our Future Naval Capabilities, Information 
Distribution, which is concerned primarily with connectivity issues, and Decision Support 
Systems.  I’d like to focus on Decision Support Systems. 
The overall goal of the Decision Support Systems FNC is to enable naval knowledge superiority. 
To do that we must support the warfighter through: 
Rapid accurate and common situational understanding in command and combat systems 
Increased speed of command…getting inside the enemy’s cycle of decision and 
execution 
Capability of self-synchronization, and 
Provide dynamic and distributed planning and battle management 
To achieve this we must provide our naval forces with a collectively shared tactical and 
operational picture and the ability for geographically distributed commanders to collaborate in 
decision making in a rapid and sustainable manner.  Does industry need automated decision 
support?  Yes, but the military requires rapid, effective real-time decision-making; industry does 
not. Industry can make corporate decisions now, or this afternoon or tomorrow or next 
week…warfighters do not have the luxury of “time”. 
The DSS FNC identified and prioritized enabling capabilities to achieve their objective.  The two 
efforts that are funded in the FNC process are: 
Common Consistent Knowledge, and 
Distributed, Collaborative Planning and Rehearsal 
Common Consistent Knowledge and Distributed Collaborative Planning and Rehearsal are 
critical enablers of Network Centric Warfare.  They provide the technologies to develop and 
maintain the Common Picture and to plan and operate across all echelons consistent with the 
commander’s intent. Let’s look at those efforts and some of the technology that we will need to 
enable them. 
Common Consistent Knowledge: 
The goal is to enable geographically distributed forces to generate a timely common 
picture.  Automation will be used to integrate data from many low-level sources into 
comprehensive information that decision-makers can use effectively. Key to this is the ability to 
visually present information that fosters instantaneous understanding…a picture is worth a 
thousand words. Capabilities that will be required include: 
The ability to exploit, manage and integrate complex information 
Development of a user-tailored picture…we cannot assume that a given picture is the best 
picture for everyone 
Situation-at-a-glance awareness 
Natural, intuitive HCI and 
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Cross-echelon commonality 
Supporting technologies that must be developed and integrated to accomplish these efforts 
include: 
Intelligent software agents for searching, retrieval, filtering, data fusion and interpretation 
Data-mining for large heterogeneous databases 
Image exploitation and manipulation 
Language translation 
HCI:  3-D graphics, mobile/wearable devices, virtual / augmented reality, high resolution 
modular displays, speech and gesture recognition
 

Human performance monitoring for workload management
 

As you can see, our partnership or interaction with, or our use of the computer will be very 
significant if we expect to provide the warfighter with the benefits of common tactical picture. 
The second Enabling Capability is Distributed, Collaborative Planning and Rehearsal and it has a 
goal of moving knowledge and expertise, not people…significantly cutting time and cost.  The 
intent of this effort is to have geographically distributed naval forces convey intent and plans that 
foster speed of command. 
Capabilities that will be required include: 
Coordinated planning across all geographically distributed echelons and security enclaves 
Intuitive management of collaboration services 
Device and connectivity-independent collaboration 
Simulation support for rapid planning 
Ability to assess and rehearse plans 
The supporting technologies that we must develop and integrate for this effort will include: 
Standards-based middle-ware for initiating, managing and reporting synchronous, 
asynchronous, heterogeneous, distributed collaborative work sessions 
Device interaction standardization / composeable architectures 
Information tagging 
Virtual environments 
Audio interaction – speaker recognition, 3-D audio, etc 
Groupware for rapid planning during virtual conferences 
Active templates for plan development, simulation and assessment 
Fast, large-scale, high fidelity synthetic semi-autonomous forces in simulated littoral 
environments...includes fast-time dynamic what-if projections
 

Cognitive models decision making, including opposing-force models
 

Metrics for assessing plan quality, and
 

Influence nets / executable models
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Again, the strong need for the computer’s ability to do what we cannot so that we benefit.  And 
in this case, the very strong coupling of how we must interact with the products of the computer 
to reap those benefits. 
In the DSS example, I think you can see the extent to which computers will enable the 21st 
century warfighter. 
I’m not sure I’ve been able to define the human-computer partnership for you…or for myself.  Is 
it a real partnership with benefits accrued by two consenting entities, so to speak, or is it a 
relationship between a tool and a master craftsman?  Yes, we program the computer to do the 
things we want; but it exceeds our ability to do those things.  It can gather data and provide us 
with knowledge from that data.  Tools can’t do that. 
In closing, IBM Chairman, Thomas Watson was quoted as saying, “ I think there is a world 
market for maybe five computers.”  We all know that prediction didn’t pan-out very well!   But, 
two other myths have dogged computers over the years: they take away jobs and they eliminate 
paper. The first myth has some truth to it.  Yes, computers have generated new jobs in new 
industries; but jobs have been lost. But, is that bad?   Banks could stay open all day and night 
and hire more people…or we can use ATM machines.  Similarly, computers have been 
responsible for eliminating a number of repetitive, tedious chores…and that’s good.  People are 
too important to waste their abilities with repetitive and tedious jobs.  We must enlist the 
capabilities of computers to improve the quality of life for our Naval Forces. 
The second prediction that computers will eliminate paper has not proven to be as easy to find 
agreement.  A recent ONR-supported survey found that the best medium for information 
manuals is still a book…not a floppy disk or a CD or a talking paper clip…a book is still the 
fastest and easiest way for an operator to lookup something. 
So, it’s a partnership or relationship that we must continue to develop and improve.  One thing is 
certain, there is no going back.  There is much we still have to work on and at times it seems as 
though it’s a bit tenuous…either we’re not quite willing to either ‘trust’ completely, or we’re not 
willing to give-up old habits.  How many of you still print-out email?  It isn’t email, or electronic 
mail, once you print it out…it’s a letter or memo or whatever.  And how many of you use paper 
copies for your briefing notes…or speeches. 
Thank you! 
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James A. Laswell (Col. USMC Ret.) 
Senior Analyst GAMA Corporation 
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What Skills Are We Developing? 
• Acceptance of Role as Decisionmaker 
• Decisiveness 
• Communication skills 
• Mission Analysis 
• Situation recognition 
• Acceptance of the ambiguity 
How to Measure Success? 
• Improved Scores  -- Self Assessment 
• Supervisor’s Evaluation  -- Performance! 
• 1/5 “Actions on the Objective at CAX” 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 
SA Day1 
SA Day2 
Cmd 1 
Cmd 2 
Coord 1 
Coord 2 
10 
Situation Awareness 
• Typical Situations 
• Doctrinal Keys 
• Mission Specifics 
• Patterns 
• TTPs 
• Recognize and 
react! 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
S  ituation Aware  ne s s  
Excellent  Ready Not Ready 
Direction to Subordinates 
• Control 
• Clear verbal orders 
• Confidence 
• Unit SOPs 
• Self-confidence 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
1 0  
Command 
11 
External Coordination 
• Higher Echelons 
• Lateral Echelons 
• Comm Procedures 
• Reporting 
• Unit SOPs 
• Self-confidence 0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10  
Coordinatio n  
Combat Decision Range Evaluations 
(n= 47, E-3 thru E-5) 
Average CDR use across all infantry regiments: 40 hours/month 
Recommend CDR Marine-Corps-wide? 
No 
(“Spend all the time in the field”) 
Improves Decisionmaking? 
Strongly 
Strongly 
(All) 
Improves Tactics? 
Somewhat 
Improves Land Navigation? 
No 
Strongly Strongly 
Somewhat 
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Who Else Improves? 
• Small Unit Leaders 
• Facilitators 
• Unit Leaders: 
– Assignment screening tool 
– Training level assessment 
– SOP and TTP review 
Key Factors for Success
 

For the Unit: For the Individual: 
• Focus on unit needs 
•	 Develop leaders 
•	 Reinforce TTPs 
•	 Improve comm skills 
•	 Unit wide standard 
•	 Garrison Tool 
•	 Take it anywhere 
•	 Train as a unit 
•	 Challenged/Interesting 
•	 Relevant 
•	 Carryover into unit 
SOPs 
•	 Recognition (debrief) 
•	 “Horns of a Dilemma” 
13 
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The Present and Future Role of Information Security,
 

Infrastructure Assurance Issues, and
 

The FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center
 

Presented May 2, 2000 by IOS Steve York 
Disclaimer: This paper contains the opinions solely of its author and does not represent the 
views of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Department of Justice. 
Introduction 
More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, US national security policy-making elites and 
the American public, now find themselves inexorably allied together in the face of a new 
challenge to our much envied way of life.  Indeed, it is a conundrum of our own creation. For 
while we breathed a collective sigh of relief as the specter of nuclear annihilation by the former 
Soviet Union quickly receded and we began to anticipate a well-deserved, peace dividend, the 
same engine of efficiency; namely, American business and its associated entrepreneurial spirit 
that drove the fatal stake into the heart of the central planning systems of Lenin-Stalinist 
communism, was unwittingly presenting us with a societal challenge perhaps as great as either 
the American Revolution or the Civil War were to our forefathers.  By expeditiously “wiring” 
our intellectual and business centers of gravity during the late 80s and throughout 90s, we were 
also surreptitiously sowing the seeds of widespread, digitally based vulnerabilities in the more 
physical components of our nation’s infrastructures. 
Arguably, we must come to grips with at least three issues.  First, how we will defend the 
critical infrastructures that undergird our Nation against those who would seek to thwart the 
attainment of our foreign policy goals by possibly placing key components of those 
infrastructures at risk?   Second, how will we promote a healthy but necessary tension between 
the domestic role of government to serve or protect its citizens and the corresponding 
responsibility of the private sector to create or maintain an efficient marketplace of goods and 
services; when in either case the aforementioned governmental services and protection roles or 
marketplace maintenance functions are increasingly derived from information systems? Thirdly, 
how will we learn to live with the dizzying pace of technology on our lives which is becoming 
daily more evident. I submit that grappling with these three issues collectively will prove to be 
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no less difficult than fashioning either the will to drive what was then the most powerful army 
from our shores or, some 80 years later, to keep that same young Nation unified. 
I believe that any reasoned, national debate on how to deal with the other, darker side of the 
information revolution would yield at least three courses of action.  First, the role of secure and 
reliable information and information systems will grow in importance and it will prove to be a 
multi-level, never-ending task.  Second, an awareness of infrastructure assurance issues will 
demand the creation of both a science-based and public policy communities that will position the 
Nation, at all levels of government, to better deal with the vulnerabilities accompanying the 
benefits of a “wired” world.  And finally, multi-disciplinarian organizations like the NIPC will 
emerge as that bridge between domestic and oversees national security issues. 
Information Security - -What is It? : Today and Tomorrow 
My own definition of information security, or at least the one that we at the NIPC are attempting 
to impart to the agents today who attend training on the FBI’s Key Asset Initiative and InfraGard 
program, as well as those receiving more technical instruction on widely-used information 
systems operations and security by the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia, has three 
fundamental elements. 
First, is a fairly high-level, operational understanding of how a information systems operates 
when properly configured and therefore an understanding of the limitations of the security 
features built into the system by its designer.  Secondly, we approach information security as a 
state of mind.  By that I mean, what are the internal processes the system administrator attempts 
to impose on system users with the concurrence of the owner of that information system 
(password utilization and other standard housekeeping protocols) as well as assessing the 
maturity of the risk assessment or management plan and any accompanying business 
recovery/crisis management plan. As we have all learned from the Y2K experience, 
implementing security features, which may or may not slow down business processes in the long 
run, are worth their weight in gold.  Further, possessing a business recovery plan with which all 
system users are familiar enables the organization to exude confidence and more than likely ride 
out a “bad hair day” with respect to information systems nonavailability. The final element is an 
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organization-wide appreciation for the integrity and reliability of the data itself. If you want the 
computing power of these machines to aid you in your decision making process, then numbers or 
“facts” that go into the equation must be inviolate.  Based on the growing number of reports now 
appearing in the mainstream media, testosterone-powered teenagers, disgruntled employees, 
hacktivists, criminals, terrorists, and nation-states can all anticipate the key features revealed to 
the public likely to accompany any real impact brought about by a successful denial or disruption 
of information-dependent infrastructures such as utilities, transportation, or financial institutions. 
Even more insidious, and thankfully correspondingly more difficult to set into motion, is the 
deliberate corruption or manipulation of data in carefully conceived ways so as to possibly 
manage the perception of decision makers wrestling with complex, fast-moving events. That 
America should become the targets of such skillful strategies ought not to surprise us.  We are 
often accused of attempting to management the perception of the designated rogue nation 
decision-makers, why shouldn’t someone attempt to turn the tables on us? As a brief aside, a 
former member of the media who is a frequent speaker at the National Defense University on the 
topic of information operations and is far more familiar with this issue than I, alleges that the FBI 
still has on its books a World War II-era mission of being that federal department or agency 
responsible for countering propaganda aimed at the American  public from within our shores.  If 
true, what are the implications today for the Bureau of this long-forgotten mission? 
In a more relevant context, I assume that many at this conference are all too familiar with the 
implications of the work by the two mid-grade officers attending the PRC Army War College 
made recently available over the Internet.  Moreover, and with full acknowledgment of how 
cynical this observation may sound; do we not live in the nation that gave the world the “content 
merchants and spin doctors” of Madison Avenue fame?  Elements of our own business world 
arguably practice a form of perception management on the American consuming public daily. 
Accordingly, I doubt that we any longer hold a monopoly on actions that can be taken to breech 
the integrity and reliability of data reposing within presumptive secure information systems. 
How many of these three elements - - knowledge of information systems operation, security seen 
as a state of mind, and an appreciation for data integrity and reliability - - will carry over into any 
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future discussion of information security? I’ll play it safe and say all three will exist in some 
form or another. But from what I can learn about information systems security, the greatest 
strides will likely be made in incorporating security features into product design and not adding 
them on as an afterthought. My source for this educated guess is having been afforded the 
opportunity to attend two recent gatherings of the Association of Computing Machines or ACM. 
This is the oldest association to have focused on computer operations and security issues. The 
sense of the majority of the members of this association appears to be that enhanced built-in 
security features is what US business will demand and be willing to settle for nothing less.  The 
challenge will be, as I understand it, can industry in fact deliver the desired product and at an 
affordable price? 
Further, I suspect that employees will be steadily encouraged, even compelled upon pain of job 
loss, to comply with increasingly strict, computer user security policies in much the same way 
that other actions once viewed as intrusive but are now seen as mundane.  I am referring to seat 
belts, auto theft prevention devices, and annual safety inspections, three initiatives that are now a 
fact of life when they weren’t a decade or so ago.   Finally, the requirement for data integrity and 
reliability will remain immutable, specifically if the viability of the “new economy” rests on the 
efficiencies that e-commerce and business-to-business technologies are just now beginning to 
deliver. 
Infrastructure Assurance - - not Protection - - is “the issue” 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 requires the federal government, regardless of who sits in the 
Oval Office, to have in place an initial operating capability, or IOC by May 2003 that will enable 
the continued operation of “minimum essential” components within the eight identified 
infrastructure sectors.  The PDD charges the entire executive branch of the federal government to 
meet this objective and asks the private sector to assist.  The infrastructure sectors include just 
about everything that daily effects our lives except the production of food, means to relax or 
conduct some sort of recreational activity, and the capacity to practice our religious inclinations, 
if we chose to do so.  The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
intentionally declined to include these three activities or pursuits as a part of its issues, findings, 
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and recommendations and so, those of us at the Center do not focus on any matter related to 
these three issues. 
The Commission was also hamstrung by the lack of time to fully explore the concept of risk 
assessment and management strategies as they might pertain to infrastructure operations.  This 
was a crucial shortcoming because exploration of risk assessment and management underlies 
how the American private sector views business operations in general and is also how an 
authority, no less accomplished than the National Security Agency, views the science of 
protecting sensitive, high priority information systems from compromise. Both business and 
information security organizations accept that they cannot “zero out” risk, since the nature of the 
environment in which they operate is filled with unknowables and complexities associated with 
tightly coupled systems (i) (Perrow 1999) that can yield unintended consequences such as lost 
business opportunities or compromised information. 
This world is unlike that of the traditional national security community which calculates threats 
more than focusing on risk levels, and seeks to protect or defend against all possibilities because 
the viability of the state may be at issue rather than guaranteeing or assurance certain core 
business operations while letting other business lines expire or be taken over by more efficient 
means of production.  Both worlds want to survive, but can measure success by different 
yardsticks.  One prefers to defend by eliminating risk through the application of overwhelming 
force while the other is often content to prevail by retaining market share while always 
remaining open to new markets pursuits, should the risk prove to be measurable and acceptable. 
Hence, until we know a lot more about how the nation’s infrastructures which is generally owned 
and operated by businessmen are truly interdependent, we have a problem that is best addressed 
by thinking in terms of assurance and risk management. 
However, I do not work at the National Infrastructure Assurance Center.  While I have no way of 
knowing, I suspect the term “Protection” was likely carefully added to the Center’s title to instill 
confidence regarding a security matter we’re only beginning to understand. It probably also 
reflects the fact that some level of protection may be possible because we do possess certain 
technological tools which we prefer not to discuss openly that could act as a deterrent to an 
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imprudent criminal organization, select terrorist groups, and more than likely, many if not all 
modern nation-states who view us as “friendly competitors” or likely obstacles their own 
ambitions.  For now, I can live with the title the Center bears as long as we as a nation do not 
read too much into exactly what the term “Protection” really means. We have much work ahead 
of us in order to avoid being be lulled into a false sense of security. 
The FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) 
When the President issued PDD 63, very few departments or agencies had thought ahead to 
preposition either programmatic resources or personnel to begin work on infrastructure assurance 
issues. For most of the federal government, the actions required by PDD 63 fell o them much 
like an unfunded mandate. Even today, many budgets are woefully underfunded for the task at 
hand and offices within these department and agencies remain staffed at skeletal levels. The 
Department of Defense (to include the National Security Agency), the CIA, and the FBI were the 
only federal entities with a gameplan and money already in hand when the PDD 63 clock started 
ticking its countdown to the aforementioned May 2003 IOC target date.  Unfortunately, a little 
more than a year after the NIPC was carved out of FBI Headquarters, preparation for Y2K or the 
Millennium Rollover began, an event which temporarily displaced many initiatives within the 
NIPC as it did to most information technology-related activities across the US private and public 
sectors. 
The NIPC was and is still envisioned by the Attorney General and the FBI to become a truly 
joint or interagency initiative, whose likes have not been seen before at the FBI. Generally 
speaking, interagency centers have a spotty track record inside the Beltway.  Perhaps the most 
successful is the Counterterrorism Center at the CIA while lesser success stories are embodied in 
the Nonproliferation Center, also at the CIA and the National Defense Preparedness Office, at 
the Bureau, a recent outgrowth of the various manifestations of the Nunn-Lugar Act. None of 
the above have truly attempted to make management a shared function, by which I mean that 
either the head or deputy of each unit within the NIPC is an FBI supervisory special agent or 
senior support specialist while the corresponding billet within each unit is filled by a detailee 
from another government agency. 
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Provisions exist for staffing by representatives of the private sector or experts from the varying 
infrastructure sectors but to date these vacancies remain as final details are being resolved that 
did serve as a bar to civilian access to law enforcement sensitive material that resides in the 
Center.  Such private sector expertise is critically needed for its engineering analytic capabilities 
and pinpoint contacts within industry which can then in turn be married up with ongoing 
intelligence analytic capabilities which the Bureau, as a member of the intelligence community, 
can adequately provide on its own.  In fact, a recent reorganization within the FBI is intended to 
fuse all intelligence activities within the Bureau, breaking down wherever possible those 
stovepipes that bar speedy and efficient processing of all source data. The Bureau has realized 
that in the age where crime can now move at the speed of light, different ways of doing business 
must be pursued. 
The organizational chart provided herein (Figure 1) depicts the investigatory, analytical, and 
outreach branches of the NIPC.  A third of the billets are for other government agency detailees. 
A second third of the positions, though now FBI employees like myself, were hired as 
professional support staff who bring a distinctly, non-law enforcement but nonetheless 
experienced national security perspective to the emerging problem of infrastructure assurance. 
The final third of the personnel working within the NIPC is comprised of seasoned FBI special 
agents. The bottomline here is that two thirds of the NIPC complement brings a fresh, “why not 
try this” approach to a thorny problem that has clear law enforcement implications but also 
requires innovative thought in the absence of hard data to the contrary. 
Further innovations for the FBI within the NIPC lie in four areas (Figure 2).  They are as 
follows: a fully interactive website; a law enforcement sector services assurance plan; InfraGard, 
a virtual private network focused on information security issues provided to infrastructure 
owners and operators by the Bureau; and the only truly bottoms-up, approach to mapping all of 
the Nation’s “minimum essential infrastructure” as called for by PDD 63, known within the 
Bureau as the Key Asset Initiative. 
Of particular interest to this conference is the fact that by the end of 2000, the Key Asset 
Initiative will have fielded the Bureau’s first geographic information system at all 56 division 
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offices (Figure 3).  When paired with the already deployed Key Asset Initiative software, special 
agents will be able to gain local and some national-level “situational awareness” regarding the 
identification and characterization of key assets with which they are required to develop long-
standing relationships.  They can then begin to implement the training they’ve received on 
applying basic risk assessment and management techniques in concert with local infrastructure 
owners and operators.  Crisis response plans can be jointly developed by the agent and key asset 
management that boosts the confidence of all concerned regarding the key asset’s ability to 
quickly recover from a cyber-based interruption in its key business operations (Figure 4). 
Finally, law enforcement can begin to move from a traditionally reactive role to a more proactive 
posture based on a greater situational awareness of the complex web of infrastructure 
interdependencies found in the community the agent serves and indeed lives with his family. 
Summary 
The Bureau, through the NIPC, has taken aggressive action in order to come to grips with the 
predominant national security issue certain to confront our Nation in the 21st century. 
Information-based technology and the security issues that arise from an absence of data integrity 
and reliability are the source of this threat to our way of life and standard of living.  Oddly 
enough, information-based technology can also provide us with a way to manage the risks 
associated with this threat.  It is a double-edged sword that those interested in pushing the 
exploration of national security, decision-support initiatives must wield skillfully and without 
hesitation. 
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Computer Investigations Training & Continuing Education 
Unit Unit 
Analysis & Information Sharing 
Unit 
Special Technologies Application Outreach & Field Support 
Unit Unit 
Watch & Warning 
Unit 
Cyber Emergency Support Strategy & Policy
Team 134 planned Unit 
Figure 1 
FBI and NIPC Initiatives 
• NIPC Website 
• Law Enforcement sector (PDD 63) 
• InfraGard 
• “key asset” program for 21st century 
Figure 2 23 
Key Asset Initiative
 

Where Are We Going?
 

Locate Key Assets 
Key Asset 
Chicago 
Detroit 
Indianapolis 
Key Asset 
Chicago 
Detroit 
Indianapolis 
Cleveland 
Begin Building
 National Picture 
Figure 3 
New KAI-related Training for Field Agents 
After a 1st order designation of “what’s critical/what’s not” 
Internal Disaster Recovery Theory & Practical Application 
Strategies for Businesses Course 
• Understanding “risk models” • General network vulnerability theory 
– model attributes • General network susceptibility to specific 
– risk categories threats 
– risk metrics – direct or indirect system effects 
– data gathering • “rough” quantification of disruption’s impact 
– model results interpretation on respective stakeholders 
Goal:  See the problem thru the – dependency issues within/across 
eyes of a businessman infrastructure sectors 
• Recovery option development theory 
Goal: See the problem thru the eyes of 
attacker/defender 
Infrastructure Interactive Exercise 
• Enable agents to conduct 4 hour simulation 
Figure 4 
Goal:  Explore issues and builds trust 24 
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John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
MCWL Mission
 

•	 Serve as the focal point for refinements of future 
warfighting capabilities 
•	 Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to 
enhance future warfighting capabilities 
•	 Evaluate advanced technologies and transition 
those that create or enhance future warfighting 
capabilities into the Marine Corps Combat 
Development System 
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
MCWL Spares No Expense in Testing it’s End User Terminals 
Experimentation Process 
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John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
MCWL Innovation and
 

Experimentation Process
 

Critical 
Step 
Complete
 DOTES 
Package 
(Doc, Org, T&E, 
Eqp, & Spt) 
Exp 
Plans 
Feedback 
War Mature Future EX 
Game Plans Ops Plan 
Results
Current 
Ops 
Analysis 
Report 
Combat 
Development 
System 
Synthesis 
X Files 
Urban 
Warfare 
Marine Corps Concepts 
Concepts Div, MCCDC 
Joint Concepts J9, 
Joint Forces Command 
Naval Concepts, MBC 
Experimental 
Design 
Experimentation Transition 
Coalition Warrior / Capable Warrior Phase II Capable Warrior Phase I Urban Warrior 
2001-Out Project Metropolis 1998-1999 
1999-2000 (DOTES) 
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Urban Warrior 
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John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Urban Warrior Products 
Solving Today’s Problems 
Military Operations on 
Urbanized Terrain 
(MOUT) 
Urban 
Patrolling 
USMC Warfighting Lab 
U.S. Marine Corps 
Military Operations on 
Urbanized Terrain 
(MOUT) 
Security 
Operations 
USMC Warfighting Lab 
U.S. Marine CorpsAssessment 
Humanitarian 
and Disaster 
Relief 
USMC Warfighting Lab 
U.S. Marine Corps 
Military Operations on 
Urbanized Terrain 
(MOUT) 
Urban 
Sustainability 
USMC Warfighting Lab 
U.S. Marine Corps 
X-Files: Lessons 
Learned 
Yodaville (Urban CAS Range) 
Combat Decision 
Range (CDR) 
Night Vision Lab 
IMMACCS 
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Urban Warrior Products 
Solving Today’s Problems 
Intra Squad Radio 
Urban Camouflage 
UniformPortable ROWPU 
Dragon Drone 
GOSSIP 
Rav, Reza. 
Ground Observation SpecialVIPER PITS Interim Fast Attack Vehicle 
Support Intel Prgm (GOSSIP) (IFAV) 
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John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Urban Warrior Products 
Solving Today’s Problems 
Platoon 
Commander’s UAV 
“Dragon Eye” 
Dragon Warrior 
Hand Held GPS 
Multi-Lingual 
Interview 
System (MIS) 
EUT Touch Pad 
Night Scope 
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Combat Decision Range 
(CDR) 
• Extremely successful training means 
• Universally hailed by commanders and 
trainees as a desirable product 
• 27% improvement in readiness 
» Train NCO’s in Combat 
Decision Making and 
Leadership 
» For Use by Every Infantry 
Regiment in the Marine Corps 
» Operational March 1999 
» Computer Based Training 
System 
» Uses 12 Major Scenarios 
from peace keeping to combat 
» More decisions in one 
scenario than a week in the 
field 
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John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Aviation LTA 
May – June 1999 
Yodaville 
• Capability: 
– Fully instrumented facility 
– Coverage down to 3,000ft AGL 
– Expanding coverage to deck in FY00 
– “No Drop” bomb scoring 
– 184 scorable aim points 
– Aim points monitored by video 
cameras 
• Description: 
– Urban aviation range in Yuma, AZ 
– Conceived by MAWTS-1 
– Funded by MCWL 
– Assess effectiveness of CAS TTP’s 
– 178 buildings, 22 streets, 31 vehicles, 
and 120 personnel targets 
– 5 hardened FAC OP’s around complex 
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Project Metropolis 
•	 Objectives: 
–	 Develop a comprehensive 
urban warfighting Program of 
Instruction (POI) 
–	 Develop TT&Ps to enable 
Marines to fight and win in 
MOUT with reduced 
casualties 
–	 Recommend improvements to 
existing and future MOUT 
training facilities 
–	 Evaluate selected enabling 
technologies that enhance 
small unit combined arms 
capabilities 
Jun’99 - Jun’00 
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John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt Project Tun Tavern
Technology Support for the 
Recruiting-Sub-Station 
•	 Focus is on providing assistance to 
the Marine Recruiter and the RSS 
NCOIC by providing advanced 
information technologies and 
software 
•	 The experiment will assess if these 
technologies can speed up contract 
time, reduce administrative time, 
access higher quality applicants, 
and produce a better quality of life 
for the Recruiter 
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Project Atlanta 
•	 New TTPs and technologies dealing with 
chemical and biological incidents in 
homeland defense and foreign conflicts 
•	 The experiments will focus on: 
–	 Marine Corps emergency managers 
–	 Interoperability with civilians and access
 
to technology
 
•	 Southern Response Experiment 
–	 A partnership between MCWL and
 
Georgia Tech Research Institute
 
–	 Focus on advanced TTPs for first
 
responders and emergency managers
 
–	 Demonstrate countering potential
 
chemical / biological threats to the
 

Southeastern United States
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John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Capable Warrior 
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
29 Palms 
Camp Pendleton 
San Diego 
Capable Warrior Hypothesis 
• If we can apply a combination 
of innovative concepts and 
improvements in technology to 
four key areas: 
– Command and Control 
– Sea based fires 
– Sea based logistics 
– Mine Counter Measures 
• Then, we can begin to realize 
the vision of Operational 
Maneuver from the Sea as the 
naval contribution to the JV 
2010 Concept of Dominant 
Maneuver 
Quantico 
Fort Polk 
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LOE 6 
• RSTA Phase 
– Integrate sensors 
into IMMACCS to 
support rapid 
operations 
LTA 
24-28 Jan 
RSTA Phase 
2-3 Mar 
XCAX Phase 
15-16 Mar 
Assess an experimental expeditionary C4ISR system that 
enables a MAGTF to conduct Naval combined arms live fire 
• XCAX Phase 
– Conduct collaborative 
planning and execution in 
combined arms 
operations using 
Common Tactical Picture 
(CTP) 
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt 
Advanced Close Air Support System 
Limited Technical Assessment 
31 May-8 June 2000 
MCAS Yuma, AZ 
Global Positioning 
System (GPS) 
Automatic Target 
Handoff System (ATHS) 
Digital Communications 
FAC Equipment 
Planning Tools
Digital Maps/Elevation 
Tactical Overlays 
Real Time Aircraft Tracking 
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John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt
Millennium Dragon
September 2000
MCWL will conduct an
experiment of STOM
operations with a C4I
system that integrates
national assets, supports
integration of long range
fires with long range
maneuver, and improves
decisionmaking in order to
develop STOM Force
TTTPs for a MAGTF in a
joint environment.
Mission
 PortArthur
Little Rock
Island
VICTORIA
Tulsa
Ouachita
Mtns
Texarkana
Shreveport
CORTINA
Leesville
 
Tuscaloosa
PDRA
Mobile
Pascagoula
Beaumont
Baton Rouge New Orleans
Memphis
Pine 
Bluff
Island
Sill Island
Pascagoula
Island
Jackson
Camp Shelby
 
ATLANTICA
Fort Polk
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt
Millennium Dragon
Objectives
• C2 of the LPTF maneuver forces in STOM
• Fuse data to produce a real-time CTP
– Intelligence
– Maneuver
– Fires
– C2
• Experiment with task organization and table of
equipment in expeditionary operations
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 Kernel Blitz (X) Objectives
June 2001
• Integrated Naval Service C4ISR architecture:
– Command relationships / Task organization
– Staff functions (Integrated)
• Sensor, fire control and information networks
to form a C4ISR architecture
• Refine TTTPs for OMFTS/STOM force
John Allison/Cal Poly.ppt
Experimentation Focus
Capable
Warrior
•Expeditionary Ops
•Littorals
•TTPs for STOM
force
•Navy coordination
•Millennium
Dragon
2001
Coalition
Warrior
•Joint / Combined
interoperability
•Task organization
•Command
relationships
•MEB level forces
2003
Millennium
Warrior (04)
•Joint
interoperability
•First major joint
integrating
experiment
2004
Millennium
Warrior (02)
•Joint
interoperability
•Command
relationships
•MEB level forces
2002
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WWW.MCWL.QUANTICO.USMC.MIL
MCWL Link to our Operating Forces
| Click to Enter | Notice To Users | Contact Us |
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ELB ACTD:  
Speeding Technology to the Warfighter
Ray Cole (Col. USMC Ret.)
Demonstration/Program Manager
Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD, ONR
ELB ACTD
“Speeding technology to the WARFIGHTER”
ONR / CADRC Decision Support Conference
2 May 2000
MR. RAY COLE
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DIRECTION
“…to Demonstrate an Enhanced Integrated
C2/ Fires and Targeting Capability to
Enable Rapid Employment / Maneuver / Fire
Support From the Sea of Dispersed Units
Operating in an Extended Littoral
Battlespace in the Following Areas:
• Flattened, Rapid, Webbed Distributed C2
Processes;
• Common Situational Understanding;
• Fully Coupled Decision / Planning /
Execution Systems (Sea/Land) on
Shared Battlespace Network;
• Intelligent Networks;
• Improved Combined Fires Response
Time.”
SERVICE
CO-SPONSORS
EXECUTING
AGENTS
“…multi-Phased Demonstration Which Will
Leverage Other DoD ACTD Efforts  and
Navy/Marine Corps Unique Initiatives to Develop
New Capabilities.  Both Non-Developmental Items
(NDI) and Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
Enabling Technologies Will Be Utilized to the
Maximum Extent Practical.”
Two Major System Demonstrations (MSDs)
• MSD I - 2nd Quarter FY99
• MSD II- 3rd Quarter FY01
OBJECTIVE: APPROACH:
OPERATIONAL
SPONSOR
ELB ACTD Implementation Directive 31 Jan 1997
  DM-1195/4
ELB SCOPE
“Rapid Technology Insertion to Advance
WARFIGHTING in the Littorals”
ELB as an Umbrella ACTD will:
~Provide the means to integrate technologies
focused on the distributed force needs in the
littorals
~Demonstrate this capability with operational
forces to identify operational utility and
remaining technology gaps
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  DM-1195/5
ELB ACTD ARCHITECTURE
2-3 Airborne Nodes Can Support a 
100 x 200 NM Operating Area
C2 APPLICATIONS
NODES
AIRBORNE RELAYS
EUTs
WARNET
  DM-1195/6
DECISION-MAKING PARADIGM
~Aware of
what we
see / engage
~Minimal decision
support
~ Instinctive reaction
minimal time available
~Greater risk
~Significantly
enhanced situation
awareness
~Extensive decision
support
~Wargamed action /
reaction
~Reduced risk
NOW FUTURE
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  DM-1195/7
COMBAT DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS
Days Days10-12 Hrs 5-7 Hrs 5-7 Hrs
IPB MD/ML CCIRs CollectionPlan CONOPS
ALL LEVELS (sqd-MEF)
  DM-1195/8
SOME THOUGHTS
~A definite process
~Labor / time intensive
~Can’t keep pace
~Technology can help
~Technology can hurt
Need fused intelligence not just data!
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ELB ACTD BENEFITS
ENHANCED LETHALITY 
& SURVIVABILITY
C2 TO THE 
Small Unit
C2 On-The Move
Decreased
Fratricide
Arrives w/ Commander
in AOA
Increased Access to
Fires
Increased Situational
Awareness
Decreased Reliance
on SATCOM &
Ground-based
Relays
  DM-1195/10
MSD I ASSESSMENT
~ELB network must be: more robust, scaleable,
more easily managed and secure
~ Lessons learned:  how to organize, manage
outside support, take care of Marines and Sailors
~Enhanced access to fire support
~Reduced reliance on SATCOM and ground-based
relays
~Reduced fratricide
~Enhanced ship-to-ship collaboration
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  DM-1195/11
CAMPAIGN PLAN
ARG / MEU early,
extended assessments
Residual Planning
& Transition successfully
demonstrated technologies
to acquisition
PRINCIPAL EFFORTS
  DM-1195/12
TARAWA ARG / 13TH MEU
~ WARNET successfully supported VTC, chat, file transfers, whiteboard
collaboration
• Used regularly to conduct CPR5 staff meetings,
Ops / Intel briefings, operations officer coordination / planning efforts
• Reliable method to conduct inter-ship coordination, distribute relevant
information files and messages
~ Secure 50nm OTH ship-to-shore link demonstrated between TARAWA / Duluth to
HMMWV via UH-1 Airborne relay
~ Novel employment of WARNET capability
• Whiteboard capability supported CIWS repair
• Whiteboard capability used to familiarize medical staff on surgical
procedures
~ Significant test events
• In port 14 Feb Complete
• At sea 21-31 Mar FLEET WEEK Complete
10-21 Apr COMPTUEX Complete
19-23 May FLEETEX
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  DM-1195/13
NEW PLANNING TOOLS
  DM-1195/14
WHAT TARAWA ARG /13TH MEU
DEMONSTRATED
~Initial Results Positive - Network receiving extensive use
~Extended ranges with helo relay package begins 29 March
~Some EMI Interference by TAS (Long Range Mode) noted
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  DM-1195/15
ARG / MEU IN-PORT / AT SEA TEST
RESULTS
~Partial configuration installation - Ship-to-ship
(1 UH-1,  1 HMMWV, VRC-99A only)
~Demonstrated connectivity at 10Mbps “burst rate,”
sustained throughput under review
~EMI noted with Target Acquisition System
~Blind spots / geometries still under review
~Helicopter VRC-99A relay successful
over-the -horizon, testing continues
~Star SaFire Thermal Imaging System testing
underway, ground tests near full motion video with
new CODEC
~VRC-99A requires periodic reset during continuous
Ops
  DM-1195/16
TRANSITION AND RESIDUAL
PROCESS
Early / cont
operational 
force
involvement in
experiment
Early / extend
assessment
Lead Role
in requirements
definition
Tech transfer/
transition
to 
acquisition
process
Residual
Program
2 yr ILS
Assessment
Technology
Characterization
Transition
criteria
Phased
Implementation
planning
Navy
Transition
USMC
Transition
Rapid
technology
insertion
to the
warfighter
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  DM-1195/17
RESIDUAL PROGRAM
~TARAWA ARG / 13th MEU
• Ship-to-ship suite (AUG ‘00 deploy)
• Limited ship-to-shore suite
• Use of ground node
• C2 / collaborative tools
• Airborne relay
• EUTs
~BHR  ARG (MSD II Ships)
• Ship-to-ship suite (BHR ARG)(Jun 01)
• Ship-to-shore suite (Feb ‘02)
• C2 / collaborative tools
• Handheld
ELB ACTD Technology Suites 
WARNET / ECOC / CCVs / Airborne Relay / EUTs
  DM-1195/18
TRANSITION / TECHNOLOGY
INSERTION
~ AAAV  (DRPM)
~ ADNS (Advanced Digital
Networking System) (PMW - 158)
~ TCDL
~ DWTS (Digital Wideband Transmission
System)
Joint Maritime Comm System /
Global Command & Control System
METOC
LPD 17
AUSWC
Advanced Deployable System (ADS)
~ Unit Operations Center (UOC)
~ Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
~ VTUAV
AAV C7A1
LAV
DD21
CAC2S
CEC
MV-22
JCC(X)
Primary Targets
Potential Targets
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  DM-1195/19
STANDARDS AND REQUIREMENTS
~ TEMPALT / SHIPALT
~Security accreditation (interface afloat LANs)
~ ISNS / ADNS certification
~EMI characterization / testing
  DM-1195/20
ROAD AHEAD
~FST-1
• 19-30 June ‘00
• SSC Lab SD, Camp Pendleton, NAS El Centro
• ELB Contractors with SPMAGTF / I MEF observers
• Focus: Comms / Networking
~Millennium Dragon (FST-2)
• 5-11 Sept ‘00
• Gulf Coast Littoral
• VRC 99 A / WaveLAN / Airborne relay / EUTs
• Planning in progress w/ SPMAGTF / MCWL
~FST-3
• Target dates 19-23 Feb ‘01
• SSC Lab SD, Camp Pendleton, NAS El Centro, USS Coronado,
ARG ships
• ELB Contractors, SPMAGTF / I MEF / C3F participation
• Focus: Rehearsal of MSD II
~KB(X)
• June ‘01
• MSD II, Capable Warrior, FBE I
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  DM-1195/21
Feb
00
24 MONTH SCHEDULE
Jan
00
COLLABORATION
Jun 00
CORE TECHNICAL
DEVELOPMENT
Dec
01Sep 00 Feb 01 Jun 01
Jan
00
Jan
00
Dec
01
Dec
01
FST 1 FST 2 FST 3
MSD II
TCD 1 TARAWA
ARG
(Deployment)
DCD
BHR
Aug
00
Oct
00
Jul
01
Mar
00
Sep
00
Mar
01
Jun
01
LOE 6
FBE G
ELB TEST
MC / MD
FBE H
ELB FST 2
NE
01
KB(X)
MSD II
CW
FBE I
Jan
01
ARG / MEU & Residual
BHR ARG
Residual
TARAWA
ARG
Return /
reinstallation
Jan ‘01
TARAWA
ARG
(at Sea)
  DM-1195/22
SUMMARY
~Enhanced situation awareness!
~Enhanced lethality & survivability
~Residual / transition programs - TARAWA ARG / BHR ARG
~Speeding Technology to the WARFIGHTER
l Integrating
l Demonstrating
l Deploying
l Transitioning
~Ahead of our time
l Network protocols / MGMT
l Handheld (Type 1 cert / IP addressable)
l Airborne relays
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  DM-1195/23
BACKUPS
  DM-1195/24
RAPID TECHNOLOGY INSERTION TO ADVANCE
WARFIGHTING IN THE LITTORALS
‘99‘ ‘04‘00 01 02 ‘03‘
Campaign Plan Midrange PlanMSD I Strategic Plan
~ Robustness
~ Simplicity
~ Scaleability
~ Security
~ Non-tactical
abn relays
~Core tech development
• Comms / networking
• Joint Interoperability
(level 2)
• Security
~ARG / MEU involvement
• TARAWA / 13th MEU
• Tactical airborne relays
(helos)
~Residual / transition
~Collaboration (MCWL / MBC
JTRS PO)
• FST 1
• JCF AWE
• MSD II
• Scaleability Study
Validate Tech / Design Review Validate Tech / Design Review
~ Seamless mobility
~ Multi-level security
~ UAV airborne relays
~ Interoperability (level 4)
~ West Coast ARG /  MEU
~ East Coast ARG / MEU
~ Guide Post ACTDs (technology
transfer)
~ Link to FNCs
• Information distribution
• Decision support
• Time critical strike
• Organic MCM
• Littoral ASW
• Expeditionary logistics
~ Joint expeditionary venue
~ JF COM  / JAWP
~ Additional mission
areas
FNCs
Organic MCM
Littoral ASW
FNCs
• Fires
• Intelligence
• Maneuver
Comms &
networking
•Information distribution
•Decision support
•Strike plan execution
•Time critical strike
(FNC)
MBC
~Interoperability
(level 4+ complete)
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Decision Support: An Operational Perspective
Colonel Robert Schmidle
Commanding Officer Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Experimental
     Since 1997 the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) has been conducting concept-
based experimentation.  During this time I have served as either the Second-in-Command or the
Commanding Officer of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (Experimental)
(SPMAGTF (X)); the unit tasked with executing these experiments for the MCWL.  The focus of
the paper is on the impressions from that experience that bear on the use of decision support by
operational commanders.  Decision support is often misunderstood as simply appliquéing
technology onto existing structure and procedures; in fact it entails potentially significant
changes to the current organizational paradigms.  We will begin examining the concept of
decision-support by discussing the three major experiments conducted to date, Hunter Warrior,
Urban Warrior, and Capable Warrior.  We do this in order to establish an operational context.
Next, we will frame the issues that influence decision-making and delineate the requirements for
decision-support that arise from those issues. Lastly, we will conclude with a look ahead to the
future applications and potential of decision-support.
     In any organization there are different tiers of decision makers but ultimately everyone in an
organization whether it is a military unit or a large corporation is a decision maker. In a military
unit organized for combat there is a place that exists specifically to facilitate decision-making;
that is a Combat Operations Center (COC).  In the COC decisions are made, and actions
directed, that are necessary to accomplish the mission of that organization. The SPMAGTF (X)
established an Experimental Combat Operations Center (ECOC) in order to facilitate the
decision making required to exercise command and control of experimental forces.  The ECOC
also served as a test bed for experimenting with different organizational structures, procedures,
and technologies.  Implied in all of this experimentation is the goal of enhancing the performance
of the commander and his staff, which is manifested in increased operational tempo, made
possible by quicker more efficient decision-making.  General George Patton is often quoted as
saying that: “an average plan executed violently today is better than a great plan executed next
week.”1 The goal of decision support, and the associated ability to enable rapid, real time
planning and execution of multiple courses of action, is to enable the commander to execute a
"great plan" today.
     The first experiment conducted by MCWL was the Advanced Warfighting Experiment
(AWE) Hunter Warrior conducted in March 1997.  It was the first in the Warrior series of
experiments.  The SPMAGTF (X) set up the ECOC in Camp Pendleton, CA (simulating a ship
board COC) in order to command and control experimental forces in 29 Palms, CA (160 miles
inland).  Figure 1 shows the layout of the first ECOC.
                                                
1George S. Patton Jr.  War As I Knew It, Houghton Mifflin Company, May 1995, p. 265.
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Figure 1
     Of note is the different organizational structure that was employed in the experiment.
This included the position of the Battle Captain, an officer who was more than simply a watch
officer. He was empowered to make decisions regarding the execution of the current fight as well
as to initiate branch planning for the next battle. The layout, however, was such that it was
difficult for the necessary interaction to occur between the functional cells without deliberate
movement on the part of the staff members. The staff was continually faced with deciding
whether to stay at their workstations and interact with the programs and software that were
intended to give them greater situational awareness (SA) or leave their computers and interact
with the rest of the staff.               During this experiment, the majority of the time the staff
members chose to stay at their workstations.  This had the effect of funneling information
vertically in the organization vice horizontally, which caused most all decision making in the
ECOC to be centralized with the battle captain and the commander.  While on the surface it
appears that this is in fact the way decisions should be made, there are in fact, many more
“supporting” decisions that a staff makes that enables a level of synchronization which in turn
insures effective execution of those decisions. In fact, the physical layout of that particular
ECOC did not improve the flow of information that was necessary in order to enhance the entire
decision process.
    Information flow is not only critical in and of itself, but also determines, to some extent, where
decisions are made. The ergonomics of a COC will effect how and where information flows.
Throughout any operations center there will be a number of nodes that represent the confluence
of information as it flows from various sources.  Those nodes, in turn, become both a physical
Large Screen
Display
Combat Information
Engagement
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Planning & Shaping
Battle  Watch
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location and a conscious “place” in which decisions will naturally occur and to which decision
makers will gravitate.  When the activity level in the ECOC increased, the primary decision
makers would physically move to the place where they “felt” they had the most situational
awareness.
    This experiment also saw the nascent use of visualization tools to, among other things, enable
the commander and his staff to more readily determine the “pattern” of enemy movement. In this
experiment the enemy was the 7th Marine Regiment, which was deployed in the field at 29
Palms, CA.  Since a human being was directing the enemy force and humans tend toward
patterns in activity, it is natural to assume that the enemy would eventually displays patterns that
could be exploited by the SPMAGTF (X). Exploited that is, if those patterns could be
determined. There are however, at least two levels of activity in which patterns are evident.  The
first level is historical; it consists of the movement of the enemy troops, vehicles, etc.  This is the
level at which most “pattern recognition” is done and most decisions are made.  The second,
deeper level of activity is predictive; it consists of analysis of the enemy commanders intent
based on observed or intuited patterns of the psychological factors that caused the activity in the
first level. This second level is the one at which the ultimate victory or defeat of a unit is
determined. After the unexpected and overwhelming victory by the Confederate Army at
Chancellorsville, VA in 1863, Gen Robert E Lee was reported to have responded to a question
from a Richmond newspaper about the risky tactic of dividing his army in the face of a
numerically superior enemy, by simply stating: “ that he was fighting Joe Hooker.”2  Lee had
long standing knowledge of Gen Hooker to prepare him for that decision, is it possible for a
decision support system to provide today’s commanders with that same type of knowledge about
an enemy commander?
     The next in the Warrior series of experiments, Urban Warrior saw a radical change in the
layout of the ECOC.  The change was based on a number of factors, beginning with a
reevaluation of the process of information flow and decision-making. To review for a minute: a
Combat Operations Center (COC) exists to facilitate decision-making, those decisions enable the
execution of the six Battlespace functions that any COC must execute in order to be effective.
Those functions are – Command and Control, Maneuver, Fires, Logistics, Force Protection, and
Intelligence. In the ECOC those functions would likewise be performed, but the internal
processes and procedures for execution would continue to be modified in the course of
experimentation. Shortly after the Hunter Warrior experiment the MCWL participated in the
“Traders Game” in New York City. This game consisted of interaction with the traders at the
New York Mercantile Exchange and with the trainers of the New York City Fire Chiefs.
    The traders on the Mercantile Exchange make hundreds of decisions a day, or in some cases in
an hour, in a seemingly chaotic environment.  The primary cues for initiating decisions or actions
on the part of the traders come from visual displays of information (the latest quotes for instance)
from which they recognize and interpret patterns of rising or falling commodity prices.  After
observing the traders for two days and participating in a “trading” session it was apparent that the
horseshoe shaped “pit” in which they traded was an effective way to exchange information and
effect the coordination necessary to execute trades. This physical layout also facilitated the
human networking and interaction so critical to high tempo operations.  Figure 2 shows the
layout of the ECOC used in the AWE Urban Warrior aboard the USS Coronado in March 1999.
                                                
2 Shelby Foote.  The Civil War, A Narrative.  First Vintage Books, 1963 p. 307.
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Figure 2
    Note that the flow of information is now potentially more circular, swirling around, and
ultimately focused inward toward the pit of the horseshoe. In the pit is the “Battle Captain” an
officer charged with the conduct of the current battle. The Battle Captain (BC) was envisioned to
be the commanders representative, making the numerous decisions required to execute the
operational plan. He would be an individual trained in the techniques of pattern recognition and
experienced in the art of Recognition Primed Decision Making 3. The role of the BC was now
inspired in part by the MCWL experience with the New York City Fire Department’s course for
training Fire Chiefs. This course consisted of a series of situational decision games designed to
evaluate the firefighters ability to deal with numerous, stressful situations while simultaneously
giving the participants valuable experience on which to base their future decisions.  The course
was the model for what eventually became the Combat Decision Range (CDR).  In terms of the
decision process in the ECOC the most useful insights concerned how a Chief would deal with
the multiple challenges that arose at any fire and how he interacted with his subordinates. For
example: the need for a Chief to quickly gain Situational Awareness (SA) as he approached a fire
and then to influence the situation once he arrived is not unlike that of a commander confronted
with a new situation in a COC.  The commander has a continuous requirement to gain and
maintain SA of both current and future operations. In the ECOC the commander could physically
                                                
3 Gary Klien, Sources of Power Cambridge, MIT Press,1998.p.17.
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position himself where he thought he could best influence events. That might be in the pit,
directly involved in making decisions, or outside the horseshoe, detached from the fray,
influencing more indirectly. The latter technique was more common, it also was coincident with
the findings of Klein Associates in their numerous observations of COC operations.  Those
findings indicated that the person that generally had the most SA in a COC (or an aircraft cockpit
) was not necessarily the one most involved in the execution, but more often was someone on the
periphery, assimilating information and interpreting events as they unfolded. 4
    In addition to experimenting with a different physical layout, the ECOC in Urban Warrior also
incorporated Expert Agents into the Integrated Marine Multi Agent Command and Control
System (IMMACCS) software. This was the first time that agents were used to facilitate
decision-making.  They worked as they were designed, providing alert clues in response to
programmed algorithms.  The potential of this technology however, was not, and to date still has
not, been realized. It is important to note that the SPMAGTF(X) views the agents as a decision
aid and not as a decision maker. If Klein is correct in his postulation that expert decision makers
make decisions based on raw data and not on processed information, then among the functions of
the expert agents is to enhance the presentation of that data to the human decision maker.5  Agent
functionality would also include performing various lower order tasks necessary to enable the
execution of those decisions.  For example, expeditiously performing the numerous, often-
tedious calculations required to determine if a potential course of action being considered by the
commander is logistically supportable.
    The ECOC layout for Urban Warrior proved to be a mixed success.  On the one hand the flow
of information throughout the ECOC and the level of SA among the staff members was
considerable higher than in previous experiments.  However, the horseshoe configuration central
to the ECOC, when set up aboard the USS Coronado for Urban Warrior did not work as well as
we had hoped.  This was principally due to two factors: first, in order to have enough room to
accommodate the personnel operating in the center or pit, the horseshoe had to be widened to the
extent that it made verbal cross communication difficult, second, the size and height of the
computer screen in front of the operators (who faced inboard toward the pit) made visual
communication among the staff difficult as well. Regardless of the technology incorporated into
the ECOC, the human interaction required to generate high operational tempo is still most
effectively accomplished by direct (unaided by electrons) verbal and visual communication.
    At the conclusion of Urban Warrior, the SPMAGTF(X) stayed aboard the USS Coronado in
order to execute the Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) Advanced Concepts Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) Major System Demonstration One (MSD-1).  This was the first time that
the SPMAGTF(X) had assumed the role of a Joint Force headquarters. The physical layout of the
ECOC remained the same for MSD-1 as it was for Urban Warrior.  The joint warfighting
environment provided increased impetus for the need to address the issue of the method and
content of information displayed to the decision makers. This was because the staff operating in
the ECOC was now an ad hoc organization possessing limited familiarity with the equipment and
each other. One thing that did, however, remain the same was that the more we experimented the
more evident it became that Klein was correct in his conclusion that experienced decision makers
                                                
4 Ibid,p.118.
5 Ibid,p.160-174.
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desired raw data (which they assimilated very quickly), not the processed information
euphemistically called knowledge. Since raw data is potentially available more readily and more
rapidly it is reasonable to assume that if you could get that data directly to the decision makers
they could make faster and more effective decisions.  Analyzing and filtering data, which is the
current paradigm, provides an analytic construct that appears contrary to the way experienced
officers actually make decisions.
    For the next series of experiments, Capable Warrior, the physical layout of the ECOC again
underwent significant changes.  The experiences and lessons from the previous experiments were
iteratively applied to the Capable Warrior ECOC.  The most significant change was the
dissolution of the horseshoe shape and the implementation of a rectangular configuration in the
center of the ECOC to accommodate the "mission team." The concept of a mission team is one
that we again owe to Klein.  It is designed to enhance human interaction and information flow by
locating the workstations of key staff officers in such a manner that communication between
them was enhanced.  Enhancing communication and subsequently increasing a sense of shared
situational awareness also accelerated the dynamic of team building. That dynamic can best be
described as linking people in an organization together first, and then connecting them with
tasks. Consequently, operations in the ECOC, based on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs),
focused on supporting the mission team's execution of the current operation.  That operation
could range from combat to humanitarian assistance; the assigned members of the mission team
reflecting the specific requirements of a given mission. For example in a humanitarian assistance
operation, a supply officer or a medical officer might replace the fires officer. Figure 3 is the
layout of the ECOC for the Capable Warrior experiments.
Figure 3
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     Note that the there is not an individual workstation for the Battle Captain, Fires Officer, or the
Operations Officer.  These three officers are crucial to the operation of the ECOC and continued
experimentation verified that they were best able to coordinate the activities of the ECOC by
moving about and influencing events at what they determined to be a decisive time and place.
The workstation for the Commander was used mostly for collaborative planning with higher,
adjacent and subordinate commands. The commander generally moved about the ECOC or if he
did sit, it was in close proximity to the mission team.  This layout proved to be the most effective
to date in terms of the execution of the battlespace functions discussed earlier.  The growth in
capability of the expert agents also continued.  Most significant was the addition of the capability
for the Fires Agent to "recommend" suitable weapons-target pairing for fire missions. This
capability allowed weapons-target pairing to be done at any terminal in the network. Therefore, it
was no longer necessary for the decision about the suitable paring of a firing asset to a particular
target to be confined to the ECOC.  That decision could now be made anywhere in the network,
however, the implications of this are still not fully sorted and there are issues of allocation
authority that need to be considered.  This capability however, could help enable the evolution of
our current control dominated hierarchy command and control system into a more adaptive,
coordinated, and self-synchronizing system.
    The next section of this paper will examine the requirements for decision support for the Joint
Force commander.  To begin with, the information the decision makers need must be available to
them in a form that contains the appropriate information and is easily assimilated.  For example,
consider the different way that the same information is displayed in Figures 4 and 5.
Figure 4
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Figure 5
     The written weather report in Figure 4 is impossible to understand unless one is well versed in
the acronyms and even then it requires some interpretation.  Contrast that display of information
with Figure 5 in which the information is displayed in a way that brings about nearly
instantaneous recognition of the current weather.  The displays in a Combat Operations Center
should, it seems evident, be more like Figure 5 than figure 4.  It has been said that the knowledge
we humans are capable of possessing is limited by our language.  I would suggest that we could
expand the notion of language to include all sensory inputs (visual, tactile, etc.) in which case the
medium of information exchange becomes even more central to any consideration of decision
support. How the information is presented to a decision maker will affect the level of knowledge
extrapolated from that information, which in turn will affect the quality and timeliness of a given
decision.
    The future of decision support for the warfighter will certainly be influenced by technology.  It
will, however, also be influenced by an understanding of a new worldview. A complex system
model is coming to be increasingly accepted as valid; replacing the traditional cause and effect
model most common in a linear mechanistic Newtonian worldview.  Complex systems are
nonlinear, interactive systems that more accurately model events as they really occur, i.e. that the
effect (the manifestation of an action) is rarely proportional to the initial cause. For example, the
actions of a young Marine, as a member of a Joint Task Force engaged in Peace Keeping
operations can have an unpredictable, strategic "effect," well out of proportion to the local,
tactical "cause." Inputs no matter how seemingly insignificant can and will have an effect on a
given situation.  Heisenberg's uncertainty principle states that even the act of observation has an
effect on the outcome of an experiment.6 The implication for decision support is that there must
be an understanding that the effect of a decision will rarely have a proportional cause.  In other
                                                
6 Douglas C. Giancoli, The Ideas of Physics, Third Editon, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986, p. 463.
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words, expecting a decision to yield a predictable linear result is simply unrealistic and any
attempt to do so is to confuse the desire to "control" a situation with the ability to actually
"influence" that same situation.
    Complex systems are open systems; they enable and encourage interaction between their
components. The metaphor of a whirlpool is particularly applicable to understanding the
relationship between organizations and complex systems.  The interaction between the molecules
of water in a whirlpool is continuous; it is what gives the whirlpool its shape. While the size, and
to some extent the shape, of a whirlpool may change as the water flows through it, essentially it
remains a whirlpool despite the fact that individual molecules (like individual people in an
organization) come and go. Therefore, the interaction between people in a human system (i.e. a
military organization) is what determines the essence of that organization; it also determines the
form or shape of that organization.
    A Complex Adaptive System is a complex system that continuously adapts to changes in its
environment. As we discussed earlier, it is a delusion to think that one can, with certainty, predict
all the consequences of a decision.  What may be possible, however, is to predict the potential of
emergent behavior in complex adaptive systems. Emergent behavior is the behavior that a system
exhibits as it emerges or evolves to adapt to a situation.  Behavior patterns generally can be
predicted, but not specific behavior at a specific time.  This is an area that has great potential for
artificial intelligence agents as decision support aids.  An agent for instance, could present to the
decision maker predictions of potential patterns of emergent behavior in a complex adaptive
system. That system could be the enemy as an entity itself or it could be the entity that is the
behavior of the enemy and friendly forces taken together.  Those patterns are the deeper form of
pattern recognition discussed earlier. It is not the specifics of potential enemy courses of action
that are of interest here, but rather the underlying patterns that determine those specifics.
    The potential of decision support is also inextricably tied to enhancing the performance of an
organization, whether that is an entire military unit or just the commander and his staff in the
combat operations center.  Performance enhancement can be realized by a number of factors
ranging from training to technology. The presentation of information to the decision maker is
one area in which technology offers great potential.  Information should be presented for
assimilation through multiple human senses. Visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile sensations
together form a richer, more complete "picture" of a given situation that any one of those
sensations in isolation. For example, the presentation of Expert Agent alerts should be reflected
in multiple mediums; visual, auditory, etc.  In addition to the presentation of information,
performance of a staff can be enhanced by a command and control system that enables rehearsal
of potential courses of action.  Rehearsal is important because it builds in the staff a mental
picture of what the plan could look like, thereby giving decision makers a known point from
which to deviate once the plan is put into operation. Rehearsal also provides the opportunity for
decision makers to make decisions, and the more decisions someone makes the more experience
they develop; consequently they are better prepared to make the decisions required when the
operation actually unfolds.
    Performance enhance can also be realized, and traditionally has been realized, by training.
The challenge facing Joint Force Commanders is how to train a joint staff, which more often
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than not is an ad hoc collection of personnel, in a relatively short period of time before that staff
becomes operational. Here again the presentation of information could be in a format to elicit
physiological reactions in the personnel that would encourage the dynamic of team building.  For
example, information presentations designed to cause a "fight or flight" reaction in the COC
officers would also have the corollary effect of bonding the participants into a more cohesive
human network.  This is evident in the unifying effect that occurs among the recruits in Marine
Corps boot camp when they are subjected to shared stress and hardship, both of which cause
stimulation of the "fight or flight" reflex.
    Decision support is the ultimate combat multiplier; it should enhance a commander's ability to
defeat an adaptive enemy.  That enemy will only be defeated by the strength of what Napoleon
called the moral force, that imponderable combination of intellectual acuity and force of will.
The strength of the moral force is manifested in suitable and opportune decisions.  Those
decisions should in turn create a tempo of operations with which the enemy is unable to cope.
The friendly force's operational tempo is uniquely relative to the enemy's, but is generally
characterized by overwhelming, violent, and unrelenting pressure on the enemy.  That pressure
starts and is sustained by timely and appropriate decisions.  To paraphrase General Patton: " an
intuitive decision, made instinctively now, is far more effective than an analytical decision, made
carefully tomorrow."   Bring on the Agents…
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Decision Support: An Operational Perspective
Colonel Robert Schmidle
Commanding Officer Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Experimental
     Since 1997 the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) has been conducting concept-
based experimentation.  During this time I have served as either the Second-in-Command or the
Commanding Officer of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (Experimental)
(SPMAGTF (X)); the unit tasked with executing these experiments for the MCWL.  The focus of
the paper is on the impressions from that experience that bear on the use of decision support by
operational commanders.  Decision support is often misunderstood as simply appliquéing
technology onto existing structure and procedures; in fact it entails potentially significant
changes to the current organizational paradigms.  We will begin examining the concept of
decision-support by discussing the three major experiments conducted to date, Hunter Warrior,
Urban Warrior, and Capable Warrior.  We do this in order to establish an operational context.
Next, we will frame the issues that influence decision-making and delineate the requirements for
decision-support that arise from those issues. Lastly, we will conclude with a look ahead to the
future applications and potential of decision-support.
     In any organization there are different tiers of decision makers but ultimately everyone in an
organization whether it is a military unit or a large corporation is a decision maker. In a military
unit organized for combat there is a place that exists specifically to facilitate decision-making;
that is a Combat Operations Center (COC).  In the COC decisions are made, and actions
directed, that are necessary to accomplish the mission of that organization. The SPMAGTF (X)
established an Experimental Combat Operations Center (ECOC) in order to facilitate the
decision making required to exercise command and control of experimental forces.  The ECOC
also served as a test bed for experimenting with different organizational structures, procedures,
and technologies.  Implied in all of this experimentation is the goal of enhancing the performance
of the commander and his staff, which is manifested in increased operational tempo, made
possible by quicker more efficient decision-making.  General George Patton is often quoted as
saying that: “an average plan executed violently today is better than a great plan executed next
week.”1 The goal of decision support, and the associated ability to enable rapid, real time
planning and execution of multiple courses of action, is to enable the commander to execute a
"great plan" today.
     The first experiment conducted by MCWL was the Advanced Warfighting Experiment
(AWE) Hunter Warrior conducted in March 1997.  It was the first in the Warrior series of
experiments.  The SPMAGTF (X) set up the ECOC in Camp Pendleton, CA (simulating a ship
board COC) in order to command and control experimental forces in 29 Palms, CA (160 miles
inland).  Figure 1 shows the layout of the first ECOC.
                                                
1George S. Patton Jr.  War As I Knew It, Houghton Mifflin Company, May 1995, p. 265.
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Figure 1
     Of note is the different organizational structure that was employed in the experiment.
This included the position of the Battle Captain, an officer who was more than simply a watch
officer. He was empowered to make decisions regarding the execution of the current fight as well
as to initiate branch planning for the next battle. The layout, however, was such that it was
difficult for the necessary interaction to occur between the functional cells without deliberate
movement on the part of the staff members. The staff was continually faced with deciding
whether to stay at their workstations and interact with the programs and software that were
intended to give them greater situational awareness (SA) or leave their computers and interact
with the rest of the staff.               During this experiment, the majority of the time the staff
members chose to stay at their workstations.  This had the effect of funneling information
vertically in the organization vice horizontally, which caused most all decision making in the
ECOC to be centralized with the battle captain and the commander.  While on the surface it
appears that this is in fact the way decisions should be made, there are in fact, many more
“supporting” decisions that a staff makes that enables a level of synchronization which in turn
insures effective execution of those decisions. In fact, the physical layout of that particular
ECOC did not improve the flow of information that was necessary in order to enhance the entire
decision process.
    Information flow is not only critical in and of itself, but also determines, to some extent, where
decisions are made. The ergonomics of a COC will effect how and where information flows.
Throughout any operations center there will be a number of nodes that represent the confluence
of information as it flows from various sources.  Those nodes, in turn, become both a physical
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location and a conscious “place” in which decisions will naturally occur and to which decision
makers will gravitate.  When the activity level in the ECOC increased, the primary decision
makers would physically move to the place where they “felt” they had the most situational
awareness.
    This experiment also saw the nascent use of visualization tools to, among other things, enable
the commander and his staff to more readily determine the “pattern” of enemy movement. In this
experiment the enemy was the 7th Marine Regiment, which was deployed in the field at 29
Palms, CA.  Since a human being was directing the enemy force and humans tend toward
patterns in activity, it is natural to assume that the enemy would eventually displays patterns that
could be exploited by the SPMAGTF (X). Exploited that is, if those patterns could be
determined. There are however, at least two levels of activity in which patterns are evident.  The
first level is historical; it consists of the movement of the enemy troops, vehicles, etc.  This is the
level at which most “pattern recognition” is done and most decisions are made.  The second,
deeper level of activity is predictive; it consists of analysis of the enemy commanders intent
based on observed or intuited patterns of the psychological factors that caused the activity in the
first level. This second level is the one at which the ultimate victory or defeat of a unit is
determined. After the unexpected and overwhelming victory by the Confederate Army at
Chancellorsville, VA in 1863, Gen Robert E Lee was reported to have responded to a question
from a Richmond newspaper about the risky tactic of dividing his army in the face of a
numerically superior enemy, by simply stating: “ that he was fighting Joe Hooker.”2  Lee had
long standing knowledge of Gen Hooker to prepare him for that decision, is it possible for a
decision support system to provide today’s commanders with that same type of knowledge about
an enemy commander?
     The next in the Warrior series of experiments, Urban Warrior saw a radical change in the
layout of the ECOC.  The change was based on a number of factors, beginning with a
reevaluation of the process of information flow and decision-making. To review for a minute: a
Combat Operations Center (COC) exists to facilitate decision-making, those decisions enable the
execution of the six Battlespace functions that any COC must execute in order to be effective.
Those functions are – Command and Control, Maneuver, Fires, Logistics, Force Protection, and
Intelligence. In the ECOC those functions would likewise be performed, but the internal
processes and procedures for execution would continue to be modified in the course of
experimentation. Shortly after the Hunter Warrior experiment the MCWL participated in the
“Traders Game” in New York City. This game consisted of interaction with the traders at the
New York Mercantile Exchange and with the trainers of the New York City Fire Chiefs.
    The traders on the Mercantile Exchange make hundreds of decisions a day, or in some cases in
an hour, in a seemingly chaotic environment.  The primary cues for initiating decisions or actions
on the part of the traders come from visual displays of information (the latest quotes for instance)
from which they recognize and interpret patterns of rising or falling commodity prices.  After
observing the traders for two days and participating in a “trading” session it was apparent that the
horseshoe shaped “pit” in which they traded was an effective way to exchange information and
effect the coordination necessary to execute trades. This physical layout also facilitated the
human networking and interaction so critical to high tempo operations.  Figure 2 shows the
layout of the ECOC used in the AWE Urban Warrior aboard the USS Coronado in March 1999.
                                                
2 Shelby Foote.  The Civil War, A Narrative.  First Vintage Books, 1963 p. 307.
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Figure 2
    Note that the flow of information is now potentially more circular, swirling around, and
ultimately focused inward toward the pit of the horseshoe. In the pit is the “Battle Captain” an
officer charged with the conduct of the current battle. The Battle Captain (BC) was envisioned to
be the commanders representative, making the numerous decisions required to execute the
operational plan. He would be an individual trained in the techniques of pattern recognition and
experienced in the art of Recognition Primed Decision Making 3. The role of the BC was now
inspired in part by the MCWL experience with the New York City Fire Department’s course for
training Fire Chiefs. This course consisted of a series of situational decision games designed to
evaluate the firefighters ability to deal with numerous, stressful situations while simultaneously
giving the participants valuable experience on which to base their future decisions.  The course
was the model for what eventually became the Combat Decision Range (CDR).  In terms of the
decision process in the ECOC the most useful insights concerned how a Chief would deal with
the multiple challenges that arose at any fire and how he interacted with his subordinates. For
example: the need for a Chief to quickly gain Situational Awareness (SA) as he approached a fire
and then to influence the situation once he arrived is not unlike that of a commander confronted
with a new situation in a COC.  The commander has a continuous requirement to gain and
maintain SA of both current and future operations. In the ECOC the commander could physically
                                                
3 Gary Klien, Sources of Power Cambridge, MIT Press,1998.p.17.
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position himself where he thought he could best influence events. That might be in the pit,
directly involved in making decisions, or outside the horseshoe, detached from the fray,
influencing more indirectly. The latter technique was more common, it also was coincident with
the findings of Klein Associates in their numerous observations of COC operations.  Those
findings indicated that the person that generally had the most SA in a COC (or an aircraft cockpit
) was not necessarily the one most involved in the execution, but more often was someone on the
periphery, assimilating information and interpreting events as they unfolded. 4
    In addition to experimenting with a different physical layout, the ECOC in Urban Warrior also
incorporated Expert Agents into the Integrated Marine Multi Agent Command and Control
System (IMMACCS) software. This was the first time that agents were used to facilitate
decision-making.  They worked as they were designed, providing alert clues in response to
programmed algorithms.  The potential of this technology however, was not, and to date still has
not, been realized. It is important to note that the SPMAGTF(X) views the agents as a decision
aid and not as a decision maker. If Klein is correct in his postulation that expert decision makers
make decisions based on raw data and not on processed information, then among the functions of
the expert agents is to enhance the presentation of that data to the human decision maker.5  Agent
functionality would also include performing various lower order tasks necessary to enable the
execution of those decisions.  For example, expeditiously performing the numerous, often-
tedious calculations required to determine if a potential course of action being considered by the
commander is logistically supportable.
    The ECOC layout for Urban Warrior proved to be a mixed success.  On the one hand the flow
of information throughout the ECOC and the level of SA among the staff members was
considerable higher than in previous experiments.  However, the horseshoe configuration central
to the ECOC, when set up aboard the USS Coronado for Urban Warrior did not work as well as
we had hoped.  This was principally due to two factors: first, in order to have enough room to
accommodate the personnel operating in the center or pit, the horseshoe had to be widened to the
extent that it made verbal cross communication difficult, second, the size and height of the
computer screen in front of the operators (who faced inboard toward the pit) made visual
communication among the staff difficult as well. Regardless of the technology incorporated into
the ECOC, the human interaction required to generate high operational tempo is still most
effectively accomplished by direct (unaided by electrons) verbal and visual communication.
    At the conclusion of Urban Warrior, the SPMAGTF(X) stayed aboard the USS Coronado in
order to execute the Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) Advanced Concepts Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) Major System Demonstration One (MSD-1).  This was the first time that
the SPMAGTF(X) had assumed the role of a Joint Force headquarters. The physical layout of the
ECOC remained the same for MSD-1 as it was for Urban Warrior.  The joint warfighting
environment provided increased impetus for the need to address the issue of the method and
content of information displayed to the decision makers. This was because the staff operating in
the ECOC was now an ad hoc organization possessing limited familiarity with the equipment and
each other. One thing that did, however, remain the same was that the more we experimented the
more evident it became that Klein was correct in his conclusion that experienced decision makers
                                                
4 Ibid,p.118.
5 Ibid,p.160-174.
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desired raw data (which they assimilated very quickly), not the processed information
euphemistically called knowledge. Since raw data is potentially available more readily and more
rapidly it is reasonable to assume that if you could get that data directly to the decision makers
they could make faster and more effective decisions.  Analyzing and filtering data, which is the
current paradigm, provides an analytic construct that appears contrary to the way experienced
officers actually make decisions.
    For the next series of experiments, Capable Warrior, the physical layout of the ECOC again
underwent significant changes.  The experiences and lessons from the previous experiments were
iteratively applied to the Capable Warrior ECOC.  The most significant change was the
dissolution of the horseshoe shape and the implementation of a rectangular configuration in the
center of the ECOC to accommodate the "mission team." The concept of a mission team is one
that we again owe to Klein.  It is designed to enhance human interaction and information flow by
locating the workstations of key staff officers in such a manner that communication between
them was enhanced.  Enhancing communication and subsequently increasing a sense of shared
situational awareness also accelerated the dynamic of team building. That dynamic can best be
described as linking people in an organization together first, and then connecting them with
tasks. Consequently, operations in the ECOC, based on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs),
focused on supporting the mission team's execution of the current operation.  That operation
could range from combat to humanitarian assistance; the assigned members of the mission team
reflecting the specific requirements of a given mission. For example in a humanitarian assistance
operation, a supply officer or a medical officer might replace the fires officer. Figure 3 is the
layout of the ECOC for the Capable Warrior experiments.
Figure 3
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     Note that the there is not an individual workstation for the Battle Captain, Fires Officer, or the
Operations Officer.  These three officers are crucial to the operation of the ECOC and continued
experimentation verified that they were best able to coordinate the activities of the ECOC by
moving about and influencing events at what they determined to be a decisive time and place.
The workstation for the Commander was used mostly for collaborative planning with higher,
adjacent and subordinate commands. The commander generally moved about the ECOC or if he
did sit, it was in close proximity to the mission team.  This layout proved to be the most effective
to date in terms of the execution of the battlespace functions discussed earlier.  The growth in
capability of the expert agents also continued.  Most significant was the addition of the capability
for the Fires Agent to "recommend" suitable weapons-target pairing for fire missions. This
capability allowed weapons-target pairing to be done at any terminal in the network. Therefore, it
was no longer necessary for the decision about the suitable paring of a firing asset to a particular
target to be confined to the ECOC.  That decision could now be made anywhere in the network,
however, the implications of this are still not fully sorted and there are issues of allocation
authority that need to be considered.  This capability however, could help enable the evolution of
our current control dominated hierarchy command and control system into a more adaptive,
coordinated, and self-synchronizing system.
    The next section of this paper will examine the requirements for decision support for the Joint
Force commander.  To begin with, the information the decision makers need must be available to
them in a form that contains the appropriate information and is easily assimilated.  For example,
consider the different way that the same information is displayed in Figures 4 and 5.
Figure 4
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Figure 5
     The written weather report in Figure 4 is impossible to understand unless one is well versed in
the acronyms and even then it requires some interpretation.  Contrast that display of information
with Figure 5 in which the information is displayed in a way that brings about nearly
instantaneous recognition of the current weather.  The displays in a Combat Operations Center
should, it seems evident, be more like Figure 5 than figure 4.  It has been said that the knowledge
we humans are capable of possessing is limited by our language.  I would suggest that we could
expand the notion of language to include all sensory inputs (visual, tactile, etc.) in which case the
medium of information exchange becomes even more central to any consideration of decision
support. How the information is presented to a decision maker will affect the level of knowledge
extrapolated from that information, which in turn will affect the quality and timeliness of a given
decision.
    The future of decision support for the warfighter will certainly be influenced by technology.  It
will, however, also be influenced by an understanding of a new worldview. A complex system
model is coming to be increasingly accepted as valid; replacing the traditional cause and effect
model most common in a linear mechanistic Newtonian worldview.  Complex systems are
nonlinear, interactive systems that more accurately model events as they really occur, i.e. that the
effect (the manifestation of an action) is rarely proportional to the initial cause. For example, the
actions of a young Marine, as a member of a Joint Task Force engaged in Peace Keeping
operations can have an unpredictable, strategic "effect," well out of proportion to the local,
tactical "cause." Inputs no matter how seemingly insignificant can and will have an effect on a
given situation.  Heisenberg's uncertainty principle states that even the act of observation has an
effect on the outcome of an experiment.6 The implication for decision support is that there must
be an understanding that the effect of a decision will rarely have a proportional cause.  In other
                                                
6 Douglas C. Giancoli, The Ideas of Physics, Third Editon, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986, p. 463.
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words, expecting a decision to yield a predictable linear result is simply unrealistic and any
attempt to do so is to confuse the desire to "control" a situation with the ability to actually
"influence" that same situation.
    Complex systems are open systems; they enable and encourage interaction between their
components. The metaphor of a whirlpool is particularly applicable to understanding the
relationship between organizations and complex systems.  The interaction between the molecules
of water in a whirlpool is continuous; it is what gives the whirlpool its shape. While the size, and
to some extent the shape, of a whirlpool may change as the water flows through it, essentially it
remains a whirlpool despite the fact that individual molecules (like individual people in an
organization) come and go. Therefore, the interaction between people in a human system (i.e. a
military organization) is what determines the essence of that organization; it also determines the
form or shape of that organization.
    A Complex Adaptive System is a complex system that continuously adapts to changes in its
environment. As we discussed earlier, it is a delusion to think that one can, with certainty, predict
all the consequences of a decision.  What may be possible, however, is to predict the potential of
emergent behavior in complex adaptive systems. Emergent behavior is the behavior that a system
exhibits as it emerges or evolves to adapt to a situation.  Behavior patterns generally can be
predicted, but not specific behavior at a specific time.  This is an area that has great potential for
artificial intelligence agents as decision support aids.  An agent for instance, could present to the
decision maker predictions of potential patterns of emergent behavior in a complex adaptive
system. That system could be the enemy as an entity itself or it could be the entity that is the
behavior of the enemy and friendly forces taken together.  Those patterns are the deeper form of
pattern recognition discussed earlier. It is not the specifics of potential enemy courses of action
that are of interest here, but rather the underlying patterns that determine those specifics.
    The potential of decision support is also inextricably tied to enhancing the performance of an
organization, whether that is an entire military unit or just the commander and his staff in the
combat operations center.  Performance enhancement can be realized by a number of factors
ranging from training to technology. The presentation of information to the decision maker is
one area in which technology offers great potential.  Information should be presented for
assimilation through multiple human senses. Visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile sensations
together form a richer, more complete "picture" of a given situation that any one of those
sensations in isolation. For example, the presentation of Expert Agent alerts should be reflected
in multiple mediums; visual, auditory, etc.  In addition to the presentation of information,
performance of a staff can be enhanced by a command and control system that enables rehearsal
of potential courses of action.  Rehearsal is important because it builds in the staff a mental
picture of what the plan could look like, thereby giving decision makers a known point from
which to deviate once the plan is put into operation. Rehearsal also provides the opportunity for
decision makers to make decisions, and the more decisions someone makes the more experience
they develop; consequently they are better prepared to make the decisions required when the
operation actually unfolds.
    Performance enhance can also be realized, and traditionally has been realized, by training.
The challenge facing Joint Force Commanders is how to train a joint staff, which more often
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than not is an ad hoc collection of personnel, in a relatively short period of time before that staff
becomes operational. Here again the presentation of information could be in a format to elicit
physiological reactions in the personnel that would encourage the dynamic of team building.  For
example, information presentations designed to cause a "fight or flight" reaction in the COC
officers would also have the corollary effect of bonding the participants into a more cohesive
human network.  This is evident in the unifying effect that occurs among the recruits in Marine
Corps boot camp when they are subjected to shared stress and hardship, both of which cause
stimulation of the "fight or flight" reflex.
    Decision support is the ultimate combat multiplier; it should enhance a commander's ability to
defeat an adaptive enemy.  That enemy will only be defeated by the strength of what Napoleon
called the moral force, that imponderable combination of intellectual acuity and force of will.
The strength of the moral force is manifested in suitable and opportune decisions.  Those
decisions should in turn create a tempo of operations with which the enemy is unable to cope.
The friendly force's operational tempo is uniquely relative to the enemy's, but is generally
characterized by overwhelming, violent, and unrelenting pressure on the enemy.  That pressure
starts and is sustained by timely and appropriate decisions.  To paraphrase General Patton: " an
intuitive decision, made instinctively now, is far more effective than an analytical decision, made
carefully tomorrow."   Bring on the Agents…
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Roadmap Toward Knowledge Superiority
We must prepare our Navy for tomorrow.  In the future, the availability and capability of
our people and equipment remain important parameters for success, and there are many parts of
our Navy working on these issues.  The Navy’s responsibility, as executors of our processes,
must be to nurture our processes and where appropriate drastically change them for operations
(some would say survival) in the 21st century. Therefore, this paper is to discuss some actions
we must take to lead change for the future.
The world has changed in some very fundamental areas over the last decade – a digital
and network explosion, world politics, global press, international economics and trade, different
budget pressures and so on. You have heard these changes discussed many times, I won’t
expound on them here.  The implication, however, is significant for us.  Our strategy as we
operate in this new environment and into the next century is based on assured access and
knowledge superiority.  We have access today and you all intuitively understand it, we have
lived it throughout our careers.  We don’t have knowledge superiority and we don’t yet fully
understand it.  This paper is to discuss leading change in the context of achieving knowledge
superiority.
Knowledge superiority has many facets.  It will give us better and more appropriately
timed decisions, so that we can take more effective and efficient actions.   We will achieve this
through a much more organized and collaborative use of our collective information and by
networking our equipment, our people and our data.  This will require new processes, new
attitudes and new ways of doing our business.  Success in the future will not be just about
physical strength or size.  Those are important, but the team that wins will be the one that makes
the best use of its information and are agile in doing so. This has always been important, but it is
increasingly so today.  Technology and the potential of asymmetric challenges have dramatically
increased the value of this information.
Knowledge superiority (KS) will effect everything we do to include a significant
influence on three distinct aspects of our Navy.  First it will enable a new and significantly more
powerful and more effective level of warfighting.  It will bring us enhanced capabilities as
nuclear power did for the submarine, carrier aviation did for our capital ships, and amphibious
landings for the Marine Corps.   Secondly, KS will bring efficiency and effectiveness to the
support side of our Navy.  It will help us operate as a world class business, where we know what
things cost, and where and when to invest to achieve the most bang for the buck or the best
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retention.  Thirdly, KS will provide for a much enhanced Quality of Service experience for our
Sailors.  It will provide a modern work place, an efficient support structure, the tools Sailors
need to efficiently do their jobs – it will increase productivity and make the Sailor proud of his or
her Navy work place and job experience.
We are beginning a journey toward something new. In the end we will have changed
everything, the tools we use, the way we operate, the way we organize, the way we train, and the
way we interact. We don’t know the end state other than to sense it is very important, but I can
outline below some first steps we should take.  As we transition to a network culture the change
we must foster will be like that our forefathers managed in going from an agrarian to industrial
society.  It’s as if we were leaders of a 400,000 person farming community today and to acquire
more capability, to achieve more power, we decide we have to convert to an industrialized
society.  We would proceed in a bottom up fashion to build common infrastructure: roads, power
systems, water networks, phones etc.  With that started we would organize around that
infrastructure: set policies, and rules for driving the roads, set interoperability standards for the
electrical systems and form police departments, establish phone books and street addressees.
Then we would change our agrarian processes to take full advantage of the new capability: we
would set up assembly lines, create business rules, build malls etc.
Our journey now is to do likewise as we move from the industrial culture of the last
century into the networked and information society of the next century.  We must start by
building the infrastructure, the network.  We then must organize our information on that
network, and finally change our processes.  We are several years into this journey already… let
me summarize our current efforts and what we need to do this next year.  These are the steps we
need to take.
Step 1:  Build a network centric infrastructure:  Complete IT21 afloat, field the Navy Marine
Corps Intranet (NMCI) ashore and train all our people in basic network and information skills.
Our progression should be from computer illiteracy, through individual digital computing to
networked interactions of our people and data.  We are currently working on the last step.  IT21
brings the network to our ships, the CINCPACFLT (CPF) Base Area Network are the first steps
toward NMCI.  These projects move our shore structure from a bunch of individual computers
and support cells toward a coordinated collection of connected regional networks, with security
built in from the start.  This network and these network services should be regionalized.  We
must consolidate our physical network talent that is resident in individual commands today into
Regional Information Technology Service Centers (RITSC), and they must provide a reliable,
consistent, secure network “dial tone” for everyone in the region.  We are starting this
consolidation within CINCPACFLT (CPF) claimancies, but NMCI will make it Naval wide.
Step 2:  Organize our information:  Make use of the network.  Its purpose is for much more
than just emails.  We should begin to work off  “common table tops” of information, to work
collaboratively on documents, to share information across individual and command boundaries
all for the purpose of getting our information to more efficiently and effectively influence our
actions.  The first steps are to develop an information management (IM) capability within each
command; to assign command and regional information managers; to educate our people in these
new information skills; to start the process of designating data owners, and to specify
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authoritative data sources.  We are beginning to think of three levels of data and/or applications:
personal, regional and global.  Our goal where applicable is to mature data and applications, to
move them from the personal domain into the regional or global domain.  As they mature they
must become interoperable with network policies: firewall, VPN, addressing, data definitions,
data ownership, data health, enterprise processes, bandwidth, latency, scalability etc.  This will
be long and tedious, but we will just eat away at them one bite, one application one data source
at a time.  Two groups will lead us as we continue down this path our RITSCs who will provide
regional network service and  individual command IM talent.  Both must work together.  Both
must work up and down the chain of command.
Step 3:  Change our Processes:   This is the big pay off, that which gives our new Navy a
quantum increase in capability and efficiency over today’s world.  Initial steps have been taken
by the CPF solution provider initiative. Over the past two years it has worked within CPF staff
and their three TYCOMS and this year it’s focusing on Fleet processes through the Stennis and
BonHomme Richard deployment.  COMTHIRDFLEET has stood up a Network Centric
Innovation Center (NCIC) to capture the lessons learned on JCS/BHR, to gather those already
learned on previous deployments and to fold them into succeeding CVBG/ARG deployers.  To
begin the formalization of tactics, techniques and procedures for the new network centric Navy,
we are experimenting with these initiatives at the Global War Game series and in our Fleet Battle
Experiments.  The best process changes are the ones that bubble up from the bottom, providing
they are consistent with our IT and data architecture.  We must encourage these initiatives,
capture their ideas, and mature them but also make sure they will work on the global network.  A
Process Coordination Center is being stood up at CPF to facilitate this effort.  It will be tasked to
act as a resource for process change initiatives, to help coordinate those initiatives and to mature
solutions that have regional and global applicability.
This is the path we are on as we lead change in the CINCPACFLT and move to a
network centric environment and toward knowledge superiority.  First, build the infrastructure
and then in an iterative fashion organize our data on a regional table top and change our
processes.  There are some fundamental principles that are implicit in this journey:  bottom up
innovation, sharing of information, regional computing, group effort which coordinates
individual skills, just one network, growth of regional and enterprise data sources, individual
horizons that are flatter but much broader, capacity for faster decisions, monitoring more and
directing less, central standards and de-centralized actions, communities of interest, transparency
of information (within the approved organization), and many more that we have yet to discover.
In summary  we need to:
- Continue building the network (IT21, CPF BANs then NMCI, train our people)
- Form and participate in regional network governance (RITSCs)
- Develop IM skills within our organizations.
- Continue to better manage our information and to move it from individual to regional
or global capabilities.
- Change our processes to move away from our current industrial mindset toward a
network and information  rich culture.
- Foster innovation, capture the great ideas of our people
62
There is a huge payoff for us when the Navy makes this transformation.  However, to get
there will take the combined efforts of us all.  The inertia of  bureaucracy is against us ---  many
are comfortable with our current industrial age processes.   This journey into the future will take
vision, bold actions, and trust in our insticts.
Barriers to Collaboration
What are the requirements which enable the Navy to effectively collaborate - to enhance
the quality, timeliness and impact of our decision making process?  Industry has discovered – as
have we at CINCPACFLT Headquarters – that the adage of “if you build it they will come” is
necessary but probably not sufficient.  In addition to having people in the organization that
understand the need and value of collaboration and their having access to collaboration tools,
there seems a need for something more.  It requires a dedicated, coordinated effort across the
Navy.  That effort is essentially comprised of three pieces.  There is the technical piece, the
financial piece and the cultural piece.  All three pieces need to be developed and integrated into a
cohesive whole for us to effectively leverage the power of global access and collaboration to
strengthen our decision-making.  If successful, the impact of collaboration will be felt throughout
the tactical-through-strategic levels and across the administrative-through-operational realms.
Within the technical piece, the hardware must be sufficient to allow every naval member
access to the IT environment.  The connectivity must be universal, secure and bandwidth
considerate.  The software must be interoperable.  The administrators must be trained to keep it
all functioning and the users must be trained in how to use the software and how to employ
software services to enhance their work, their decision support and their ultimate decisions.  The
data architecture for the stored information must be wisely crafted and rigorously applied to
ensure redundant and contradicting information can be identified and eliminated.  The data input
procedures must be such that data elements are entered once and then be available to and used by
all that need them.
Within the financial piece, we must learn to adequately and rightly fund the IT enterprise.
This is an enormous challenge for our organization which is built on a vertical “platform”
orientation. Collaboration is a horizontal function. Our system has difficulty resourcing the
horizontal capabilities.
Another difficult aspect of the financial piece is the accounting for and distribution of
savings.  Collaboration has its value, but the value’s estimation is often hard to determine,
demonstrate or equate to dollars saved.  Value determination is also difficult by the benefit of
collaboration being realized, most often, across organizational lines.   What resource sponsor
gets credited with the savings and how do we redistribute the savings to pay for the costs of
collaboration?  Let’s use the example of an enterprise-wide Timekeeping tool.   Suppose that
DFAS sponsored the development, training and deployment costs.  But who funds the
integration, maintenance and support costs after the tool has been employed and where does the
time saved accrue?  In the back office or in the front office?
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The third piece of the dedicated effort to implement collaboration in the Navy is the
cultural one.  Does collaboration and information sharing come naturally to humans?  Some will
say it does and site the fact that we actually do it all the time -- in coffee rooms, over lunches, in
professional journals and in meeting rooms -- as proof.  Some say that it is not and site that our
culture values individual effort, individual expertise and individual originality.  Add into the mix,
our traditionally hierarchical organizational structures and we can find a situation that
organizationally and individually promotes stove-piped thinking and stove-piped working.
One of the premier issues that must be tackled to culturally enable collaboration is the
articulation and inculcation of the "WIFM" of collaboration.  "WIFM," or What’s In It For Me,
addresses the personal value of collaboration.  It will not be sufficient to address this purely at
the enterprise level.  The connection between collaboration and better decisions, decisions made
in a more timely fashion and the ability to implement decisions quickly are advantages that will
have to be spelled out for commands.  Collaboration’s power, the ability to enhance access to
information, to decrease the redundancy of effort and to promote rapid understanding of new
tasks must be expressed at the individual level.  It must be presented in ways that can be related
to the immediate situation.   Unless commands, departments, Junior Officers, Chiefs and Sailors
can see the value in collaboration, no one will do it.  And, those few brave souls that might try
will be restrained by their organizations that do not understand.
Armed with the value of collaboration and empowered with the means to collaborate, we
can start to attack the inhibitors that remain.  Lets focus on three big inhibitors to collaboration:
trust, time and know-how.  Chief among them is trust.
There are two principal aspects of the trust issue that need to be addressed successfully.
There is the obvious one of security.  Is the data and information collection, storage and
dissemination – as well as the act of collaboration itself -- done in a secure fashion?  Can one be
confident that the data, information and knowledge being gained through collaboration are
current, accurate and objectively presented?
Then there is the aspect of trusting the act of collaboration.  Will sharing (rather than
hoarding/parceling) one’s expertise diminish one’s value to the organization?  Will one be
criticized if they admit a lack of expertise in an area in which they seek collaboration?  Will one
be rebuked if a mistake is made during the highly visible act of collaborating?
Another inhibitor is time.  We are all faced with challenging days.  Collaboration takes
time. How do we create time for collaboration in our schedules?  We seem to have a relatively
narrow recognition of what is considered “productive.”  Point papers, Power Point presentations,
naval messages, correspondence – these are things we can point to, that we can count, that we
can understand as being demonstrations of productive endeavors.  We can trace how any one of
these played in a particular decision.  But we do not have the same regard for mentoring, getting
training, providing teaching, professional reading, open discussions of topics, reflection or
contemplation of ideas.  These things we tend to regard as sidelines to what we really do.  These
things are often not budgeted for in one’s time management calculations nor acknowledged as
necessary in decision making.  And yet these things are at the heart of collaboration.
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The last inhibitor is know-how.  Although, as stated earlier, sharing and collaboration are
natural acts for humans, our culture does not necessarily foster these activities.  Consequently,
we have a group of professionals that do not necessarily know how to collaborate or share
information.  Most of us would be hard pressed to identify that which we know and know well –
or to understand that which we do know is of value to someone else.  How many times have you
thought, “Well if I know it, everyone must know it”?
Even if we understood that something we knew might be of value to someone else, we
are not sure how to go about getting that information out to others.  And many of us don’t know
ALL the various ways of tapping into the information and the expertise of others.  Most Action
Officers start with a fresh piece of paper when they get a new task.  How do we teach them to
start with a search instead?
Now, there are things we can do to address these cultural inhibitors.  We can work toward
risk management rather than stay in the confines of risk avoidance.  We can establish data
ownership procedures and develop authoritative data sources.  We can revamp or reward and
create recognition and promotion systems to enhance our appreciation of collaboration as a job
requirement.  We can create expertise directories, super search engines, virtual constructs in
which collaboration can be facilitated and other collaboration tools.  And we can develop
training methodologies to help people understand how to share, what to share and how to use
what they gain from sharing.  Some of this can be assisted by technology.  However, a great deal
of it is procedural.  And this will only be successful if practiced within all the Navy’s
organization and throughout the naval enterprise.
Decisive Action Through
Better Decisions.
RADM Chuck Munns
CINCPACFLT N6N8
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Improving the Machine Side
• Build and operate one network.
• Organize content
• Facilitate cultural change
– network over platform
• Improve &  realign Processes.
Decisive Action Through Better, Faster Decisions
Requires a Cultural & Process
Change
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The Progression of Tools
Extended
Enterprise
Enterprise
Group
Individual
Data Information Knowledge Work
E-mail
Data Links
Shared
Files
Data
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Chat
Room
Team
Room
Collaborative
Space
Simulation
Adapted from: Enterprise.comt  f : t i .
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Improving Collaboration
(attack the inhibitors)
• Trust
– Incentive for Sharing
– Security
• Time
– Quadrant 1 vice Quadrant 2
– Redefine “productive”
• Not so much product based as,
• Mentoring, training, reflection, thinking.
• Know how
Data
Ideas        Experiences
Machine
Information
Knowledge
Decisions
Collaborate Correlate
Present
Reason
Perceive
Human
Thought
Current Efforts
Enhance Cognition
To Enable the Warrior
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Some New Principles
• Bottom up innovation
• Information - sharing, transparency, health.
• Movement from individual to Group
– computing, thinking, information stores
• Flattening of the organization
– Central standards, de-central actions.
• Faster time constants.
• Monitor more, direct less.
• Decision basis - more than geographic.
The Commanders View
• Intent
• issue landscape
• logic landscape.
• chat room for pertinent issues.
• Support that reacts to my intent.
• Open the time line (lessons, forecasting)
• Team that knows what’s important (info
flow)
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To Collaborate
• Net Technologies
• Collaborative Tools
• Multimedia Conferencing
Interact with national experts, the chain of command,
home base and peers.  Key ingredients are teamwork
and a shared resource.
Leads to anchor desks & home echelons,
creating smarter  warriors,  improved
PERSTEMPO,  higher morale & better support.
Leads to anchor desks  ho e echelons,
creating s arter  arriors,  i proved
P ST P ,  higher orale  better support.
• Data Mining (Data Search, Filter, Correlate, Fuse)
• Multimedia Interface, Uncertainty Representation
• Data Visualization and Anomaly Detection
• Autonomous Software Agents
Creates a smarter commander through better
comprehension of enemy actions and more
effective use of historical lessons.
reates a s arter co ander through better
co prehension of ene y actions and ore
effective use of historical lessons.
Use Software and Computer Speed to Find New and
Meaningful Relationships Among Data
To Correlate & Present
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• Computer Forecasting
• Software Agents
• Life Long Personal Digital Assistant (PDA)
• Visual Computing
Information Technologies to Reduce Data Overload
and Infuse Increased Understanding
Dominant warfighting through easier
acquisition of knowledge, allowing more time
for better decisions.  Will reduce manning.
o inant arfighting through easier
acquisition of kno ledge, allo ing ore ti e
for better decisions.  ill reduce anning.
To Perceive
• Memory Assistance & Pattern  Recognition
• Battlefield Metaphors
• Complex Adaptive Systems & Genetic Algorithms
The Warrior Making Better Decisions Through
Enhanced Cognition
The mind and the computer evolve together.
This can fundamentally change the way we
train and educate.
The ind and the co puter evolve together.
This can funda entally change the ay e
train and educate.
To Reason
71
(Intentionally blank)
(Intentionally blank)
72
Measuring the Human Dimension in
Information Superiority
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Director
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Measuring  the Human Dimension in
Information Superiority
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Agenda
• Key Concepts
– Information Superiority
– Information vs. Awareness
• Classic HEAT Measures of Information
• Command Post of the Future (CPOF) Measures of Awareness
– Organizing the Issue
– Example Results from Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) 1
: What is it?
Different Perspectives,
the Same Bottom Line:
More for Us; Less for Them
ifferent Perspectives,
the Sa e Botto  Line:
ore for s; Less for The
The capability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information
while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability
to do the same. DPG and Joint Pub 3-13
The
Information from Sources
to People at Time and
Place in Format. DPG
Joint Vision 2010:  The band
where the miracle happens.
Assured
Information on
Demand
Anywhere in
Real Time with
Zero Error
Seamless Joint
and Combined
Interoperability
Information
Overload
Information
E
ff
ec
t iv
en
es
s
The Information Edge
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           Two Sides of  
•Increased Tempo
•Increased Lethality
•Improved Survivability
•Quicker Victory
•Efficiency
•Responsiveness
•“Just in Time”Logistics
•Smaller Inventory
•Smaller Footprint
A Relative State that is Achieved when a Competitive Advantage is Derived from
the Ability to Exploit an Information Advantage
More Teeth
Less Tail
Network-Centric
Enterprise
Network-Centric
Warfare
Infostructure
Information Superiority
A State
achieved by establishing a
Relative Information Advantage
from which a
Competitive Advantage
can be gained
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Key Attributes
Networking the
Force Collaboration
Sharing
Protection Offensive IO
Adversary
Awareness
Shared
Awareness
Synchronization
Synchronization
Shared
Awareness
Awareness
 Cognitive Domain
World View
Body of Personal Knowledge
Experience/ Training
Individual Capabilities
Human
Perception
Reality
Information/Knowledge Domain
Knowledge of Situation
       Information
Data
Situational
Understanding
Awareness
Assessment
Indicants
Overall
Patterns
Entities
Domain Spaces
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Information & Awareness
• Battlespace Information results from the fusion of key elements
that characterize the battlespace
– Explicit Information (e.g. position of forces, geography, and
weather)
– Requires Little Interpretation
– Can be communicated quickly and easily
• Battlespace Awareness yields predictive ability based upon
interpretations based upon experience and a priori knowledge
– Tacit Information (e,g,. capability and tactics of an adversary, local
customs, intent)
– Supporting facts can be easily transferred, the underlying
organizing logic can seldom be transferred quickly and easily.
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“The Situation” is
Patterns Between and Among
Missions and Constraints in Mission
Environment
– Physical (Terrain, Weather, etc…
– Political, Social, Economic
– Neutrals and Innocents
Time
&
Space
Opportunities
&
Risks
Forces Red
–Capabilities & Intentions
Forces Blue
–Capabilities & Intentions
Other
–Capabilities & Intentions
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What is Awareness
•Not the Information
•Available
•Requested
•Provided
•But “What Sticks Between the Ears” about the situation
– Always Perceived
– Never Complete
– Always incorporates the individuals’
 ~ experience
 ~ training
 ~ world view
 ~ body of personal knowledge
Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment
Tool (HEAT)
HEAT is a set of consistent procedures that measure the effectiveness of a
military headquarters or command center
• Quantitative, objective, and reproducible assessment of quality of C2
processes and overall effectiveness of directives
• Applied more than 50 times to exercises and real world applications in
more than 200 command centers
HEAT views headquarters as analogous to an adaptive control system that
influences environment through plans and directives
• Headquarters can be judged by viability of plans
– Remain in effect for intended period
– Include contingencies
– Achieve assigned missions
• Diagnostic scores for quality of C2 processes
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HEADQUARTERS
HEAT Analytic Structure
DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS PREDICT CONSEQUENCES
QUERY
INFORM
UNDERSTANDING
MONITOR
DECIDE
DIRECT
AWARENESS
ENVIRONMENT:
     - OWN & ENEMY FORCES
     - PHYSICAL
     - POLITICAL & ECONOMIC
INFORMATION
HEAT Information Measures
Completeness
• Are all the required elements present?
Correctness
• Does the information match the truth?
Consistency of Shared Information
• Is the information the same across all nodes?
Precision
• Was the information presented at the proper level of
precision?
Currency (Latency)
• How old is the information?
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The goal of CPOF is to shorten the commander’s decision cycle
to stay ahead of the adversary’s ability to react.
Command Post of the Future
Command Post of the Future (CPOF) is a DARPA program that aims to:
•  Increase Speed and Quality of Command Decisions
– Faster recognition and better understanding of changing battlefield
situation
– Faster and more complete exploration of available courses of
action
• Provide More Effective Dissemination of Commands
– COA capture for dissemination of commander’s intent
– Status and capability feedback from deployed operators
• Enable Smaller, More Mobile and Agile Command Structures
– More mobile, distributed command element
– Smaller support tail & reduced deployment requirements
Limited Objective Experiment - 1
(LOE -1)
Hypothesis:
• Tailored visualizations will improve Situation
Awareness
MOEs:
• Correctness of Situation Awareness
• Quality of Pattern Recognition
• Level of Entity Retention
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Force-on-Force
Insurgency
Situation 13Situation 10
Situation 5Situation 4
Less 
Complex
More 
Complex
LOE-1 Scenario Space
Data Collection
• 157 valid runs over 5 days (98% of design goal of 160)
• Data Collection Vehicle - Debrief Questionnaire
• Questions divided into four major elements: overall
Situation Assessment, Patterns, Elements, and a Sketch of
the situation
• Military experience data collected for each subject
• Run randomization compensated for variations between
coders and subjects
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Top Level Measures
• Overall Situation Awareness
– Picture of the battlespace - enemy posture and
intentions, friendly possibilities for favorable action
• Pattern Recognition
– Dynamics of the battlespace - relative positions,
strength, and capabilities
• Element Retention
– Locations, status, events over time
• Ability to draw a general Sketch with relative positioning
of important entities in space and time
“The Situation” is
Patterns Between and Among
Missions and Constraints in Mission
Environment
– Physical (Terrain, Weather, etc…
– Political, Social, Economic
– Neutrals and Innocents
Time
&
Space
Opportunities
&
Risks
Forces Red
–Capabilities & Intentions
Forces Blue
–Capabilities & Intentions
Other
–Capabilities & Intentions
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Shared Awareness
Information
Domain
View 1
Information
Domain
View 2
Information
Domain
View 3
Information
Domain
View 4
Awareness
Human 3
Awareness
Human 4
Situation
Shared Awareness
Awareness
Human 2
Sensors
Organic Sensors
Shared Information
Awareness
Human 2
1.You have three minutes to brief your commander on your assessment of the situation, what do you tell him?
Debrief Questionnaire
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1a.  In this situation what are the friendly:
Opportunities?
Risks?
1b  What are the adversary’s:
Offensive capabilities?
Defensive capabilities?
Vulnerabilities?
Intentions?
1c.  What are the vulnerabilities for own forces?
2a.  If you are not certain about adversary intentions and capabilities, what are the different possibilities?
2b.  If you are not certain, what information would you require to resolve this uncertainty?
3a.  What specific elements or element combinations lead you to your situation assessment?
3b.  Please make a sketch of the situation, including the specific elements or element combinations cited in
your previous answer.
3c.  Was any information you would find valuable missing from the presentation of the situation?
4.  What was good and or bad about this display?  What would you like to see added, removed or changed?
Debrief Questionnaire (cont’)
Metrics
Overall
• Prompted % of key components wrong inferences    added inferences
• Unprompted % of key components wrong inferences    added inferences
Patterns % of pre-identified           wrong            added
Elements % of important elements           wrong            added
Sketch % of pre-identified elements        wrong            added
         temporal pattern
         geographic pattern
Completeness Correctness Richness
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Today’s Technology
Allegiance
 Color Coding
Treatment B
Blobs and Allegiance
Color Coding
• CPOF: “Present time
is reached.”
Bn  - enemy
Co   - enemy
Pt   - enemy
Bn  - friend
Co   - friend
Pt   - friend
Legend
Treatment A
Function
 Color Coding
The Force-on-Force
Visualization Treatments
Interpretation
• CPOF Technologies Generated:
– Better Situation Awareness (Higher Mean or X)
– CPOF Technologies Performance Improves for Prompted
CPOF Technologies Significantly
Outperform Control in Overall Scores
Prompted
23.89 25.62
21.41
33.86
N=157    p=.007
Unprompted
22.30 23.40
17.77
25.80
N=157    p=.058
s
x
Control
CPOF Technologies
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CPOF Technologies Significantly
Outperform Control in Complex Situations
Interpretation:
CPOF Technologies generated better Situation Awareness
(higher mean or x) in complex situations
Unprompted Prompted
6.28 18.53
3.95
17.24
N=78    p=.000
8.85 18.28
5.10
19.96
N=78  p=.000
s
Control
CPOF Technologies
x
15.00 15.93 12.06 14.85
Treatment B Outperforms Treatment A in
Overall Situation Awareness in Situation 13
Unprompted
22.93
N=29   p=.073
Prompted
29.66
12.71
N=29    p=.002
s
x
Treatment B
Treatment A
Interpretation:
Treatment A used icon visualization scheme that subjects
stated was confusing
12.21
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Summary
• Information does awareness
• Natural layers of overall patterns and elements
• Measures must always be developed in a
military context
• Overall
• Patterns
• Elements
• Incorrect
• Richness
Value Chain
Operational Advantage
Better Execution
Networking the
Force Collaboration
Awareness Shared
Awareness
Synchronization
Sharing
Offensive IOProtection
Adversary
Information and Awareness Advantage
(less fog)
Execution Advantage
(less friction)
Better Decisions
Better Plans
Synchronization
Shared
AwarenessAwareness
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Hierarchy of       Measures
Policy EffectivenessPolicy Effectiveness
Policy EffectivenessTask/Mission Effectiveness
Policy EffectivenessSynchronization
Policy EffectivenessDecision Making
Policy EffectivenessShared Understanding
Policy
Effectiveness
Shared
Information
Policy
EffectivenessInformation
Policy
EffectivenessAwareness
Policy
Effectiveness
Shared
Awareness
Measures of
Human
Performance
• Reaction time
• Expertise
• Experience
• Leadership
• Motivation
• Fatigue
Measures of
System
Performance
• Platforms
• Networks
• Decision Aids
• Presentation
• Sensors
• Weapons
• Logistics
Advantage
Awareness
Information
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Tactical Communications and Networking:
The Last Mile Challenge
Jeffrey S. Ribel
Systems Analyst
Adroit Systems, Inc.
Technology as an Enabler to Small Unit Operations
One of the first experiments conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
(MCWL) in 1995 set out to determine the effect of simple commercial technologies on the
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of small units conducting dispersed operations.
Standard fire teams composed of four Marines were run through intense scenarios with a
standard set of equipment.  Then they completed the same scenarios while equipped with
commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment like cell phones and handheld Global Positioning
System (GPS) devices.  The results were amazing.  Once the young Marines realized that the
devices were easy to use and reliable, they decided to change their TTPs to incorporate these
enabling technologies.  They dramatically improved their operational efficiency and
effectiveness within the scope of each scenario.  They were able to split into smaller teams since
they now had reliable mobile communications.  They had a large piece of enhanced situation
awareness (SA), since they knew their own position location information along with that of their
adjacent and subordinate units.  Given the resources and the mandate, these young Marines
displayed initiative and innovative thinking that reaffirmed the validity of the Marine Corps
Warfighting Laboratory’s theory that concept-based experimentation is the best approach to
properly integrate information technology with Marine Corps tactics, techniques and procedures.
This is just one example of how the explosion of information technology (IT) can
revolutionize military, government, and civilian organizations individually and collectively.
Conversely, there is still a paradox since every IT solution we innovate uncovers more questions
and issues, and increases our reliance on the very same technologies that solved the initial
problem.  One such dilemma is how do we enable warfighters and first responders with enhanced
situation awareness and a communications and network architecture to support such capabilities?
The answer is in the above example.  We must field 80% solutions to operating forces and
organizations in small increments to experiment with the new capabilities in that environment.
How do we take this one step farther?  We give them training, equipment, and ongoing support
for required decision support tools.  The paradox lies in the fact that these capabilities require
appropriate communications and network connectivity across all levels of the organization.  The
major challenge is to bridge the current gap between the upper and middle levels down to the end
users out in the field.  These end users are considered “disadvantaged” because that gap currently
poses challenges not seen in providing connectivity for command posts and larger facilities.
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These end users – often small military teams, first responders, and others out in the field – must
have interoperability, flexibility, responsiveness, mobility, discipline, survivability, and
sustainability, all characteristics that support -- not hinder -- mission accomplishment.  Herein
lies the challenge of “the last mile.”
Unfortunately, there is no one solution that fits all last mile requirements.  I would love to
stand here and say, “Ladies and gentlemen, I have analyzed your organizations’ diverse last mile
requirements, and I proudly present to you the panacea for your ills: Wireless Local Area
Network (LAN).”  Our problem is not this simple.  If it were I would not be standing before you
as a Systems Analyst, I would be the Chief Technology Officer or Chief Executive Officer of a
global communications and networking powerhouse!  Rather, we will identify the boundaries of
the last mile problem, scope the requirements for a solution, and later discuss in open forum
potential technologies and products that should be in our toolbox of solutions.  This is rightfully
so, since innovation and integration require education, training and personnel equally as much as
the enabling technologies.
A Focus on Information Superiority
To set the stage for today’s operational environment, let us briefly discuss the military
point of view.  General Gordon Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, states that “Information is
the currency of victory on the battlefield.” (JP 3-13 1998)  Furthermore, Joint Publication 3-13
says
“Rapidly advancing information-based technologies and an increasingly competitive
global environment have thrust information into the center stage in society, government,
and warfare in the 21st Century. Information and information based technologies are
pervasive and impact every facet of warfighting…” (JP 3-13 1998)
This quote directly addresses the information and IT-based nature of our command and control
systems and current operations.
Joint Publication 1-02 (2000) defines a command and control system as “the facilities,
equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned.”  We
refer to each of these components as vital parts of command and control.  There is no value in
trying to determine which component is most important.  Without being too cliché, we see that
the whole is definitely the sum of its parts.  The value of the command and control system is
highly dependent on the quality of the components that comprise the system.  To use the military
example again, we can engineer and improve parts of the system to the nth degree, but without
communications the system crumbles, and without some level of decision support, there is very
little value to the mission-oriented commander.  In relation to decision support, information
technology and communications are pillars in the foundation of any command and control
system designed to implement and support such a worthwhile endeavor.
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Why is Decision Support a Worthwhile Endeavor?
Command and control warfare is based on protecting our information and information
technologies, while attempting to interrupt the enemy’s ability to do the same.  Many current
forms of unconventional and unrestricted warfare revolve around our ability to destroy the
enemy’s will to fight by affecting their command and control systems and delaying or preventing
decision-making.  Conversely, decision support tools allow us to filter out irrelevant information
and pinpoint specific bits of knowledge that speed our ability to make important decisions.  The
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s dynamic decision-making hypothesis states that,
 “One of the characteristics of the 21st Century battlefield is…a more rapid operational
tempo coupled with larger quantities of information more rapidly available to commanders.
Hence, success will depend to a greater extent on their ability to make faster and better
decisions at all levels of command.” (MCWL 2000)
Joint Pub 6-02 (1996) states that command, control, communications, and computer (C4)
infrastructures must “Provide decision support for maneuver, targeting, fire support, intelligence,
air operations, logistics, and information warfare.” Decision support is inextricably tied not only
to successful military operations, but also to government and industry operations.  In today’s IT-
based environment, commanders and leaders could easily drown in irrelevant information, which
would incapacitate their decision-making ability and thwart any attempt to bring order to the
massive flow of information into an organization’s command facility.  Decision support tools
like the Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control system (IMMACCS) and
SEAWAY enable:
• Enhanced situation awareness (SA) through a common, adaptable, scalable, and tailored
view of the environment
• High level internal representation of characteristics of (and relationships between) real
world objects in the environment
• Structured decision support via agent-based reasoning applied to the above objects,
relationships, and environment
• Event alerts specified by user parameters
• Interface and data sharing with legacy systems, and
• Human-computer partnership based on the strengths of each partner
Decision support systems have commercial promise as well.  For example, early internet
search engines were based on indexing by keyword and presented much more irrelevant
information than the latest search engines that incorporate some sort of agent based reasoning.  A
search for “CDM” in the Excite search engine (http://www.excite.com), may produce a link to
the CDM Technologies website, but also to the Church of Divine Man & CDM Psychic Institute!
The search algorithm has no way to determine which CDM meets the search request, so it
presents both possibilities, and thousands of others as well.  A search at Ask Jeeves
(http://www.askjeeves.com), which uses a natural language parsing agent, allows queries in the
form of a question, such as “What is the URL for CDM Technologies?”  This Query returns
potential answers based on the context of the question and arranged by each relevant word in the
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query.  Ask Jeeves also presents an aggregated group of relevant hits from various other search
engine sites on a single screen in drop down selection boxes.  This is no silver bullet for the
information consumer, but as search engines incorporate lower level decision support related
technologies, they enable relevant and timely information flow to website visitors who will
return and continue to use the tools that provide valuable results.
Many Fortune 500 companies warehouse functional area data by storing it in databases
from companies like Oracle, Informix, and Microsoft.  The companies mine this data using query
tools supplied by companies like MicroStrategy.  Imagine the power of a decision support front
end for these query tools.  Agents could mine an object-oriented database (OODB) of millions of
objects to create and establish relationships between them.  In the area of networking, Lockheed
Martin has created just such a tool.  This tool uses agents to examine a database of information
composed of event logs, network traffic, network activity, email, and other services.  The query
agent sorts the information and permits screening of network activity by keyword, user, service,
and combinations of each.  The applications of this tool range from business intelligence to
corporate network misuse detection to information warfare.
The above examples of decision support in action derive their value from the ability to
access relevant information via the networks and communications that connect each node on the
network. In the case of a local area network (LAN), if connectivity is lost between nodes there is
no decision support, unless information is cached locally and used in a latent manner.  Metcalf’s
Law states that the value of a network increases by the square of the number of nodes on that
network.  Communications and networking over the last mile is critical to an organization’s
ability to provide decision support and information flow between different levels in the
hierarchy.
Recent Paradigm Shifts That Favor Technical Solutions
Humans naturally strive to increase productivity, as proven by recent attempts to leverage
the benefits of information technology at all costs.  Occasionally, paradigm shifts like this occur
that lead to organizational change and societal progression (or regression).  Convergence in time
of recent shifts has led to “Revolutions in [Every Category].”  The following paradigm shifts are
particularly relevant to the challenges associated with last mile connectivity.
The Nintendo Generation.  Moore’s Law states that computer processing power doubles
every 18 months. He stated this theory in the late 1960s.  Today, the law still applies, and we
have children from multiple generations that grew up familiar with that processing power, and
covet it in everyday life.  These children use that increasing processing power and personal
experience to continue the innovation cycle as they move into the military, government, and
civilian workforce.  This experience is vitally important to proper training and the resultant
lifecycle of technology.
Shift in Research and Development Spending.  As consumer demand for information
technology grew, research and development (R&D) by industry grew while overall military
budgets shrank, along with that portion allocated to research and development.  The Department
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of Defense has a long history of innovative developments like the original internet and satellite
communications.  In recent past, industry has far surpassed military capability to innovate.  The
military and government agencies must take advantage of commercial off the shelf (COTS)
product development to enable our organizations and personnel to get the job done, just like
industry enables consumers today.
Some antagonists would argue that we are too dependent on industry to provide
technology to the masses. The following quote has a negative connotation, but certainly has the
ring of truth based on historical precedent.
“Technology is like ‘magic shoes’ on the feet of mankind, and after the spring has been
wound tightly by commercial interests, people can only dance along with the shoes,
whirling rapidly in time to the beat that they set.” (Liang and Xiangsui 1999)
Interestingly enough, it comes from the book “Unrestricted Warfare” by two People’s Liberation
Army senior colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.
The Wired World.  Wired magazine does not derive its name from the copper and fiber -
optic cables that circle the globe today.  The term “wired” has become synonymous with
seamless, always-on connectivity often implemented with wireless and broadband technologies.
Unlike the origins of wireless radio frequency (RF) technology developed for the military,
wireless today has a distinctly commercial connotation, often associated with standards-based,
open networks like TCP/IP and other types of internet connectivity.
The Value is in the Network.  Commercial emphasis used to lie in providing a product
or service.  Many companies and investment professionals now recognize that Metcalf’s Law
shows that value often lies in your network, not in the single node.  The collective power of the
consumer base is one example.  Internet Service Providers and many other internet based
businesses already (or will soon) offer free products and/or services while making money by
mining the collective value of their consumer base.  The long-term viability of this business
model has yet to stand the test of time, but we already see companies commoditizing technology
products like cell phones and personal computers to create a valuable and sizable client base as a
profit center.
Mesh Network Topologies can Flatten Hierarchical Organizations.  Many
organizations reap the benefits of decentralized command and coordination today.  When smaller
and smaller teams become networked, the network’s value increases for the sponsoring
organization.  By pushing connectivity down to lower levels, we enable decision-makers on
scene if they have access to useful tools via the network.  Of course, the end user knowledge of
“commander’s intent” and the procedures behind the technology directly impact the
organization’s ability to successfully flatten their structure.
The Strategic Corporal.  As we push information and delegate responsibility down the
organizational chain, we also increase the requirement for proper education, training, experience,
and ultimately mission success.  Recently there has been an increased emphasis on small unit
operations.  What used to be tactical implications on outcome quickly become strategic in nature
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when we empower smaller, task-organized units with the mandate to perform and the right
decision support tools.  Connectivity to these lower levels becomes increasingly important, and
we note that due to the change in perspective and focus, what we commonly call “the last mile”
is really “the first mile.”  This paradigm shift will help focus our collective attention and assets
on the problem at hand – appropriate “tactical” communications and networking.
Miniaturization as an Enabler.  The transformation from an analog to a digital world
and breakthroughs in signal processing and computing have proven that miniaturization drives
innovative new products and services never before considered possible. In about fifty years, state
of the art has gone from a computer called ENIAC that literally filled rooms with vacuum tubes
to a matchbox-sized web server that fits in a shirt pocket; from transistors to Application Specific
Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and Digital Signal Processors (DSPs); from systems to systems on a
chip that allow alphanumeric pagers, and soon cell phones, in a wrist watch form factor.
As if a testament to the power of the information technology paradox, the following
quote addresses computing speed,
"...With the advent of everyday use of elaborate calculations, speed has become
paramount to such a high degree that there is no machine on the market today capable of
satisfying the full demand of modern computational methods. The most advanced
machines have greatly reduced the time required for arriving at solutions to problems,
which might have required months or days by older procedures. This advance, however,
is not adequate for many problems encountered in modern scientific work and the present
invention is intended to reduce to seconds such lengthy computations..." (ENIAC Patent,
1947)
This observation has stood the test of time. The source is the ENIAC patent filed on June 26,
1947.
Challenges of the First Mile
Joint Publication 6-0 states that C4 systems must be interoperable, flexible, responsive,
mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable. (JP 6-0 1995)  These characteristics all apply to
connectivity over the first mile, especially when providing tools like decision support to
dispersed personnel.
Interoperability is key to the success of military, government, and industry system design
and implementation.  Assets and resources are wasted if we do not design for interoperability
throughout each stage in the system lifecycle.  Due to previous investment and different
technical requirements and approaches, most solutions will comprise a system of systems, each
interoperable or compatible, and modified for use as a collaborative system.  The days of
creating stovepipe or proprietary system are gone, unless there is a compelling fiscal, security or
technical requirement for the system.  Eventually, older legacy and stovepipe systems will
disappear as they become unsustainable for fiscal and maintenance reasons.  Open systems and
standards will become the norm due to commercial investment.
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Flexibility includes the ability to employ a system across each possible organizational
scenario without extensive system reconfiguration or degradation.  Systems must be scalable and
adaptable for differing operational requirements and environments.  Flexible systems provide the
services required without major impact on the end users or communications and network
planners.
Responsiveness calls for appropriate reliability, quality of service, and availability across
the system at various levels throughout the organization.  Systems must be timely and redundant
if necessary. Timeliness means speed. Latency will destroy a network’s ability to support real
time applications and decision support tools.  Redundancy can be achieved through alternate
paths or duplicate (backup) equipment, and graceful restoration of service(s) following an
outage.
Mobility is characterized by small, portable or handheld system components that easily
facilitate regular and continuous movement.  Systems at the end user level should not inhibit the
operational tactics or required information flow to and from each organizational node.  Mobility
is ideally characterized by systems that require little or no ground-based infrastructure for small
units.  Wired and cabled systems are often not mobile.  Individuals and units need to seamlessly
roam throughout the operating area without extensive reconfiguration or regular reissue of
equipment.
Discipline should be inherent to the system and the organizations employing the system
in an operational environment.  Discipline includes physical and procedural management and
systems control functions, security, and prioritization of information flow.
Survivability entails system security, including physical, cryptologic, operational, and
procedural protection.  The system must be robust enough to provide the services required in
extreme environments without susceptibility to jamming, intrusion, deception, or interference.
Security is absolutely vital.  In the military operational environment, any lack of ability to protect
your information and systems is a showstopper.
Sustainability includes maintainability for extended periods, and self-supporting
operations for shorter periods of time.  A sustainable system should also continue to operate
locally if wide area connectivity is lost.
How Much Bandwidth is Necessary?
Bandwidth is a favorite communications and networking topic.  As a Marine Corps Basic
Communications Officer Course (BCOC) student in 1992, our class motto was “It’s all about
bandwidth, baby.”  This concept is reinforced by an unidentified source that once said as quickly
as bandwidth becomes available, it would be saturated by applications and systems that do not
necessarily exist or are not supported today.  This reflects the rapidly changing IT environment
and our ability to quickly fill the dark fiber that has already been laid.  I have repeatedly seen
briefing slides from high levels in the Department of Defense that estimate military component
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and Joint Task Force (JTF) bandwidth requirements.  With every brief, the estimates increased
dramatically, from hundreds of kilobits per second for each service, to greater and greater orders
of magnitude.  Every organization must determine its own bandwidth requirements based on
operational need and focus of effort and resources.
A good example of this trend to fill available bandwidth is our use of Microsoft
PowerPoint in the conference rooms of America. Militarily, the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff recently ordered briefers to abandon slick graphics and avoid
glitzy slide transitions and sound effects while focusing only on substantive briefing material.
Commercially, the San Jose Mercury News recently published an interview with the CEO of
SUN Microsystems, Scott McNealy.  Mr. McNealy pointed out that he discovered their corporate
network contained 12.9 gigabytes of PowerPoint slides that required untold man-hours to
research, compile, jazz up, brief, and maintain.  He banned the use of PowerPoint and noted that
since his decision, SUN has posted three straight quarters of record profits due to their
employees’ return to substantive work.  Despite his ongoing operating system battle with
Microsoft and his obviously biased personal opinion, Mr. McNealy has a valid point.  We must
focus on providing the most relevant information in a timely manner to the right people at the
right place at the right time. This renewed focus dictates an appropriate mix of communications
for decision support and the optimum level of interaction between the computer (hardware and
software) and its human operator.
The Human-Computer Partnership
Figure 1 depicts the Cognitive Hierarchy as outlined in Joint Publication 6-0 (1995).
Although a simple concept, the Cognitive Hierarchy sets the framework within which
communications, decision support, and computer hardware and software must interact.  Human
and computer processing is applied to data, which turns into information.  Human cognition is
applied to information, which turns into knowledge.  Human judgment is applied to knowledge,
which turns into understanding.  In turn, understanding enables human decision-making with
computer assistance.  Communications provide the transport mechanism between each of the
various levels in the cognitive hierarchy.  As stated by Chapman, Wood and Pohl, “while the
computer can retrieve and send information from and to shared databases, it exercises these
capabilities only on the request of its user.  Collaboration within the problem team is largely
restricted to the communications initiated by team members.” (Chapman et al. 2000)  CDM
Technologies and Cal Poly have been very careful to develop collaborative decision support
systems that use the strengths of the human and computer partners, rather than just automating
human manual processes.  In fact, they note that human and computer capabilities are
complimentary.  “Human capabilities are particularly strong in areas such as communication,
symbolic reasoning, conceptualization, learning, and intuition…Computer capabilities are
strongest in the areas of parallelism, speed and accuracy.” (Chapman et al. 2000)
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Figure 1.  The Cognitive Hierarchy
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has embraced the human-computer
partnership, to the degree that it is virtually inseparable from their Five Year Experimentation
Plan.  Through an iterative process of research, development, experimentation, refinement, and
exploitation, they strive to find the best fit within the Marine Corps for various information-
related enabling technologies.  Throughout this process, all data collected is captured for the
record and later scrutinized to determine the successes and failures ascribed to certain systems
and technologies.  Along the way, tactics, techniques and procedures are developed, modified,
and disseminated as lessons learned to the Fleet Marine Force.
I urge you to follow the example set by the Marine Corps. Commit resources to study
your organization’s special operational requirements and bandwidth needs.  Along the way,
educate your employees on the potential efficiencies and new capabilities possible within an IT-
enabled organization.  Incite technical and procedural innovation and infuse your organization
with the pride that evolves from overcoming the challenges posed by the evolving operational
environment.
Summary
In conclusion, the military, government, and industry must join together to research and
develop affordable communications and networking systems that use efficient protocols and
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pervasive standards and promote interoperability, flexibility, responsiveness, mobility,
discipline, survivability, and sustainability for operating forces at the lowest appropriate levels of
our organizations.  We must band together to garner industry and government sponsorship of
important efforts like the National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue’s (NIUSR) Extreme
Information Infrastructure (XII) effort led by Lois Clark McCoy.  We must send our technicians,
engineers, and programmers out into the field with operating forces to learn the constraints and
restraints of the environments in which our organizations work, and for which they are
developing solutions.  A renewed focus on reducing and overcoming the challenges of the first
mile will both enable future two-way information flow for decision support and ensure that
decision support is available in near-real time to those that can benefit the most – the personnel
on scene in the “heat of the moment.”
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Information Representation Basis of Decision Support Systems
Russell Leighton
CAD Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, California
Introduction
The software industry (and to great extent the computer industry as a whole) is undergoing
radical change with respect to information exchange and management. It is recognized that with
the tremendous increase in the flow of information, brought about by the advent of the global
Internet, that management of this flood has become a primary issue. Even from an individual
perspective managing daily information-flow consumes a large fraction of our productive time.
Worse yet, we can expect that the flow rate will increase with time. Additionally, issues
regarding the exchange of information are becoming industry-wide concerns as indicated by the
increasing interest in distributed systems and common data exchange formats. It is recognized
that we can no longer afford development of distributed systems using incompatible data
exchange schemes. It is also becoming more evident that passing around unintelligent (flat) data
restricts the ability to filter information and/or imposes large resource penalties to adequately
interpret the data. Hence, even with the limited application of decision support in current
systems, future information processing systems are going to rely heavily on decision support to
manage the flood. By building systems, or even complete operating environments, that utilize
intelligent information representation the addition of decision support becomes a natural fit.
The focus of this paper will be to discuss the use of ontological models as the basis for
representing information in decision support systems. After a brief explanation of what an
Ontological model is, discussions of why ontological models might be used, how to go about
developing a model, some limitations of ontological models, and the possibilities for extension
will follow.
What Is an Ontological Model?
The representation of data and its interpretation for decision support systems by necessity must
be complex due to the very nature of the decision support process. Either this complexity may be
defined in the interpretation of the data or it may be placed in the data representation itself. By
placing the complexity in the data representation, less work would need to be performed to
interpret the data. Additionally, this complex representation may more accurately reflect the real
nature of the problem we are trying to analyze and may in fact more directly represent the
knowledge that we are trying to capture. It could be further argued that as we move this
complexity into the representation we are moving more towards a true information representation
and away from the less complex data representation.
Complex information representation may be best described using an Ontological Model. The
definition of an Ontological Model could be defined based on the notion of an Ontology. The
dictionary definition of Ontology is "a particular theory about the nature of being or the kinds of
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existents" which is rather open-ended and subject to interpretation. We could describe an
Ontological Model more specifically as "a model describing kinds of objects based on
characteristics, relationships, and behavior."
The descriptive features of an object are described by its characteristics. A typical flat data
representation would consist solely of these characteristics. However, "real world" objects are
characterized not by just their outward features but also by their relationships - the roles that they
play with respect to other objects. For example, a door can be described by its dimensions, color,
etc. However, by recognizing that the door also serves the role of an opening between connecting
rooms we can infer additional information. Furthermore, relationships themselves may have
characteristics that could constrain roles. A constraint, for example, could be defined restricting
the role of a room-opening to that of a door (or possibly a window). A strictly relational data
representation would include relationships (roles as keys to foreign tables) but with no logical
constraints.
In addition to its features and relationships an object can be further characterized by its behavior -
e.g. how the object responds or acts based on some internal or external stimulus. Behavior could
be, for example, simply the derivation of a feature based on other characteristics. If the dependant
characteristics change then the feature would be updated as defined by the object's behavior. In a
simple data representation all behaviors must be inferred and would therefore be subject to the
particular perspective of the interpreting entity. In some situations, this inference of behavior
makes sense because the outcome may be dependent on the environment in which reasoning
occurs (such as with a software agent or human being providing decision support). However, if
this behavior is inherent in the logic of the object and is intended to represent a common
response then it makes sense to implement the behavior in the object rather than require that all
interpreting entities implement the same logic.
Why Use an Ontological Model?
The basis of object-oriented representation is firmly rooted in "real world" concepts and the way
that human beings perceive their environment, therefore, a natural use of an ontological model
would be to represent "real world" objects. Systems employing expert knowledge therefore
benefit greatly from such a natural representation of the domain upon which they reason on.
Additionally, Ontological models may be utilized throughout the system development process.
As the software industry moves increasingly towards use of object-oriented programming
languages the use of an Ontological model for application design is becoming commonplace.
Furthermore, development of decision support systems requires some form of a knowledge
acquisition process to enable capture of expertise. An ontological model could be used to aid in
this process.
Through development of ontological models, a natural artifact is documentation. The use of
standard methodologies provides a common modeling language, which if used to formulate
models can supplement documentation for a software development project.
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 Knowledge Acquisition
The task of acquiring the knowledge needed to build a specialized application requires the
capture of expertise. Even with access to subject area experts and raw information, organizing
and formulating an accurate picture can be a difficult problem. Methodologies used to build
ontological models have been developed to closely mimic information organization in a way that
is natural to human understanding. Therefore, knowledge tends to translate well into an
ontological representation built using these methodologies. Additionally, the modeling process
and subsequent model analysis suggest questions that help to further refine and correct model
deficiencies and inconsistencies. The questions that arise from the model analysis directly reflect
the knowledge contained in the model in content.
 Information Representation
The use of an ontological model, to represent information, provides a rich description of the
knowledge domain. The model ultimately used by the system may very well be directly derived
from the model built during knowledge acquisition.
In a flat representation, characteristics are defined to describe the data. Relationships may be
defined as characteristics that simply refer to other data items. However, such references are not
constrained and as such could be defined outside of any logical role, therefore, checks must be
made to insure that the reference makes sense. Additionally, any behavior associated with
particular data must be inferred through its characteristics. Both the reference checking and the
behavior inference must be performed outside of the representation and is therefore subject to
varying interpretations. By incorporating both relationships, constrained by logical roles, and
behavior into the information representation a great deal of the complexity involved in reference
checking and behavior inference is removed from the external application. In addition, if a model
was developed as part of the knowledge acquisition process it may be possible to directly use this
model as the basis for information representation in the developed system.
 Floor Layout
As a simple example, consider the following floor layout. We could represent the parts that make
up a floor-layout as a collection of data. For example, we have rooms that have a location and
size, windows and doors with dimensions, and some lights.
102
Figure 1- Floor Layout Diagram
Given a complete set of coordinates, for each part we could infer relationships between rooms,
doors, windows, and lights. Additionally with some complex reasoning, we could infer some
roles, for example, whether a door leads to some interior room or to the exterior of the building.
 Floor Layout Object Model
Instead, let's propose a relatively simple model that includes not only the characteristics but some
relationships with logical roles as well. This model diagram illustrates some common symbols
defined in graphical methodologies used to convey ideas posed by ontological models.
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Figure 2 - Floor Layout Object Model
Recognize that we are defining kinds of things and their characteristics and relationships with
other kinds of things. Take for example, a Door is shown as a kind of Access, which in turn is a
kind of Object. A Door can play the role either of an external access (inherited from Access) or
as an internal access with respect to a Room. Notice also that a Window may also play the role of
an external access but not as an internal access (logically it does not make sense to have a
Window between rooms in our simple knowledge domain). In addition, a Door can reference
rooms and a Room can reference lights.
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 Floor Layout Instance Model
Applying this model to our actual floor layout results in this instance model representation.
Figure 3 - Floor Layout Instance Model
Without requiring any external inference, it is easy to identify the logical relationships between
the floor layout objects. For example, it is very easy to identify accesses for any room.
Additionally, we can readily see which accesses are internal versus external. With some further
simple deduction it is simple to determine which rooms are connected to another room through
their relationships to a door (an internal access). Taking it even further it is easy to identify routes
from any room to the nearest external access.
How Is an Ontological Model Developed?
The first decision is to select a language for describing the model. Good choices for a language
depend highly on the intended audience, but selection of a standard methodology (such as the
Unified Modeling Language) is generally good practice.
Identification of existing models and common patterns always aid the modeling process through
reuse (in other words do not reinvent the wheel unless your notion of a wheel deviates
significantly from everybody else's).
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Creating the initial model is similar to the process for starting any creative effort (writing for
example). It usually requires high level abstract, conceptual thinking. It is important to not get
wrapped up into any low level details and instead focus on developing a basis from which
questions may be formulated whose answers will begin to help fill in the details. An excellent
starting point for most projects are the high level project requirements.
Once an initial model is developed, a knowledge acquisition process can be used to refine the
model (which in turn is used to capture knowledge acquired).
 Knowledge Acquisition Process
Starting with the initial model, we identify essential concepts and relationships. For example, in
the floor layout example we can identify logical groupings, characteristics, and relationships
from the spatial representation.
Next, we may formulate questions based on these concepts and relationships. For example, a
requirement for the system may include the ability to perform lighting analyses for rooms. This
may suggest a question such as "What characteristics describe a light with respect to a room?"
Additionally, "What are possible external sources of light and their characteristics?" and "Are
there any factors that affect these sources of light?"
Answers to these questions are best obtained from people who are experts in the domain. In
many cases we are ourselves somewhat knowledgeable in the area and are certainly able to
answer the questions to some degree. However, it is still useful to record the questions as part of
the process.
Given the answers the model may in turn be refined to support representation of this new found
knowledge and then the process is repeated until everyone is satisfied with the model.
Limitations Of Ontological Models
Models that are developed by individuals or groups tend to reflect the perspective of those
individuals or groups. In and of itself this is not a problem as long as the captured knowledge
includes the perspective of the audience for which the developed system is intended. In other
words, any model intended to be used for information representation should be developed by a
group that includes the people who will use the system dependant on the information
representation.
Models that lack depth tend to be fairly static because of the dependence imposed on external
systems. While not necessarily a limitation in the concept of an ontological model, most existing
models lack completeness, which limits their specific application.
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Extending An Ontological Model
Extension of an existing ontological model may be as simple as adding to the model itself.
However, changes in the information representation may require significant changes to the
system utilizing the representation. Depending on the completeness of the representation (in
other words, the degree of the definition of characteristics, relationships and behavior) adding to
or modifying the representation may require adding or modifying the system functionality.
If distinctly separate ontologies exist that have been implemented as services, it may be possible
for a system to make use of these separate domains by providing an inter-domain translation or if
you prefer mapping.
It may even be possible to dynamically add to or modify the information representation, the
degree to which is highly dependent on the completeness of the representation. In other words, if
the representation is flat the using system may need to infer relationships and behavior which, in
turn, implies a high degree of dependence on the representation. Any changes to this
representation would most likely require changes in the using system. Conversely, if the
representation is reasonably complete there will be little or possibly no dependence on the
representation, which would allow dynamic modifications without a requisite system change.
This is in fact the "Holy Grail" that we are seeking in the search for an information representation
basis for decision support systems.
Conclusion
Currently most decision support systems rely heavily on complex software agents to reason on
data based on simple information representations. Even for the more advanced systems, those
based on complex representations, information interpretation or inference must be performed.
Future systems will be based around very complex information models that incorporate not only
characteristics and relationships, but behavior as well. Ultimately, even the reasoning agents
themselves will be objects, or perhaps objects will have complex behavior enabling self-
contained reasoning, or more likely some combination of both will be present. Throw in the
possibility of ubiquitous distributed inter-operable systems and we have the basis for a complete
object based operating environment with potential that goes even far beyond decision support.
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ICDM:
A Development and Execution Framework
for Agent-Based, Decision-Support Systems
Kym Jason Pohl
CAD Research Center
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
Abstract
Decision-support systems provide human decision
makers with a means of solving complex problems through
collaboration with collections of both human and computer-
based expert agents. The ICDM Framework provides a
formalized architecture together with a set of development
and execution tools which can be utilized to design, develop,
and execute agent-based, decision-support applications. Core
to this process is the development of an ontological system
providing a relationship-rich model of the application
domain. Based on a three-tier architecture, ICDM
incorporates forefront technologies including distributed-
object servers, inference engines, and web-based presentation
to provide a framework for collaborative, agent-based
decision making systems rich in developmental efficiency and
architectural extendibility.
Keywords
ontology, decision-support, computer-based decision making, artificial intelligence,
agent, web-based computing, distributed systems, object-oriented DBMS, distributed
object server, CORBA
Object-Based Representation
In modern-day society, the need for an effective means of engaging in
collaborative decision making is more prevalent than ever. With the development of
newer, agent-based technologies, this need is beginning to be successfully addressed.
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Throughout the past decade the Collaborative Agent Design (CAD) Research
Center (CADRC) at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, California has been intricately involved
in the design and development of agent-based, decision-support systems from a practical
standpoint (Pohl et al. 1997). As a result of these efforts, the CADRC has developed a
manifesto of sorts describing a collection of criteria fundamental to the development of
agent-based, decision-support systems (Pohl 1997).
First and foremost on this list is the need for an object-based representation of
information. Information processed within the system must be described as objects
having attributes, behavior, and most importantly relationships. Collectively, these
descriptions form an application’s information object model or ontology (Fowler and
Scott 1997). This requirement not only applies to the modeling of information but at
times is even portrayed in the representation of the agents themselves. It has been the
experience of the CADRC that without such an objectified representation, where critical
informational relationships can be captured, determination of information meaning and
implication becomes extremely difficult if not impossible.
After numerous implementations it became clear to the members of the CADRC
that to take full advantage of such objectified representation, a supportive framework
needed to be established. A framework that centered around objects.
The ICDM Framework
The ICDM framework exists as an architecture, together with a set of
development and execution tools which can be used to design, implement, and execute
agent-based, decision-support applications.
The ICDM model is based on a three-tier architecture making clear and distinct
separations between information, logic, and presentation (Gray et al. 1997).
These tiers are represented by the three major components comprising the ICDM model;
a collection of information management servers (i.e., Information Server, Subscription
Server, etc.) (information tier), the Agent Engine (logic tier), and the Client User Interface
(presentation tier) (Figure 1). Each of these components functions in an integrated fashion
to form a comprehensive agent-based decision-support execution framework. This
framework allows multiple human decision-makers to solve complex problems in a
collaborative fashion obtaining decision-support assistance from a collection of
heterogeneous on-line agents.
Information Server
Core to the information tier is the Information Server (IS). Conceptually, the IS
represents a library of objectified information which clients utilize to both obtain and
contribute information. The only difference is that clients can obtain this information in,
not only a pull fashion (query service), but can also have the IS push them information on
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an interest basis (subscription service). Physically, the IS exists as a distributed object
server based on the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) (Mowbray
and Zahavi 1995).
Being the basis for the IS, distributed object servers are designed to service client
requests for information. The knowledge of exactly where the information resides and
how it can be retrieved is completely encapsulated inside the object server. This means
that clients need not be concerned with who has what information and in what form that
information exists. This feature becomes instrumental in providing an environment where
collaborative application components operate in a de-coupled manner via the IS.
Figure 1 – 3-Tier Architecture
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Regardless of the information’s native representation, distributed object servers
can be used to present information to clients in the form of objects. However, this does
not discount the need for information to be modeled as high-level objects in its native
form portraying behavior and conveying relationships. While on the surface this
representational morphing capability of object servers seems promising, in practice this
feature proves to be quite misleading. If the information is not represented at a high level
upon its conception, such objectification amounts to little more than wrapping data in
communicable object shells. These shells fail to convey any additional insight into the
meaning or implication of the information than was present to begin with in its original
form. Although in the future there may be potential for successful research efforts in this
area, at present, unless information is originally modeled as objects, knowledge-oriented
applications prove to gain little from this distributed object server feature.
However, applications that do, in fact, model information as high-level objects
stand to gain considerably from employing distributed object servers. Distributed object
servers preserve purely objectified representations of information as it moves throughout
the system. This is due to the fact that the internal mechanisms of distributed object
servers process information as objects themselves.
The ICDM model takes full advantage of these object-oriented facilities by
integrating an Object-Oriented DBMS (OODBMS) (Bancilhon et al. 1992) into its
information environment. The OODBMS is the facility that the IS uses to store the
application’s objects. Employing an OODBMS to store the information objects has two
significant advantages.
First, an OODBMS retains the object-oriented representational nature of the
information as it exists in its persistent form. Whenever there is representational
degradation there is potential for loss of informational content and meaning. By utilizing
both access and storage facilities which are capable of processing and manipulating
information as objects, there is no degradation of representation as information flows
throughout the application environment.
The second advantage of employing an OODBMS relates to the manner in which
IS clients request information. Whether mining for information or posting a standing
subscription, clients formulate their information requests in terms of objects. More
specifically these requests are described in terms of object attributes and object
relationships. These queries can range from simple existence criteria to the more complex
incorporating both logical and relational operators.
Another method in which information can be obtained from the Information Tier
deals with the notion of subscription. Clients can dynamically register standing
subscriptions that are again described in terms of the application’s ontological system.
For example, a client may request to be notified whenever InfoTech hires a new
employee. Once registered, the Subscription Server continually monitors this condition.
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When satisfied, the Subscription Server essentially pushes the results to whomever has
indicated an interest (i.e., registered an appropriate subscription). The alternative to this
subscription mechanism would be to have interested clients perform the same query on an
iterative basis until such a condition occurs. Each unsatisfied query may potentially
decrease resources (i.e., computing cycles) available to other application components and
would essentially prove to be a waste of time. If a client takes a more conservative
approach where the repeated query is made on a less frequent basis, the client risks being
out of date with the current state of affairs until the next iteration is performed. With this
in mind, the incorporation of a push information to interested clients mechanism becomes
essential in providing decision-support applications with an efficient, up-to-date operating
environment.
Agent Engine
The Agent Engine represents the logic-tier of ICDM’s underlying three-tier
architecture. Existing as a client to the Information Tier services (i.e., access, query,
subscription, and persistence) the Agent Engine is capable of both obtaining and injecting
information. Architecturally, the Agent Engine consists of an agent server capable of
serving collections of agents (Figure 1). These collections, or Agent Sessions, exist as
self-contained, self-managing agent communities capable of interacting with the
Information Tier to both acquire and inject information. For the most part, the exact
nature of agents and collaborative model employed is left to the application specification.
However, regardless of the types of agents contained in an Agent Session, agent activity
is triggered by changes in application information. This information may take the form of
global objects managed by the Information Tier or local objects utilized in agent
collaboration which are managed by the Agent Session itself. Regardless of whether
agents are interacting with the Information Tier or each other, interaction takes place in
terms of objects. This again illustrates the degree to which an object representation is
preserved as information is processed throughout the application environment.
Agent Session Configuration
Breaking agent analysis into heterogeneous collections of agents allows for a
number of interesting configurations. These configurations determine the size, number,
and individual scope of the agent sessions. While a wide variety of Agent Session
configurations exist, the CADRC has found considerable success in formulating this
configuration based on two primary criteria.
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Figure 2 - Multiple users can interact with a view
which in turn is analyzed by a single Agent Session
The first criterion introduces the notion of a view. A view is a conceptual
perspective of reality. In other words, a view can be thought of as a single investigation
into solving a problem whether it is based on fact or speculation. For example, a view
may describe events and information relating to what is actually occurring in reality. Yet,
another view may describe an alternative or desired reality. An illustration of this
approach can be observed in the Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control
System (IMMACCS) developed by the CADRC for the Marine Corps. IMMACCS uses a
single view to represent the information and events occurring in the battlespace. In a
similar manner, IMMACCS employs any number of additional views to represent
hypothetical investigations to determine suitable strategies for dealing with potential
events or circumstances. Regardless of use, however, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between a conceptual view and an Agent Session (Figure 2). This means
that independent of exactly which version of reality a view represents, there exists
dedicated Agent Session providing users of that view with agent-based analysis and
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decision-support. Each agent of a particular Agent Session deals only with the view
associated with its Agent Session. Organizing information analysis in this manner allows
for an efficient and effective means of distinguishing information and activities relating to
one view from those pertaining to another. Unless prompted by user intervention (i.e.,
user-directed movement of information between views), each set of information is
completely disjoint from the other.
The second configuration criterion employed by the CADRC determines the
quantity and nature of agents contained in an Agent Session at any point in time. As
mentioned above, the decision-support applications developed by the CADRC utilize a
variety of agent types. Three of these agent types include Domain Agents, Object Agents,
and Mediator Agents (Pohl 1995). Recall that service-oriented Domain Agents embody
expertise in various application-relevant domains (i.e., structural systems and thermal
dynamics for architectural design, tidal dynamics and trim and stability for ship stow
planning, etc.). The collection of Domain Agents populating an Agent Session at any
point in time determines the variety of domain specific perspectives and analytical depth
available during analysis of the associated view. Under the configuration scheme utilized
by the CADRC, users can add or remove these domain perspectives in a dynamic fashion
over time.
Object Agents, on-the-other-hand extend the notion of high-level informational
representation by essentially agentifying information through empowering information
objects with the ability to act on their own behalf. Both human users and other agents as
needed can initiate this agentification of information into Object Agents.
In an attempt to resolve conflicts arising between collaborating agents, Mediation
Agents may be employed as third party mediators. It is the goal of these mediators to
bring about consensus among agents that may have reached an impasse.
Under the ICDM model each of these agent contingents is dynamically
configurable by both the user(s) in addition to the system itself. This approach to Agent
Session configuration promotes the notion of offering assistance in the form of
dynamically configurable tools rather than predefined solutions (Pohl 1997).
Agent Session Architecture
Architecturally, an Agent Session consists of several components including the
Semantic Network and Semantic Network Manager, Session Manager, Inference Engine,
and Agent Manager (Figure 3). These components operate in an integrated fashion to
maintain a current information connection between the agents residing in the Agent
Session and the associated view described in the Information Tier.
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Figure 3 - Agent Session Architecture
Semantic Network
The Semantic Network consists of a collection of two sets of application specific
information objects. The first set is used for local collaboration among agents. Depending
on the specific collaborative model employed, agents may use this local Semantic
Network to propose recommendations to each other or request various services. This
information is produced and modified by the agents and remains local to the Agent
Session. The second set of information is a sort of duplicate, mirror image of the view
information stored in the Information Tier. In actuality, this information exists as a
collection of object-based interfaces allowing access to view information stored in the
Information Server. Such interfaces are directly related to the application’s ontological
system. In other words, these interfaces, or proxies (Mowbray and Zahavi 1995), are
represented in terms of the objects described in the information object model. Through
these interfaces, Information Server clients have the ability to access and modify objects
contained in the Information Tier as though they are local to the client’s environment. All
communication between the object interfaces and their remote object counterparts is
encapsulated and managed by the Information Server and completely transparent to the
clients. This is a fundamental feature of distributed object servers on which the
Information Server is based (Orfali et al. 1996).
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Semantic Network Manager
As the primary manager of the two sets of information described above, the
Semantic Network (SN) Manager focuses the majority of its efforts on the management
of the bi-directional propagation of information between Information Server proxies and
an equivalent representation understandable by the Inference Engine. Such propagation is
accomplished through employing an Object Manager. The purpose of this manager is to
essentially maintain mappings between the object proxies and their corresponding
Inference Engine counterparts. The necessity of this mapping reveals a limitation inherent
in most distributed object server and inference engine facilities. Most facilities supporting
one of these two services require control over either the way client information is
represented or the manner in which it is generated. This is due to the fact that both
facilities require specific behavior to be present in each object they process. Examples of
such facilities include IONA’s ORBIX distributed object server (IONA 1996) and
NASA’s CLIPS inference engine (NASA 1992). Both of these facilities suffer from this
limitation. Nonetheless, this dilemma can be solved through the use of an intermediate
object manager which maintains mappings between the two sets of objects.
An additional responsibility of the SN Manager deals with the subscriptions, or
interests held on behalf of the agent community. That is, the SN Manager is responsible
for maintaining the registration of a dynamically changing set of information interests
held on behalf of the Agent Session agents. In addition, the SN Manager is responsible
for processing notification(s) when these interests are subsequently satisfied. Such
processing includes the propagation of information changes to the agent community that
may in turn trigger agent activity. To perform these two interest-related tasks the SN
Manager employs the services of the Alert Manager. The Alert Manager provides an
interface to the Subscription Server facility and is available to any Information Tier client
wishing to maintain a set of information interests. Employment of the Alert Manager by
subscribers has two distinct advantages. First, clients are effectively de-coupled from the
specifics of the subscription interface. This allows the same application client to be
compatible with a variety of object server implementations. Second, the Alert Manager
interface allows subscribers to effectively decompose themselves into a dynamic
collection of thread-based interest clients (Lewis and Berg 1996). That is, the Alert
Manager extends the monolithic one-to-one relationship between the Subscription Server
and its clients into one that supports a one-to-many relationship. Such decomposition of
functionally related behavior into lightweight processes promotes the concepts of multi-
processing in conjunction with resource conservation.
Inference Engine
The Inference Engine provides the link between changes occurring in the
Semantic Network and agent activation. Recall that agent activation can occur when a
change in the Semantic Network is of interest to a particular agent. In such a case, the
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Inference Engine, having knowledge of specific agent interests in addition to changes
occurring in the Semantic Network is responsible for activating, or scheduling the
action(s) the agent wishes to execute. This activation list forms the basis for the Agent
Manager to determine which agent actions to execute on behalf of the currently scheduled
agent.
Agent Manager
The Agent Manager is responsible for the management of the agent community
housed in an Agent Session. This management includes the instantiation and destruction
of agents as they are dynamically allocated and deallocated to and from the agent
community. In addition, the Agent Manager is responsible for managing the distribution
of execution cycles allowing each agent to perform operations. Disbursement of
execution cycles occurs in a round-robin fashion allowing agent analysis to be evenly
distributed among relevant agents. Whether or not an agent utilizes its allotted cycles
depends on whether it has any tasks or actions to perform.
Session Manager
As the overall manager of the Agent Session environment the Session Manager
has two main responsibilities. The first of these responsibilities focuses on the
initialization of each of the other Agent Session components upon creation. When an
Agent Session is created as a response to the creation of a view, the Session Manager is
the first component to be activated. Once initialized, the Session Manager activates the
SN Manager and Inference Engine. Continuing its efforts, the Session Manager then
activates the Agent Manager. Upon startup, the Agent Manager initializes itself by
allocating an appropriate initial set of agents. Depending on the application specifics,
these agents may in turn perform a series of initial queries and subscriptions which will
eventually propagate to the Information Tier via the SN Manager.
Client User Interface
Representing the third and final tier of the three-tier architecture employed by
ICDM the Client User Interface (CUI) exists as a web-based application which can
operate in a light-weight computing environment. The CUI essentially provides human
users with a means of viewing and manipulating the information and analysis provided by
the other two tiers of the agent-based, decision-support application. Understanding the
importance of data presentation, the CUI presents the user with this information and
analysis in a robust and graphical manner.
As clients of the IS, CUI users have the ability to interact with each other in a
collaborative fashion. That is, by virtue of either injecting or obtaining information from
the IS, CUI users working on the same view have the potential of exchanging relevant
information in a collaborative manner. This type of information exchange occurs
regardless of whether the view represents the main design effort or exists as a localized
solution attempt explored by a subset of users. All information and analysis remains
localized within its particular view unless explicitly copied into another view as a user
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initiated action. In this manner, no informational or analytical collisions occur between
conceptual views without the potential for user-based supervision and subsequent
reconciliation.
Development Toolkit
As a further formalization of the ICDM approach to agent-based, decision-support
applications, the CADRC is continuing their development of a collection of design and
development tools to accompany the execution framework discussed above. These tools
essentially combine the roles of application designer and application developer into a
single effort. Decision-support applications can be designed and developed through a
series of high-level models describing information structure and analytical logic. High-
level classes can be identified through a series of Unified Modeling Language (UML)
(Fowler and Scott 1997) class diagrams forming a comprehensive information object
model.  This model essentially describes the application specific design and problem
space as a collection of high-level objects complete with attributes and relationships. This
is the same high-level description of application information identified earlier as being
crucial to agent-based, decision-support applications.
By the same token, it is the belief of the CADRC that much of the analytical
reasoning applied to this information can be described in terms of a methodology suitable
for representing object-based logic. Though currently at the theoretical stage, the
methodology intended to be employed to serve this purpose attempts to represent logic as
a series of rules (Hayes-Roth et al. 1983). Each of these rules identifies both a condition
and a corresponding action to take upon the satisfaction of that condition. This is where
the advantages of using a high-level, object-based representation again become apparent.
It is the belief of the CADRC that both the condition and action components of these
rules can be described in terms of the application’s information object model. That is,
conditions can be represented as a series of constrained references to object attributes
strung together with logical and relational operators. The corresponding rule action is
itself described in terms of a series of basic manipulation functions (i.e., create, modify,
delete) executed against the information object model. When the informational state
described in the condition section of the rule occurs, the corresponding action component
will modify or produce information thus creating an entirely new informational state. This
new state may in turn trigger other rules to execute in a similar fashion. Although not all
logic can be represented in this manner, it is the expectation of the CADRC that this
approach can be applied to a significant portion of analytical reasoning found in decision-
support applications.
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Using high-level design models that describe both domain information and
domain logic as input, the ICDM Toolkit allows for the automatic generation of a
significant portion of the supporting decision-support system. In other words, using the
ICDM Toolkit the information object model can be used as a basis for automatically
generating basic (i.e., construction, attribute-level modification, and destruction) object-
specific behavior. In a similar manner, the logic model can be used to automatically
generate the condition and action components of the agent rules representing the logic-tier
of a decision-support application.
By elevating the vast majority of agent-based, decision-support application
development to the level of conceptual design, such applications can be developed,
maintained, and modified in a considerably more efficient and proficient manner as
compared to a more manual, implementation-specific approach. Further, this approach
essentially eliminates the loss of intent that often occurs as application development
moves from the designers to the program developers. Utilizing the ICDM model together
with its design and development tools these roles essentially become synonymous.
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JMADSS/Shared Net
Decisions
• Decision are made at ALL levels throughout an
organization.
• TYPE and SCOPE of decisions vary greatly
• Type and amount of information/data needed to make a
decision varies:
• type of decision being made
• wants/needs of decision maker
• information availability
JMADSS/Shared Net
Data/Information
• We have ever increasing potential to access a rich data
environment
• sensors, national feeds, reports
• Need to support the ability to maintain
• Low level data
• Higher level information/knowledge
• Linkages between the two.
• To avoid data/information overload, we must provide the
ability to dynamically filter, query and subscribe to
information sources.
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Goal
• Build a family of systems which can be used to support
the information needs of a variety of decision support
systems.
• Characteristics:
• Dynamically tailored information feeds.
• Scalable architecture supporting stand-alone & distributed systems
• Adaptable - able to adapt to changes in the environment
• Timely - information/data must be current enough to meet mission needs.
• Available - system must be able to provide service when requested.
• Data Integrity - consistent, correct, & guarded from unauthorized
modification
• Data Privacy - information/data available only to authorized users.
• Testable -  system should be designed to support testing.
JMADSS/Shared Net
The Problem
• Building Decision Support Systems (DSS) is hard.
• Subject expertise, knowledge representation, & decision algs
• Building Collaborative DSS is harder.
• Synchronization, common knowledge representations &
communications models, timing, & progress.
• Building Distributed Collaborative DSS is even harder.
• Server/communications failures, information replication and
consistency, security, global timing
• Building Real-World Distributed Collaborative DSS is
harder still.
• Unexpected interactions, external events, extended time delays
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Mars-Net
Collaborating:
• Rovers,
• Probes,
• Orbiters,
• Micro & Long
Haul Relays
• Earth-based
Scientists &
mission
controllers
•Earth-based big
decisions & goals.
•Semi-autonomous
 local decisions
•Multiple countries
•Fielding 2006-2012
JMADSS/Shared Net
Mars-Net Architecture
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JMADSS/Shared Net
Implementation Goals
• Support the secure storage/retrieval/distribution of both
low level data and higher level information/knowledge.
• Provide a framework which isolates Decision Support
systems from knowledge of where information is located
and how it is distributed & maintained.
• Adopt an open approach which supports expandability
and adaptability.
• Abstract away from things that can change in the environment
• Allow open component development.
• Use COTS components if possible.
• Assumes it was developed for a similar target use or is adaptable.
JMADSS/Shared Net
Approach
• Use an iterative rapid development methodology.
• Phased Development approach
• Provide support for Decision Support Systems
• Adapt system to support distributed systems
• Adapt system to support particular real-world use scenarios.
• Use Periodic fielding to identify and isolate problems.
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Storage/Retrieval/Distribution
• Goal: Support the secure storage/retrieval/distribution of
both low level data and higher level information/knowledge
• Use Objects & Relations as the High Level representation
of information.
• Objects mimic real-world objects
• Relationships between options which represent real-world
relationships.
• Provide tools allowing clients to
• Pull objects and relationships from the common repository (Query)
• Subscribe to have objects/relationships Pushed to them when they
change.
JMADSS/Shared Net
Location
Yaw, Spin
Topology
Composition
Activity Reports
Remote Sensors
Location
Yaw, Spin,Speed
Orbiting object
Sensors
Mission Executive:
What course correction is
needed to focus the sensor on
the target when it is lit ?
Status
...
Spacecraft
Sensor
Asteroid
Location
observation request
Target
A Simple Collaborative Example
Status
...
Nav
Status
...
Power
Status
...
Propulsion
Power Agent:
Do we have enough reserve
power to run the sensor ?
Navigation Agent:
Is propulsion & power
available?  Where is the sun?
Storage Agent:
Do we have enough room to
accept telemetry?
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Framework
• Goal: Isolate components from knowledge of where
objects are stored, and how they are distributed.
•  Use CORBA as basis of framework
• Native support for objects
• Support for multiple languages and platforms
• Rich set of COTS tools
 
Abstraction 
Layer
Clients
Object
Services
CORBA Abstraction 
Layer
JMADSS/Shared Net
Initial Implementation
• You don’t fully understand (or have the ability to
accurately predict) the behavior of a real-world system
until you actually build and field it.
• In building real world systems of any complexity, there can be any
number of unexpected interaction faults.
• Reused components, while of high quality, may not behave as we
expect.
• Mars is very harsh and time delays make it very difficult to
use as a test bed.
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Phase 1 Collaboration
• USMC has very similar interests & needs
• Desire for Decision Support for simultaneous events
• Interest in objectification of the environment (battlespace)
• Need to work under hostile conditions
• Small level of funding.
• ELB’s Communication Topology is similar to Mars-Net
• Although technologies and timing characteristics are very different.
JMADSS/Shared Net
USMC IMMACCS/ELB
SN
1 mile
250-300 Nautical Miles
Very similar architecture
Very similar needs
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SNAPIcache
BVT
(FGM)
JMADSS/Shared Net
Phase 1 - Observations
• Building Collaborative Decision Support systems is hard.
• Ability to abstract away from both the object servers and
CORBA proved invaluable.
• Architecture proved to be very extensible
• changes in the object model & new types of clients
• Current client-server architecture will not scale efficiently.
• Single point of failures
• inefficient use of communications systems
• Adaptability of COTS products can be severely limiting.
• Internal protocols may not adapt to new networks/protocols.
• Time interval between bug isolation and repair can be very long.
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Phase 1.1 - Adaptation
• Based on Observations, adapt phase 1 components
• Increase scalability and use network more efficiently by
broadcasting subscriptions.
• Patch COTS software to include fixes for our more
common problems.
• Scheduled to begin testing this week.
JMADSS/Shared Net
Architectural Options
• Single central machine architecture is likely not enough
• Too much information to process efficiently (time delays)
• Processing load is too large - particularly if a lot of clients.
• Single point of failure.
• Decentralized independent data stores
• Some decisions require a broad scope of data which may need to
be pulled from a wide variety of hosts
• Hybrid Approach
• Collection of distributed processing nodes able to share
information in a variety of other nodes.
• Peer-peer, reporting, independent, superior
• Nodes are likely to be distributed with intermittent connections.
• Must be able to prioritize events which have strong impact on
decisions.130
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USMC IMMACCS/ELB
SN
1 mile
250-300 Nautical Miles
Collection of Object Serving Nodes
SN
SN
SN
SN
SN
JMADSS/Shared Net
Architecture must take into account:
• Information Sharing Density -
• How many systems are sharing the same objects?
• How many systems are updating vs reading the objects?
• Probability that a change to an object made by one component will
impact the decision(s) made by another component.
• Locality of Information -
• Are the systems accessing this object nearby, remote, or a
combination?
• How connected are the machines?
• Timeliness of Information
• What is the maximum latency we can tolerate?
• Does a system always need the latest data, or can they use older
data?
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Focuses of Phase 2 Research
• Transparent Fault Tolerance
• Information Consistency in distributed databases
connected via unreliable networks.
• Efficient distributed authentication and authorization
• Migration to real-time operating systems and real-time
CORBA.
JMADSS/Shared Net
Further Information
• Mars-Net:
http://marsnet.jpl.nasa.gov
• Shared Net
http://snserv.jpl.nasa.gov
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Air Weather Service
Technologies Introduced in
Last 20 Years
• Satellite downlink of meteorological data
• Doppler radar (NEXRAD)
• Automated Weather Distribution Systems
(AWDS)
• 3-D and 4-D visualization products
• Automated Surface Observing Systems (ASOS)
ASSOCIATES INC.
Historical Forecasting Skill
Forecast
Accuracy Experience =13.5 Years Experience =
4.3 Years
100
  90
  80
  70
  60
  50
  40
76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
YEAR
70%
65%
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See Subtle Patterns
Who is going to turn data
into understanding?
DATA
INFORMATION
KNOWLEDGE
UNDERSTANDING
Notice Missing Data
Build Own Mental Model
Seek Information
There are no Basic Data
ASSOCIATES INC.
Can We Make People Stupid ?
• Excessive data
– Passive attitude
– Limited information
seeking
• Reduce confidence
• Pre-processed data
• Procedural mentality
– Freeze the database
categories
• Low-cost, rapid advice and
feedback
• Formal analyses and task
decomposition
• Use simplistic metrics
• Attention management
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Observations
Regiments: Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, 29 Palms,
     7/12 regiments
MEF:  Three years of observations at Phase III exercises, 
one Phase II exercise
Battalion exercise at 29 Palms
Hunter Warrior
ASSOCIATES INC.
MEF Planning Flow
Future
Plans
Future
Operations
Current
Operations
(a) Conceptual Planning (b) Detailed Planning
(c) Detailed Replanning
Deliberate Planning
(d) Conceptual Replanning
Dynamic Planning
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Decision-Centered Design
• Contrast to technology-driven design
• Focus on key decisions
– What they are?
– Why they are difficult?
– How they are made?
• Review critical incidents to identify decision
requirements
• Use IT to support decision requirements
ASSOCIATES INC.
CTA is:
Definition of Cognitive Task Analysis
EXPERTISE
• The description of the cognitive skills needed to
perform a task proficiently
• Primarily valuable for tasks that depend on
cognitive aspects of expertise, such as decision
making and problem solving
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Why Don’t We Ask?
• We don’t know how
• We’re afraid to
ASSOCIATES INC.
Nuclear Power Plant
Emergency Response Organization (ERO)
(Klinger & Klein, 1999)
Goal:  Improve performance of ERO
Approach: Decision-Centered Design
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What we did
• Modified room layout
• Quiet, efficient workspace
• Priorities are clear
• Difficult scenarios are easy
• NRC scores up, previous
problems dropped
• Expertise is exposed
• Clarified roles and functions
using low fidelity simulations
• Reduced staff size from 80 to 35
ASSOCIATES INC.
Decreasing marginal
utility of staff
Total load
Staff Size
Increasing
coordination costs
W
o
rk
lo
ad
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Conclusions:     1 + 1 < 1
• The whole can be less than the sum of its
parts
• Information technologies can support
expertise—or interfere with it
• Designers have to focus on key decisions
• Designers have to support expertise
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Logistics Command & Control (Log C2)
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•1 Bde in 96 hrs
•1 Div in 120 hrs
•5 Divs in 30 days
 Soldiers on Point for the Nation
Persuasive in Peace;
Invincible in War
•  Responsive
•  Deployable
•  Agile
•  Versatile
•  Lethal
•  Survivable
•  Sustainable
•  Increase Strategic Responsiveness
•  Improve Operational Jointness
•  Develop Leaders for Joint
        Warfighting and Change
•  Complete Full AC / RC Integration
•  Man Warfighting Units
•  Provide Well-Being of Soldiers,
        Civilians and Families
•  Help Soldiers Achieve Goals
The Army Vision r  i i
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–
“A Revolution in Military Logistics, 
Leveraging Technology to Fuse New 
Concepts, Information, and Logistics 
Systems, Reshaping the Way We Project and 
Sustain America’s Army in the 21st Century”
Revolution In
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-0500
The United States Army it  t t  
Strategic Logistics Plant t i  i ti  l
Military Logistics
Logistics C2 
(Log C2) ATD
 Supports JV 2010 and AV 2010 concept of Focused Logistics
 Binds CSS and the Operational Planning together
 Shortens CSS planning to within Force XXI one hr planning cycle
 Provides new automated planning tools for commanders
 Facilitates the right CSS data, to the right person, at the right time
DOD
Logistics
Strategic Plan
Log C2 ATD Supports Army’s VisionLog 2 T  upports r y’s ision
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“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”
Yogi Berra
Decision Support is focused on
shaping the future
ecision upport is focused on
shaping the future
h Data
h Information & Knowledge
h Vision             Mission objectives
h Values
REQUIREMENTS
CECOM Bottom Line: The Soldier
The Army’s Tactical Need r ’  ti l 
CSSCSGCSS-A
CSSCS
Data Latency
Lack of automated
data access
Sneaker Net”
Daily
Reconstitution
Crewing
Resupply
Evacuation
Civil Affairs
Weapon System Mgmt
Enemy Prisoner of War
CSS Destruction Plan
Emergency Evacuation
Mortuary Affairs
Decontamination
How much 
& when?
Lack of automation
of logistics staff activities:
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SUSTAINING 
BASE
CSS 
STOVEPIPES
GCSS-A
ABCS
XXX
MCS
MCS
FAADC3I
ASAS
GCSS
GCCS
FAADC3I
ASAS AFATDS
ATCCS
XX
II
X
FBCB2
XXXX
MCS
AFATDS
ASAS
FAADC3I
AFATDS
CSSCS
Strategic
(GCCS)
Tactical
GCSS-A
GCSS-A
GCSS-A
Log C2 ATD enhances the planning capability of CSSCS
and provides for timely data interface between
CSSCS to GCSS-A & FBCB2.
CSSCS
CSSCS
GCSS-A
Operational
The Evolving Architecture l i  r it t r
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Real Time C2 for CSS Eventsl i   f r  t
CSSCS
GCSS-Army
Rev/sec
Temp
Particulate
Time
Sensors report
system health
FBCB2
CHARACTERISTICS
§ Intelligent Agents using to perform data mining, alert services, and adaptive planning
§ Provided CSSCS the ability to spawn agents to monitor the Joint Common Database (JCDB)
§  Collaboration, visualization, COA development and analysis, knowledge creation, execution
monitoring and rapid replanning
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•Applications will be inherently collaborative
modular, scalable, distributed, cross-platform, dynamically
configurable, web enabled
•Maintain a clear separation between data, user interface, rules
•XML as the primary representation of data for both persistence
and messaging (collaboration)
• XSL documents for transforming data to HTML/XML
•User Interface in Microsoft Foundation Classes
•Collaboration Server in Java
Technological Approachl i l r
CECOM Bottom Line: The Soldier
Servers
DaVinci App - G3
(C++)
DaVinci App - G2
(C++)
DaVinci App - G4
(C++)
WEB 
Server
Plan Viewer
DaVinci ThinApp
- Chief of Plans
(Java or C++)
CG’s Web Browser
Terrain 
Data
Server
MCS
Server DCE/RPC
Collaborator
Translator
Legacy System (MCS Block 3)
MCS
Technology
Insertion Using
Collaboration
Framework
 Web Browser
- Applet
- Plug-in
- DHTML/XSL
Collaboration Server
Plan 
Data
Server
 Auto COA 
Generation
(Java)
 Agent
 Agent
 Agent
DAVINCI ArchitectureI I r it t r
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Goal: Decision Support for CSS
Staff and Commander
l: i i  rt f r 
t ff  r
Develop log support plan in 1-3 hours or less utilizing intelligent agents providing automatic “alert”
capability to identify potential log problems
• Diverted shipments (redirected by senior mgmt) or delayed shipments
• Battlefield losses (e.g., NBC, mines, casualty)
Automatic Reconstitution Process Enhancement
• Planning
• Coordinating
Course Of Action (COA)
• 1- 3 hours to create
COA while using
intelligent agents that
search the network &
alert commander/staff
of events and
conditions impacting
CSS
•Reconstitution
optimization software
(hosted on CSSCS)
 examples:
MSR interdictions
Battle loss
  Delayed shipments
Current Process Log C2 ATD
•CSS staff respond
within 4 -8 hours with
the  feasibility of 3
COAs given by Cmdr
• No automated ability
to perform
reconstitution
• Executing
• Evaluating
CECOM Bottom Line: The Soldier
§ Leveraged the Course of Action (COA) generation & collaboration software initiated under the
Battle Planning Science & Technology Objective and Battlefield C2 ATD
§ Currently collaborating with the Command Post XXI ATD by developing the logistics functionality
and views for cross-BFA/cross-echelon planning
§ Demonstrated JAVA version collaborating with installed versions over a wireless LAN using
notebook PC’s, NT desktops and SUN workstations on 16 Nov 99
Visualization and Plan Object
Model
i liz ti   l  j t
l
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CSS SOURCE DATA AUTOMATION 
 Suite of decision aid software (commanders’ decision tool bag) hosted on CSSCS
• Access to essential, timely, and accurate data from multiple data sources
• Eliminate ambiguous data
• Few keystrokes, written commands or voice commands to achieve decision
• Minimize human staff assessments for commander’s decisions
• Improve decision cycle process for commanders
• Reduce risk associated with commander’s decisions (increase confidence level)
• Improving the commander’s
automated decision tool kit by
providing software that creates
plans for the following function
(each within one hour):
CSS Cmdr
Ø Resupply
Ø Weapon system
status management
Ø CSS destruction
Current Process Log C2 ATD•Commanders either
do not have access to
necessary CSS data
or have no automated
tools to perform the
following functions:
  CSS Cmdr
Ø Resupply
Ø Weapon system
status management
Ø CSS destruction
Maneuver Cmdr
ØEmergency evacuation
Ø Crewing
Ø Mortuary affairs
Ø Civil affairs
Ø Enemy POW plan
Ø Decontamination
Maneuver Cmdr
ØEmergency evacuation
Ø Crewing
Ø Mortuary affairs
Ø Civil affairs
Ø Enemy POW plan
Ø Decontamination
Goal: Decision Support for CSS
Staff and Commander
l: i i  rt f r 
t ff  r
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AXIS
WHITE
AXIS
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AXIS
WHITE
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MULTI
UNITS
Plan  1
AXIS
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AXIS
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D
B
MI
GSR
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Road March
Road March
Road March
Secure
AA
Occupy
AA
Occupy
AA
Establish
OPs
L
D
L
D
L
D
Com
NetRoad March
Occupy AA
Occupy
AA
Occupy
AA
Smoke
Screen
GSR
Site
Enemy
Screen
MTC
Recon AO
MTC
MTC
MTC
Engage Main 
Enemy Force
Engage Main 
Enemy Force
Engage Main
Enemy Force
Engage Main 
Enemy Force
Obj
Obj
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
AXIS
BLUE
AO
C
L
D
L
DRoad March
Secure
AA
Establish
OPs
MTC
MTC
TACSOP
Templates
COA
Sketch
Units
Synchro-
nization
Matrix
COA
Actions
Planning
Factors
Combat
Multipliers
COA
Statement
COA
Compare
Actions
Equipment
Capability
Overlays
Enemy
Situation
& OB
AO
Data
METT-T Weather
Movement
Calculation
Control
Measures
EXIT
TOOLS
PLANNING TIMELINE:   PLAN BRAVO 
AXIS
WHITE
A
D
A
         METT-T WORKSHEET
PLAN 1              AXIS BLUE
Action           Unit      Time    Reaction   Time Effect
Movement
To Contact
 0500Z       Bridge
 0600Z        Out
0500Z
0800Z
Objective
0800Z
1200Z
Counter 
 Action
Secure
Bridge
Candidate     Time
Unit             Required             
SFA 7A
Engage Main
Enemy Force A
A
1200Z
1300Z
0400Z
0500Z
B
Action Record
Name:                   SECURE BRIDGE
Plan: BRAVO
Performing Unit:
Location:              52SBT80000300
Start Time:           0400Z
End Time:            0500Z
Enemy Reactions/ Contingencies
AIR ATTACK
ARTILLERY ATTACK
BRIDGE OUT
AMBUSH
SFA 7
Save   Exit
• Demonstrated TRW’s Tactical Standard Operating
Procedures’ (TACSOP) knowledgebase
• Demonstrated access on 16 Nov 99
• Currently under contract with TRW to develop a
CSS knowledgebase for commanders
Knowledge Base Developmentl   l t
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Data Exchange
Data warehousing seamless interfaces GCSS-A to CSSCS
• Elimination of human intervention in data transfer
• Increases access to real time data
Data transfer from FBCB2 to GCSS-A
• Platform information directly to the automated log system
GCSS-A data replication of joint systems
• Army commanders can make informed decisions based on total CSS picture
CSSCSGCSS-A
FBCB2
• Manual updates once every 24 hours from
an organization
• Access to one database •Provide translation middleware to
support a common data warehouse
for GCSS-A and CSSCS that
enables updates on an hourly basis
• Provide GCSS-A access to joint
systems (TC-AIMS II, MC4), Army
tactical platforms, and SIDPERS
Log C2 ATDCurrent Process
CSSCS
Goal: Decision Support for CSS
Staff and Commander
l: i i  rt f r 
t ff  r
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JTAV
JCDB
Data Cache
JDBC Application
CSSCSGCSS-A
Log C2 Data Access
§ Provide timely Data Mediation between CSSCS, GCSS-A,and Joint Systems
–Eliminate Human Intervention for Data Access/Transfer
–Increase Access to Real Time Data
–Automated Data Update
§ Demonstrated access on 16 Nov 99
§ Transitioning initial ‘enroute’ application to CSSCS on 31 Mar 00 for ABCS 6.1
Data Mediationt  i ti
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Alternative 
Action
Analyzer
Alternative 
Action
AnalyzerPlatform
Sensor
Assessment
Platform
Sensor
Assessment
Communications
 Interface
Communications
 Interface
•Diagnostics
•Health Indicators
• Fault Reports
• Part Requests
• Maintenance Request
•Enhanced Weapon  Status
•Logistics Recommendations
C2
 Interface
C2
 Interface
Notional
CSSCS
Notional
CSSCS
T O C
Maintenance
Interface
Maintenance
Interface
GCSS-A
Maintenance
Module
GCSS-A
Maintenance
Module
A /L O C
C R T
• Embedded diagnostic capability to troubleshoot M1A1/A2 Turbine Engine
• Diagnostic data integrated with FBCB2 and GCSS-A
•Analysis of fault and health data predicts future operational readiness and assess a COA
• Automated generation of work orders and part requisitions within GCSS-A
• Capability demonstrated 27 January 2000
Platform Data Automationl tf r  t  t ti
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Secret High
CHS II CSSCS Workstation
or Server (Informix)
CHS II High-side Secure
Data Server (Oracle)
FTP
NSA Certified B3
Wang protection profiles for EAL Level 6
CTIL response
CHS II
SBU
GCSS-Army
(Oracle)
• Required to remove the floppy disk transfer between Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) & Secret
• CSSCS user can make queries of GCSS-Army DB in real-time, without requesting data from unit
level DBs, by going directly to the high side server
• Demonstrated at Ft. Gordon on 19 Nov 99
• POC: Andrea Jansen, 804-734-0006, jansena@lee.army.mil
XTS-300
(rack mounted)
FTP
CTIL request
Data Security/Accessibilityt  rit / i ilit
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“A nickel ain’t worth a dime anymore!”
Yogi Berra
Values:  The Missing Linkl :   i i  i
CECOM Bottom Line: The Soldier
Optimization Problemti iz ti  r l
hAgents must operate within a B2B-type marketplace in
which the economic terms are fully understood by all active
participants (e.g., dollar, minute, risk, attrition, lift asset)
hEach agent must be capable of tailoring the value placed
hAgents must be capable of being given a priority level based
upon the user whose interests the agent represents (e.g., the
CG’s agent, the chef’s agent, …)
hProximity of planning change to current time is included in
the assessment
By May 5th
Date
Value
Vector
On May 5th
Date
Value
Vector
Minimize Cost
Value
Vector
Cost
Below $1000
Value
Vector
Cost
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Partial Acronym Listrti l r  i t
ABCS = Army Battle Command Systems
ASAS = All Source Analysis System
ATD = Advanced Technology Demonstration
ATCCS = Army Tactical Command and Control Systems
AV = Army Vision
BFA = Battlefield Functional Area
C2D = Command and Control Directorate
CECOM = Communications and Electronics Command
COA = Course of Action
CRT = Combat Repair Team
CSS = Combat Service Support
CSSCS = Combat Service Support Control System
CTIL = Commanders Tracked Item List
C4I = Command, Control, Communications, Computers
and Intelligence
DAVINCI = Distributed Analysis and Visualization
Infrastructure for C4I
FBCB2 = Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
GCCS = Global Command and Control System
GCSS = Global Combat Support System
GCSS-A = Global Combat Support System -
Army
HTML = Hyper Text Markup Language
JCDB = Joint Command Data Base\
JDBC = Joint Data Base Connectivity
JTAV = Joint Total Asset Visibility
JV = Joint Vision
LAN = Local Area Network
Log C2 = Logistics Command and Control
MC4 = Medical Communications for Combat
Casualty Care
MCS = Maneuver Control System
TOC = Tactical Operation Center
XML = eXtensible Markup Language
(Intentionally blank)
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INFORMATION  FOR THE JOINT THEATER
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Ms. Virginia Wiggins
Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center
Background
In support of Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) and the visionary concepts of operations of the
Military Services, the ability to provide current, reliable and timely information to enable
“Focused Logistics” for the warfighter is paramount.
The Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Decision Support Center’s (DSC) Senior Steering Group (SSG),
comprised of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff (VCJCS) directed
the Joint C4ISR DSC to conduct a study on vulnerabilities of Information Assurance (IA) and
the Joint Theater Distribution System (JTDS).   The fundamental question posed by the SSG
was:
“What are the impacts of information warfare operations on the information architecture for the
Joint Theater Distribution System being evaluated by the Joint Theater Distribution/Joint Test &
Evaluation) (JTD/JT&E) effort?”1
This fundamental question generated four supporting questions with a fifth question added by
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics, DUSD(L) after the study start date.  These
supporting questions were:
What are the key elements of the information infrastructure supporting the Joint Theater
Distribution System?
Will the system have the network capacity available for support?
Which of these elements are most vulnerable to disruption or denial of information flow?
What is the impact on combat operations if the Theater Distribution System is disrupted by
information warfare?
What strategies can be used to mitigate the impact of information warfare on the Joint Theater
Distribution System?2
Providing answers to the Study questions required an in depth review of the JTD/JT&E effort,
and the underlying support infrastructures for logistics, and transportation.  The JTD/JT&E
reengineering activity is focused on in-theater distribution from the air and shipping ports of
                                                
1 Memorandum from Director, Joint C4ISR DSC, June 23, 1998, as approved by ASD (C3I) June 29, 1998, USD(A&T) July 13
1998 and VCJCS September 17, 1998.
2 Added by Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSD(L))
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debarkation (APODs and SPODs) to a central distribution point. It is currently focused on
defining the "AS IS" architecture and in examining what changes can be implemented to
improve distribution processes in theater.  The JTD/JT&E are essential to addressing some of the
process issues that are currently in theater.  The JTD/JT&E does not, and is not, required to
address the global issue of information assurance and the end-to-end impacts of information
warfare on the logistic system.
As the DSC team evaluated the scope of Joint Theater Distribution, it was determined that to
fully assess information assurance, a global holistic approach had to be applied with specific
considerations given to: number of systems, global connectivity, private industry interactions,
technology migration, people, processes, policy, procedures, laws and investments. This
approach allowed the team to consider the implications for JV2010 and the full spectrum of the
Focused Logistics mission.
Time and resource limitations required the study team to make maximum use of available
information from CINC/Service and /Agency (C/S/A) subject matter experts and their activities.
These activities included but were not limited to;  the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics (DUSD(L)) calendar year 2000 (Y2K) testing, Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector
General (IG) audits and analyses, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Joint Task Force
(JTF)-Computer Network Defense (CND), Service wargaming, and Service scenario efforts.
Representatives from the C/S/As were participants in these efforts.
 The study was complemented by a Senior Review Group (SRG) that included two former
CINCs, a former Director of DIA, a former Director of DLA, a former Deputy ASDC3I, the
former Commander of Army Material Command, and several former Service Operational
Commanders.
In completing the study, the team developed several products used to support the analysis, which
were used by contemporary efforts, and can be used by future efforts.  These products included:
Final Report and Briefing
A threat and risk analysis methodology
A methodology to link Logistics information flow to combat outcomes
A database providing detailed information on operational information flows and Information
Exchange Requirements for Logistics processes
A database providing information on logistics and transportation nodes and systems deployed
world wide
155
Findings
The Study effort resulted in four general findings and numerous specific ones related directly to
the Study questions.
General Findings
General Finding 1:
An end-to-end analysis of the logistics process was required to assess Information Assurance
(IA) implications.  The extent to which the DoD’s logistic and transportation community is
integrated with international and domestic commercial communications, manufacturing, and
service industries is a dominant factor in assessing IA.
Figure 1 displays the end-to-end processes required to execute Joint Theater Distribution. Shaded
areas representing non-government owned suppliers, transportation, and communications
requiring full integration and harmonization.
General Finding 1:  Joint Theater
Distribution Environment
CONUS Intratheater Theater
Logistics Information Flow
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Theater Distribution is an end to end process incorporating  full
integration and harmonization with commercial world
Theater Distribution is an end to end process incorporating  full
integration and harmonization with commercial world
 Figure 1.  General Finding 1.
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General Finding 2:
Since the end of the Cold War the logistics “mass” necessary for combat has been drawn down
significantly, and further draw downs are planned. This has resulted in a decrease in the
robustness of our combat logistics capability.  In order to execute Focused Logistics the DoD
must be able to replace the need for mass with information. Such a change requires improvement
in automated capabilities and training.  The increase in automated processes and the associated
training will allow for the necessary information flow, management data, and IA to realize
Focused Logistics as envisioned in JV 2010.  In order to execute focused Logistics as envisioned
in JV 2010, the DoD must be able to move the necessary information (shown as the blue dashed
line in Figure 2.) Logistics capabilities must be sufficiently agile to compensate for lack of mass.
In Figure 2, the red line reflects the mandated drawdown of DoD logistics support capabilities.
The blue line represents the required reliance on Information Technology to include Information
Management and Information Assurance.  It is the opinion of the study team that uninterrupted
information flow is critical to the ability of US forces to sustain operations as envisioned in JV
2010.
 
General Finding 2 :  The Impact of
Focused Logistics
1991 2000 2010
Reliance
on
Logistics
Mass
Reliance
 on
Information
Flow
• DoD
Stockpiles
reduced
• Force
structure
reduced
• Bases
closed,
functions
re-aligned
A decrease in mass requires an increase in agility and
responsiveness to accomplish the Logistics mission
A decrease in ass requires an increase in agility and
responsiveness to acco plish the Logistics ission
• “Time Definite
Delivery”
inventory models
• CONUS-based
force
projection and
support
• Increasing
integration of
commercial
providers
The red line has been
mandated…the blue
line is required to
execute Focused
Logistics
The red line has been
mandated…the blue
line is required to
execute Focused
Logistics
 Figure 2.  General Finding 2
General Finding 3:
The nature and extent of the threat to DoD information assurance is rapidly growing in both
quantity and quality. Research conducted by the team clearly indicates that the potential threat
spans a wide spectrum of sources from casual hackers to state players.  In addition, the nature of
the threat has grown increasingly sophisticated, resulting in a constant race between attackers
and the means to defend against them. It should also be noted that attacks have become
increasingly sophisticated, resulting in operational impacts, not just “cosmetic” damage to Web
sites.
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Figure 3 summarizes the reported and projected attack on DoD information systems as reported
by the US General Accounting Office and by other sources.3
Figure 3.  General Finding 3
General Finding 4:
There is no clear and concise overarching DoD policy or guidance for IA.  The many ongoing
activities within DoD in the logistics functional area are continuing without benefit of
understanding how they fit in the larger picture and thus will not achieve the level of IA
necessary to accomplish the long-term goals established by senior leadership. It would appear
that a program to overcome this condition would include a centralized management structure
similar to the recently successful Y2K undertaking with the understanding that the changing
threat environment will necessitate it remain in place in some form over time.  Participation will
be required from all organizations involved with DoD logistics.
Specific Findings
Question 1: What are the key elements of the information infrastructure supporting the Joint
Theater Distribution System?
• Finding:  While there are several key elements that may be more important than others, the
interdependency of logistics information flows makes it difficult to focus on just a few.
                                                
3 GAO/AIMD-96-84  Information Security Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, and Federal
Computer Week, 20 December, 1999.
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Interdependency means that there are “no service unique systems”.  In order for any service
to requisition a part, on average, at least two services and one agency are required. The
logistics environment is large, complex and information intensive with no coherent
operational architecture or protection mechanism.  An operational baseline is needed in order
to manage changes or additions.
Question 2: Will the system have the network capacity available for support?
• Finding:  Review of planned communications capacity and infrastructure, in conjunction with
the emerging doctrine for logistics, indicated that capacity in theater at the tactical level, the
so called “last mile,” is (and is likely to remain) an issue.
Question 3: Which of these elements are most vulnerable to disruption or denial of information
flow?
• Finding:  Vulnerabilities vary with situation, attack strategy and requirements.  The logistics
community is “inextricably linked” to the global information infrastructure (including the
Internet) and commercial enterprise.  Technology velocity is a key factor and, therefore,
vulnerabilities are dynamic.  Threats can be multi-dimensional, and can evolve rapidly. Thus,
the very nature of the logistics informational process may result in significant and substantial
vulnerabilities that may change over time.
Question 4: What is the impact on combat operations if the Theater Distribution System is
disrupted by information warfare?
• Finding:  Assured information is critical to the ability of the forces to execute Focused
Logistics.  Modeling and Simulation analysis of the Major Regional Conflict (MRC)
Scenario named Lantica (adopted from the Army) provided insight into the potential combat
impact.  In sum, after fifty excursions for each of five test cases, disruptions in information
flow led to longer engagements at higher costs.  Those costs were in the form of human
casualties, vehicle losses, and conflict duration. Simulation results indicated that, with
information delays of up to 5 days over the base case, losses increased by a factor of 2 over
those in the base case.  With information delays of 30 days (an assumed upper boundary)
losses increased by a factor of six (6) over the base case.  Significantly, in that upper
boundary case (30 day delay), US forces were unable to defeat the opposing force in 30% of
the trials run.
Question 5:  What strategies can be used to mitigate the impact of information warfare on the
Joint Theater Distribution System?
• Finding:  Given the time and resources allotted, the Study was unable to develop any specific
mitigation strategies.  Nevertheless, insight into the process revealed that logistics IA must
include both network defense and defense in depth at the information element level.  The
team found that current strategies focus on just two steps (provision of policy and site
specific accreditation) in what must be a multi step process.  The result is a potentially
significant gap in our overall mitigation strategies.  In order to answer the question of a
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specific set of mitigation strategies, a "next step" for the logistics community needs to be
defined. A risk analysis must be performed identifying threat impact, cost of mitigation,
information criticality, operational constraints, and time impact.
Overall, Logistics IA is a C4I class problem.  The solution must include consideration of
Operational Architectures, Threat Assessment, Return on Investment, Certification, People,
Policies, Processes, Procedures, Technology, Law and Investment (See Figure 4).
Figure 4. What We Need to Do
Conclusions
Information Assurance is critical to the successful conclusion of battle in the JV 2010
environment.  Absence of Information Assurance could be a “War Stopper”.  Attaining
Information Assurance will require leadership focus at least equal to the efforts taken to resolve
the Y2K phenomena with the understanding that continuous attention will be required as the
threat and technology change over time.The IA threat/decision space must be determined and
corrective action prioritized. (See Figure 5).
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What We Need to Do
[IA Elements]
Threat Assessment Methodology
Cost / Benefit Assessment
Certification & Accreditation
Law / Policy / Procedures / 
Tactics /Techniques / Training 
Architecture
TODAY, THE AREA’S 
ARE WORKED 
INDEPENDENTLY
IA Must be Built-In………..NOT Added On
IA Elements Can Be Implemented in a Parallel Process
IA ust be Built-In ..NOT Added On
IA Elements Can Be Implemented in a Parallel Process
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Figure
5.  Defense in Depth and the Information Assurance Decision Space
Recommendations
DoD should manage the Logistics IA effort with aggressiveness and attention comparable to
that given the Y2K effort .  To do this, DoD must:
Establish methodology for mitigation alternatives applicable to all functional areas.
Develop actionable steps for logistics IA.
DoD should define a “next step” for the DoD community:
Must support definition and bounding of the Logistics Information Assurance decision space
Must include mechanism for evolution, evaluation of IA strategies
Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, Finance, Policy,
Air, Land, and Sea Combatants ...
Modeling & Simulation (Red on Blue)
DoD should establish an Executive Agent and implement the following:
Near Term: (next 18 months) Develop the Process
Immediate DoD level effort to develop comprehensive multi-disciplined logistics IA Plan which
sizes the problem, defines the decision space, identifies high payoff mitigation
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alternatives…based on documented operational architecture. Redefine Logistics functions and
Structure to include IA capabilities?
Include a technical architecture and implementation plan (Standards).
Establish a mechanism for continuous and comprehensive threat projection vice historical
reporting.
Establish and apply a DoD managed mechanism for mission driven, red on blue assessment of
IA solutions for the logistics architectures to support the planning effort.
Develop investment alternatives to support integration of logistics IA effort into overall DoD
planning.
Consolidate Policy (Laws) and Directives (Reduce to a minimum set).
Conduct laboratory and operational experiments to investigate and evaluate mitigation strategies
(Modeling and Simulation).
Conduct training (Architecture, Information Assurance/Security).
Mid Term: (18-24 months) Apply the Process
Apply the plan to Logistics efforts underway (i.e. JTDS/JT&E Test cases).
Continue laboratory and operational experiments to investigate and evaluate mitigation
strategies.
Establish training programs to develop Information Management Staffs.  The training should
include training in architectures, information management, and information assurance/security.
Long Term: (>24 months) Institutionalize the process
Tie to the JWCA and POM process.
The process will be iterative due to the changes in technology, policies and doctrine.
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AVAILABILITY
Timely, reliable access to
data and information services
for authorized users.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Assurance that information is
not disclosed to unauthorized
persons, processes, or
devices.
INTEGRITY
Condition existing when data is
unchanged from its source and
has not been accidentally or
maliciously modified, altered, or
destroyed.
AUTHENTICATION
Security measure designed
to establish the validity of a
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or system or a means of
verifying an individual's
authorization to receive
specific categories of
information.
NON-REPUDIATION
Assurance the sender of data
is provided with proof of
delivery and the recipient is
provided with proof of origin,
so neither can later deny
having processed the data.
Source: NSTISSP
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Threats &
Vulnerabilities
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þ Human Intentional
þ Human
Unintentional
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þ Environmental
þ Hardware
þ Software
þ Media
þ Network/
    Communications
þ Procedural
DoD IA Goal
Ensure DoD’s vital
information resources
are secure and
protected
Ref: DoD CIO October 1999, DoD Information Management (IM) Strategic Plan
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Topics
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; The Impact Of Focused Logistics
; The Threat
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Joint C4ISR Decision Support
Center Mission
• Organizational Relationship:  An  OSD
organization, JC4ISR, DSC is tasked by a Senior
Steering Group comprised of the VCJCS, USD
(A,T,&L), and ASD/C3I.
• Mission:  The JC4ISR Decision Support Center is
tasked to provide decision makers with analytic
support for establishing requirements, acquiring
and fielding C4ISR systems.
• JC4ISR DSC Director, Col David Komar
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Information Assurance to execute Focused Logistics and Joint
Theater Distribution
DSC tasked to conduct study to address the following questions:
• What are the key elements of the information infrastructure supporting the
Joint Theater Distribution System?
• Will the system have the network capacity available for support?
• Which of the key elements are most vulnerable to disruption or denial of
information flow?
• What impact on combat operations if the Theater Distribution System is
disrupted by information warfare?
• What strategies can be used to mitigate the impact of information warfare on
the Joint Theater Distribution System?
What We Studied
Study required rapid look at complex and extensive communityStudy required rapid look at co plex and extensive co unity
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• Q1-Logistics Environment:  large, complex, information intensive, with no
coherent operational architecture or protection mechanisms
• Q2-Capacity:  capacity to support logistics at the pointy end of the spear is…and
will remain…an issue
• Q3-Vulnerability:  logistics community is “inextricably linked” to global
information infrastructure (including the Internet) and commercial
enterprise…technology velocity a key factor
• Q4-Combat impact:  assured information is critical to ability of forces to execute
focused logistics…disruptions lead to longer fight at higher cost
• Q5-Strategy:  network defense is necessary, but not sufficient…strategy must be
a defense in depth based on information defense
• Q5-Policy:  many policies…no clear guidance or well understood strategy
What We Found
Logistics IA is a C4I class problem; approach must include consideration
of People, Policies, Processes, Procedures, Law, and Investment
Logistics IA is a C4I class problem; approach must include consideration
of People, Policies, Processes, Procedures, Law, and Investment
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Theater Distribution is an end to end process incorporating  full
integration and harmonization with commercial world
Theater Distribution is an end to end process incorporating  full
integration and harmonization with commercial world
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What We Found
[Systems Today...An Unbounded Environment]
Your system
Your local network
Your Firewall
Your Actual System Boundary
Unbounded systems are characteristically distributed and
interoperable and lack global visibility with common security.
   i i ll  i i  
i l   l  l l i i ili  i   i .
Office of the Manager of the National Communications System
Source: Federal Computer Week, 20 Dec 1999
You may be
  connected via
    The Web…
    NIPRNET...
    SIPRNET…
    and dial-in
       access...
>60M hosts
   on the Web
~50% are US 
    hosts
There are no
more single-
Service
Systems
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Reliance
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Logistics
Mass
Reliance
 on
Information
Flow
• DoD
Stockpiles
reduced
• Force
structure
reduced
• Bases
closed,
functions
re-aligned
The red line has been mandated…the blue line is
required to execute Focused Logistics
The red line has been andated the blue line is
required to execute Focused Logistics
• “Time Definite
Delivery”
inventory
models
• CONUS-based
force
projection and
support
• Increasing
integration of
commercial
providers
A decrease in mass
requires an increase
in agility and
responsiveness to
accomplish the
Logistics mission
A decrease in mass
requires an increase
in agility and
responsiveness to
accomplish the
Logistics mission
What We Found
[Impact of Focused Logistics]
Not to Scale
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What We Found
[The Threat...Now]
Your DoD Information System in FY 00:
• Will  experience Unauthorized Access.
• Will experience Unauthorized Manipulation of its
information
• Will experience Denial of Access.
• And critical decision support capabilities will be
Disrupted, Delayed or Disabled.
Your information is no more assured than the
weakest link in your information chain
our infor ation is no ore assured than the
eakest link in your infor ation chain
  Source:  Federal Computer Week, 20 Dec 1999, CERT Advisories
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Information Attacks on DoD Systems
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What We Found
[The Increasing Level of Attack]
Source: Projections - GAO/AIMD-96-84
             1998 to 1999 Increase - Federal Computer Week, December 20, 1999 
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Case
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Conflict Duration
Blue Casualties
Blue Vehicle Losses
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Normalized Comparison of Results
Conflict Duration
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Results of 50 TOpS*combat simulation runs for each case
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li     
Log Information Delays result in: 
• Increased Conflict Duration
• Increased Blue Casualties
• Increase Blue Vehicle Losses
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* Theater Operation Simulation (US Air Force) -Red / Blue force mode
30 Days Combat + 5 days
       Order
Case 2 Base + 1 day delay
Case 3 Base + 2 day delay
Case 4 Base + 5 day delay
Case 5 Base + 30 day delay
What We Found
[Simulation Results]
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What We Found
(Policy and Guidance)
Policy and Guidance
• Exists from national level
down to services and
agencies
• Is not fully coordinated
• May be selectively applied
Varying applications of policy by
services and program managers
are likely to require some level of
mediation
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What We Learned
There is NO item of information that is 100% secure 100% of the
time… If someone wants it, it can and will be obtained…
Source: The Sword & Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, by Christopher Andrews and Vasili Mitrokhin,
Published 1999
There is  ite  of infor ation that is 100  secure 100  of the
ti e  If so eone ants it, it can and ill be obtained
Source: The Sword & Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, by Christopher Andrews and Vasili Mitrokhin,
Published 1999
•Log systems can be disrupted at various levels
•There will be a combat impact
•The players are NOT just state players anymore
–Motivation & Capability determine extent of impact
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Why Is It Important
• Focused logistics…critical to operations of US forces
• Assured information…critical to execution of
focused logistics
• Logistics “inextricably linked” to global information
infrastructure
• Agility, flexibility, robustness required to meet
threats have to have ability to evolve quickly /smartly
• Information-centric defense-in-depth  key to assured
information, agility, flexibility and robustness
Global, Holistic Approachlobal, olistic pproach
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    What would a bounded Decision Space
    contribute to the Logistics IA Objective?
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• Systems approach to defense of resources, including information elements
• Tailored to anticipated threats to resources
– Intelligence driven, not just event based
• System Level cost benefit analysis for defense mechanisms
• Systems approach to defense of resources, including information elements
• Tailored to anticipated threats to resources
– Intelligence driven, not just event based
• System Level cost benefit analysis for defense mechanisms
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[Defense In Depth]
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Defense in Depth
and the IA Decision Space
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IA Elements
IA Must be Built-In………..NOT Added On
IA Elements Can Be Implemented in a Parallel Process
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AREA’S WORKED 
INDEPENDENTLY
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Study Recommendations
DoD should:
• Manage the Logistics IA effort with aggressiveness
and attention comparable to that given the Y2K
effort
• Define a “next step” for the DoD community:
– must support definition and bounding of the Logistics
Information Assurance decision space
– must include mechanism for evolution, evaluation of IA strategies
• Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, Finance, Policy,
    Air, Land, and Sea Combatants ...
•  Modeling & Simulation (Red on Blue)
The IA challenge CAN be successfully addressedThe I  challenge C  be successfully addressed
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Required Actions
• NOW  Community Needs to Decide on a
Follow-on Effort (Not a Study)
• Near Term (next 18 months):  Develop the
process to ensure Logistics IA for legacy and
new systems
• Mid Term (18-24 Months):  Apply the  process
• Long Term (>24 Months):  Institutionalize the
process
Develop Process, Apply Process, Institutionalize
 the Process in a Global Holistic Approach
evelop Process, pply Process, Institutionalize
 the Process in a lobal olistic pproach
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Computational Intelligence for Decision Support
Russell C. Eberhart, Yaobin Chen, and Jinchun Peng
Purdue School of Engineering and Technology
Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis
Introduction
Several analytic tools have matured recently that facilitate solving problems that were previously
difficult or impossible to solve.  Included are evolutionary computation, artificial neural
networks, and fuzzy systems.  Combinations of these new analytic tools among themselves, as
well as with more traditional approaches, are collectively known as computational intelligence,
and are being used to solve extremely challenging problems.  Computational intelligence
applications typically require a small fraction of the time of other approaches to develop
prototypes and applications.  The resulting systems are robust with respect to noise, missing data,
etc., and often run significantly faster than systems built using other approaches (Eberhart et al.
1996).
This paper discusses the application of computational intelligence to decision support systems
(DSSs).  One definition of a DSS is that it is an interactive, flexible, and adaptable computer-
based information system specially developed for supporting the solution of a non-structured
management problem for improved decision making.  It uses data, provides easy user interface,
and can incorporate the decision maker’s own insights.  In addition, a DSS may use models, is
built by an interactive process (often by end-users), supports all phases of decision making, and
may include a knowledge component (Turban and Aronson 1998).  Stated more succinctly, the
goal of a DSS is to provide useful knowledge at a glance (Wood 1999).
This paper begins by reviewing the field of computational intelligence and its constituent
methodologies.  We review the concepts of evolutionary computation, artificial neural networks,
and fuzzy logic, emphasizing the use of evolutionary computation as the foundation of our
approach to computational intelligence.  We then briefly look at the concept of swarm
intelligence, taking a brief tour through relevant paradigms of social psychology before
discussing the particle swarm optimization algorithm.
Next, we examine computational intelligence algorithms and implementations applicable to
DSSs, starting with the more general topics of evolving neural networks and evolving fuzzy
systems and ending with a practical example of using evolutionary computation to optimize
shipping container movements at an integrated automated container terminal.
Finally, we indulge in some speculations regarding future work.  We see exciting possibilities in
both research and applications.
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1 Computational Intelligence and its Components
Before discussing computational intelligence itself, it is logical to briefly examine each of its
main constituent methodologies: evolutionary computation, artificial neural networks, and fuzzy
logic.  A definition is offered for each, and examples of application areas are listed.  For more
detailed analyses and information, refer to (Eberhart et al. 1996).
1.1 Computational Intelligence Component Methodologies
Evolutionary computation (EC) comprises adaptive optimization and classification paradigms
roughly based on mechanisms of evolution such as natural selection and self-organization.  The
evolutionary computation field includes genetic algorithms, evolutionary programming, genetic
programming, evolution strategies, and particle swarm optimization.
Primary application areas of EC include:
• Optimization:  finding the best possible solution to a complex problem (often NP hard) in
the specified time.
• Classification: operating in multiple-fault dynamic environments.
• Explanation: providing explanation facilities for systems such as complex artificial neural
networks
We view evolutionary computation as providing a foundation for computational intelligence.  It
seems to us to be in some sense the mortar that holds the bricks together.  All of our recent
applications involve evolutionary algorithms plus other components; the evolutionary paradigm
is always present.
An artificial neural network (ANN) is an analysis paradigm that is roughly modeled after the
massively parallel structure of the brain.  It simulates a highly interconnected, parallel
computational structure with many relatively simple processing elements (PEs) (Eberhart et al.
1996).  ANNs are able to approximate any non-linear function to any specified degree of
accuracy.
Primary application areas of ANNs include:
• Classification as reflected in decision theory: determining which of a set of predefined
classes best represents an input pattern.
• Associative memory: obtaining an exemplar pattern from a noisy and/or incomplete one.
• Clustering, or compression: significantly reducing the dimensionality of an input.
• Control systems: modeling a non-linear system as well as designing the control system.
• Simulation: generation of structured sequences.
Fuzziness refers to nonstatistical imprecision and vagueness in information and data.  Fuzzy sets
model the properties of imprecision, approximation, or vagueness. In a fuzzy set, fuzzy
membership values reflect the membership extents (or grades) of the elements in the set.  Fuzzy
179
logic comprises operations on fuzzy sets, including equality, containment, complementation,
intersection, and union; it is a generalization of crisp (two-valued) logic.
Primary application areas of fuzzy systems include:
• Control systems: controlling complex systems in real time.
• Fuzzy expert systems: providing support in diagnostic and decision support systems
1.2 Computational Intelligence
Computational intelligence is a process or methodology involving computing (usually involving
a computer) that exhibits an ability to adapt to new situations, and/or to self-organize, such that
the system is perceived to possess attributes such as reason, decision, prediction, implication, and
intention.  Capabilities of a system with computational intelligence may include generalization,
discovery, abstraction, and/or association.  Put another way, computational intelligence
comprises practical adaptation and/or self-organization concepts, paradigms, algorithms, and
implementations that enable or facilitate intelligent behavior in complex and changing
environments.
Computational intelligence systems in silicon often comprise hybrids of paradigms such as
artificial neural networks, fuzzy systems, and evolutionary computation systems, augmented
with knowledge elements.  Computational intelligence silicon-based systems are often designed
to mimic or augment one or more aspects of carbon-based biological intelligence.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among intelligent system components.  The shading of
individual process blocks roughly indicates the level of computational intelligence present.  As
can be seen, the highest concentration of computational intelligence generally exists in the
adaptation and self-organization process.
Inputs to the intelligent system from the environment can be sensory inputs in the case of
biological systems or data in the case of a silicon-based system. The intelligent behavior output
includes communications to, and actions upon, the environment.  Intelligence is as intelligence
does.  If there is no action or communication that affects the environment, there is no intelligent
behavior.
Primary data flows are represented by the thick arrows.  The sensing and pre-processing area
outputs pre-processed data.  In addition to reactions (discussed below), outputs of the processing
and algorithms process include processed data, clusters, classes, and features.  Outputs of the
adaptation and self-organization area where the bulk of the system’s computational intelligence
resides include decision, prediction, reason, intention, and implication.
The world model contains the knowledge that the system has about the world, or environment, as
the name implies.  Included in the world model are such things as data, survival information,
available resources information, culture, goals, values, and adaptation strategies.  Between the
world model and each of the four process areas is a two-headed dotted arrow, signifying a flow
of “information” or “knowledge” in both directions.  The sizes of the arrowheads are meant to
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very roughly reflect the relative quantities of the flows.  For example, the flow from sensing and
pre-processing to the world model is much greater than the flow to sensing from the world
model.  A greater proportion of the flow, however, goes from the world model to the output
generation area that vice versa.
Figure 1.  Relationships among components of intelligent systems; shading roughly indicates
computational intelligence level.
One dotted arrow goes from sensing to intelligent behavior; another goes from processing and
algorithms to intelligent behavior.  These represent processes leading to actions related to safety
and survival.  An example of a reflex is an action such as a person makes upon touching a hot
stove.  An example of a reaction is the process you’d go through if you opened your front door
and found a Bengal tiger staring you in the face.
Figure 1 is meant to convey the belief that there is no distinction between carbon- and silicon-
based intelligence.  A system simply possesses one or more of the attributes illustrated, and the
actions on and communications to the environment are intelligent to some degree, depending on
system attributes.  Computational intelligence is buried within the core of the system, be it
animal or machine.  It is generally removed from the interface with the environment.  It is an
area in which developments are rapidly occurring that are resulting in exciting new analytical
tools.
2 Swarm Intelligence and Particle Swarm Optimization
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In this section we describe a recently developed evolutionary computation paradigm called
particle swarm optimization.  It was developed by Jim Kennedy, a social psychologist, and Russ
Eberhart, an engineer.  The paradigm has roots in computer science, psychology, and artificial
life.
Evolutionary computation is discussed in the previous section.  In this section, we first take a
brief tour of social psychology paradigms that have provided the underpinnings of the swarm
intelligence concept.  For a more detailed account, see (Kennedy et al. 2000).  Three social
psychology paradigms directly fed into swarm intelligence, although others also played roles.
They are Latané’s dynamic social impact theory, Axelrod’s culture model, and Kennedy’s
adaptive culture model.
Latané’s dynamic social impact theory asserts that the behaviors of individuals can be explained
in terms of the self-organizing properties of their social system, that clusters of individuals
develop similar beliefs, and that subpopulations diverge (polarize) from one another.  In
summary, it says that individuals influence one another, and in doing so become more similar,
and that patterns of belief held by individuals tend to correlate within regions of a population.
This model is consistent with findings in the fields of social psychology, sociology, economics,
and anthropology.
In Axelrod’s culture model, populations of individuals are pictured as strings of symbols, or
“features.”  The probability of interaction between two individuals is a function of their
similarity, and individuals become more similar as a result of interactions.  The observed
dynamic is polarization, homogeneous subpopulations that differ from one another.
Kennedy’s adaptive culture model makes important revisions to the above approaches.  For
example, there is no effect of similarity on the probability of interaction.  Rather, interaction
occurs if fitnesses are different.  In fact, the effect of similarity is negative in that it is
dissimilarity that creates boundaries between cultural regions.
So, what do we learn from all this that we can apply to swarm intelligence and particle swarm
optimization?  A brief summary of culture and cognition relevant facts is that:
• Individuals searching for solutions learn from the experiences of others (individuals learn
from their neighbors)
• An observer of the population perceives phenomena of which the individuals are the parts
(individuals that interact frequently become similar)
• Culture affects the performance of individuals that comprise it (individuals gain benefit
by imitating their neighbors)
Now that we’ve completed our brief tour of social psychology, we move into the area of swarm
intelligence and particle swarms.  For our purposes, a swarm is an apparently disorganized
collection (population) of moving individuals that tend to cluster together while each individual
seems to be moving in a random direction.  We also use swarm to describe a certain family of
social processes.
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Particle swarm optimization is a paradigm for optimizing nonlinear functions.  It was developed
by Jim Kennedy and Russ Eberhart (Kennedy and Eberhart 1995, Eberhart and Kennedy 1995).
It is simple in concept, easy to implement, computationally efficient, and effective on a wide
variety of problems.  It is related to bird flocking, fish schooling, and swarming theory.  It is also
an evolutionary algorithm, with some similarities to genetic algorithms and evolution strategies.
The particle swarm population is initialized by assigning random positions and velocities to each
population member (particle).  Potential solutions are then flown through hyperspace.  Each
particle keeps track of its "best" (highest fitness) position in hyperspace.  This is called pbest for
each individual particle, gbest for the best in the population (when a global model is used), and
lbest for the best in a defined neighborhood (when a neighborhood model is used).  At each time
step, each particle is stochastically accelerated toward its pbest and gbest if the global model is
used, or pbest and lbest if a neighborhood model is used.  The neighborhood comprises the
particle and a selected number of its topological neighbors.  For example, a neighborhood of five
includes the particle and its two topological neighbors on each side.
The particle swarm optimization process is as follows:
1. Initialize the population in hyperspace.
2. Evaluate the fitness of individual particles.
3. Modify the velocity of each particle based on its pbest and gbest (or lbest).
4. Terminate on some condition.
5. Go to step 2.
The velocity and position update equations for the global version of particle swarm optimization
are
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where d is the dimension, c1 and c2 are positive constants, rand() and Rand() are random
functions, and w is the inertia weight.  (For the neighborhood version, just change pgd to pld.)
The performance of each particle is measured according to a predefined fitness function.  The
inertia weight influences the tradeoff between global and local exploration.  A common approach
is to reduce the inertia weight during a run (i.e. from 0.9 to 0.4 over 1000 iterations), to set c1 and
c2 to about 1.5 or 2.0, and to set the maximum allowable velocity Vmax to the dynamic range of
each variable (on each dimension).
We can now define an intelligent swarm as a population of interacting individuals that optimizes
a function or goal by collectively adapting to the local or global environment.  Put concisely,
swarm intelligence = collective adaptation.
3 Applying Computational Intelligence to Decision Support
In order to be useful to decision makers, decision support systems should meet four criteria
(Wood 1999).  They should satisfy a compelling need in a complex decision situation, provide
useful assistance in the user’s context, be collaborative, and be adaptive.
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Computational intelligence can play a role in all four criteria.  In fact, as we have seen, the
essence of computational intelligence is adaptation, and the essence of particle swarm
optimization is collaboration.  The methodologies described in this paper thus focus primarily on
the third and fourth criteria, which have to do with how decision support systems are designed to
function internally.
In this section, we present two general approaches to applying computational intelligence:
evolving artificial neural networks and evolving fuzzy expert systems.  We then conclude the
section with an example of a computational intelligence application to a decision support system:
the planning of shipping container moves in an integrated automated container terminal.
Neural networks are very good at solving some problems, such as mapping input vectors to
output vectors.  Evolutionary algorithms are very good at other problems, such as optimization.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that hybrid tools can be developed that are better than
either approach by itself.  Using an evolutionary algorithm such as particle swarm optimization,
we can evolve not only the weights but also the structure of artificial neural networks.
The approach can be used with virtually any artificial neural network structure.  It thus is logical
to evolve neural networks capable of being universal approximators, such as back-propagation
and radial basis function networks.  In back-propagation, the most common processing element
(PE) transfer function (the calculation carried out at each hidden PE of the network) is the
sigmoid function, ( )inputeoutput −+= 1/1 .  Eberhart et al. (1996) were the first to use particle swarm
optimization (PSO) to evolve artificial neural network weights, thus replacing the back-
propagation algorithm.  But PSO can also be used to indirectly evolve the structure of a network.
An added benefit of this approach is that the scaling or normalization of input data is made
unnecessary.
In this approach, PSO is used to evolve both the network weights and the slopes of the sigmoid
transfer functions of hidden (and output, if used there) PEs.  If we now consider the transfer
function to be ( )inputkeoutput *1/1 −+= , then we evolve k in addition to evolving the weights.  The
method is general, and is applicable to other network topologies and transfer functions.
Flexibility is gained by allowing slopes to be positive or negative.  A change in the sign of a
slope is equivalent to a change in the signs of all of the input weights to that PE.
The structure is evolved as follows.  If the evolved slope for a hidden PE is sufficiently small, the
sigmoid output can be clamped to 0.5, and the hidden PE can be removed.  The network weights
from the bias PE in the hidden layer to each PE in the next layer are increased by one-half the
value of the weight from the PE being removed to the next-layer PE.  PEs can thus be pruned,
reducing network complexity.  If the evolved slope is sufficiently high, the sigmoid transfer
function can be replaced by a step function.  This is used for either large negative or positive
slopes.  This method is also applicable in an analogous way to output PEs with sigmoid transfer
functions.  The network computational complexity is thus reduced.  Since transfer function
slopes can evolve to a wide range of values, it has been found that input normalization is
generally not needed.  This significantly simplifies the applications process and shortens
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development time.  The PSO process acts on the network structure in a relatively continuous
way, so that no sudden discontinuities exist such as those that plague other network evolution
approaches.  For more details regarding the use of PSO to evolve artificial neural network
structures, see Kennedy et al. (2000).
Fuzzy expert systems are widely used for applications such as control and diagnosis.  For fuzzy
systems, however, the generation of the fuzzy rules and fuzzy membership functions typically is
difficult.  The number of possible fuzzy rules increases exponentially with the number of
variables.  Therefore, efficient methods are needed to automatically design fuzzy expert systems
for complex applications such as decision support.  The system hypersurface is generally
complex, multi-modal, and non-differentiable, making evolutionary algorithms good candidates.
The method used to evolve fuzzy expert systems involves evolving (adapting) fuzzy membership
functions and rules to achieve acceptable system performance.  The first important consideration
is the representation strategy: all information about the rule set and membership functions must
be encoded.  We often encode the entire fuzzy system into a string of integers, including the
number of rules used, the rule set, and the membership function types, shapes, and ranges.  Prior
to the evolution process, we often cluster inputs using a neural network paradigm such as
learning vector quantization or fuzzy min-max clustering.  We then use the evolutionary
algorithm, such as PSO or a genetic algorithm to evolve the fuzzy system.  While running the
algorithm, fuzzy rules are used to adapt the parameters of the evolutionary algorithm.
This, then, is an example of a computational intelligence tool in which all three major component
methodologies play an essential role.  Fuzzy expert systems evolved using this approach
typically outperform those using other approaches, and have significantly more compact rule
sets.  Furthermore, development time is significantly faster.  For more details on this approach,
see Shi et al. (1999).
Finally, we consider the design of integrated automated container terminal facilities.  This
approach has the potential to increase the throughput of container ports by 50 percent.  Our
objective is to develop planning and scheduling algorithms for these facilities.  Our approach is
to use a computational intelligence tool that combines fuzzy logic and evolutionary
programming.  A typical two-berth facility was used for our proof of concept.
An evolutionary programming method was employed to optimize container handling operations.
Different from common evolutionary programming methods, the mutation in the proposed
method is strongly yard-oriented. In principle, a yard operation system may be regarded as a
discrete event system. One operation (move) of a container causes its state to change.  Because
the minimum move sequence can’t be determined in advance, the problem space has to be
expanded with the optimization process. This expansion is implemented with one loop of the
optimization program. In general, the initial value of the space dimension is the number of the
related containers. Another optimization objective is to minimize the buffer spaces. However,
sometimes the original problem has no solution if too few buffer spaces are allowed. In our
program, we use another loop to achieve this. The buffer number increases from one to the
maximum available value.
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The core of this optimization method is evolutionary computation. It is worthwhile to point out
that the objective of the evolutionary programming phase is different from the overall
optimization process. Evolutionary programming is used to judge if a move sequence with a
given length exists that correctly implements the state transition, not to minimize the number of
moves. However, the combination of the evolutionary programming and loops achieves the
overall objective of maximizing the efficiency of the system. For every given move sequence
length m, we may set a limit to the number of the evolution generations. Whenever the proper
action sequence is found within the maximum allowed generations or whenever the generation
limit is reached although no goal result is obtained, the current evolutionary process terminates.
Generally, the smaller m is, the larger the limit that is set and vice versa.
Simulation results reveal that this method is effective and efficient.  For example, for 250
containers that arrive through a truck gatehouse, our method can be used to intelligently stack
them once in an intermediate area, then move them to the berth-side (water-side) yard ready for
loading exactly according to the vessel stowage plan.  The final move to berth-side can typically
be done in 256 moves (for a total of 506 moves, counting the pick and place operations from the
arriving trucks to the intermediate stack), and the planning for this operation using our algorithm
takes less than 30 seconds.  While some aspects of this methodology are proprietary, additional
information can be found in Peng et al. (2000).
4 Future Activities
In research, we are looking forward to working in at least three areas.  First is the development of
metrics for decision support systems that can be applied in a real-time mode.  For example,
determining optimal patterns of the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy for system development and
operation seems promising.  Second, we are looking at ways to incorporate self-organization into
systems design.  Self-organization is being increasingly recognized as an essential element of
evolution.  Whereas evolution has been viewed as primarily comprising the process of natural
selection (in a neo-Darwinist sense), it is becoming increasingly recognized that self-
organization plays an important role: evolution = natural selection + self-organization.  Third,
we are investigating the real-time tracking of nonlinear dynamical systems using computational
intelligence.  It seems possible that we may even be able to track chaotic systems, within limits.
In applications, we continue to work in the area of advanced transportation decision support
systems.  We are beginning work on the second phase of the Integrated Automated Container
Terminal automated planning system, and hope to apply our expertise and methodologies to
problems of interest to the Office of Naval Research.  We are also continuing our work in the
medical diagnostics area.  The future look bright!
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Theme A:  Expeditionary Command and Control (C2) Users
1. Differing User Group Requirements
A key capability of collaborative agent-based systems is their potential to discipline
the decision environment, filtering the extraneous, clarifying the situation, and
offering alternatives. However, user environments differ radically (e.g., a mobile
infantry squad in an urban battlefield versus a fixed logistics staff aboard ship).
Should we develop a matrix of user requirements (e.g., small units to large ones,
dismounted infantry to pilots)?
2. Customization of the User-Interface
‘Scalability’ of collaborative decision-support systems can be defined as the need to
provide appropriate scope to address what is really important to the users at each level
within the organization. This is normally defined in advance by the commander.
‘Tailoring’ on the other hand, can be defined as providing the capability to each user
to specify the of information needed and the manner in which it is to be displayed.
This is more commonly left to the individual user. ‘Functionality’, actions that the
system is authorized and required to perform under certain conditions, is less clearly
defined. While broad performance parameters are set in a top down fashion during
system design and later, there is an increasing requirement to give the individual user
the capability to create ‘custom agents’ (i.e., specific system capabilities) to assist in
narrowly defined areas. What considerations should apply here?
3. Free Format Text and Voice Recognition
Text-to-voice and voice-to-text capabilities are becoming more and more reliable.
How can these capabilities be employed to enhance understanding and accelerate
decision tempo within the contemporary operations center? Can they contribute in an
archiving context? Have they a role in alerts and warnings? Can these capabilities be
joined with agent functions to pass information to units that do not possess an
electronic data capability (e.g., automatically translating an agent visual alert to voice
and passing it over an FM radio to a field unit)?
4. Rapid Objectification of Infrastructure Data
The most sophisticated collaborative agent-based systems generate maps and various
‘views’ directly from the object model. However, there will be only limited time to
develop a rich object model in a short warning contingency. Further, NIMA data may
be lacking or incomplete for the contingency area of operations (e.g., West Africa).
What ‘off-the-shelf’ tools and methods should be developed in order to ‘objectify’
aerial photos, construction data, commercial map information, etc.? Can extant GIS
products be used to complement the ‘objectified’ aspects in order to rapidly produce a
more complete and useful graphic reference for the user?
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5. Formalizing the Data Objectification Process
There is a requirement to continuously enrich and expand the object model. Should a
permanent staff responsibility be established for this function (e.g., the ‘OM section,
G-2’) or should it be handled in another fashion?
6. Human Decision Making Skills and the Role of Training
A collaborative decision-support system requires the active participation of the human
user at the higher levels of the decision making process.  This places capability
requirements on the user that users may not be adequately prepared for.  What
particular decision making skills are necessary and useful for the effective utilization
of collaborative decision-support systems?  How can the performance of human
decision makers be improved through formal training methods?
Discussion Items:
Initial issue – verification of data.  Can the commander trust the data that are being acquired?
The conversion of data into information can lead to serious misinterpretations. Users will not use
a decision-support system unless they have confidence in the performance of the system. In this
regard decision-support systems must have fairly deep explanation facilities (e.g., what is the
next best recommendation and how close is it to the best recommendation). Data quality is a key
requirement in respect to:
• consistency
• accuracy
• integrity
• availability
• geo-rectification
Geo-rectification of data leads to standardization and is of critical importance. Decision-support
tools are heavily reliant on geographic information.
How do you represent what the system is doing so that the human is comfortable with the
system’s actions. The National Missile Defense system is an example where action is automatic.
The system should delineate between defensive and offensive operations, where defense is
almost always automatic while offense is not. We should not allow computers to make your plan,
but let the computer tell you the implications of your plan.
Dealing with data in the computer does not work. Computers must deal with information. More
sophisticated tools such as agents can use their reasoning capabilities only on the basis of
information. A clear distinction needs to be made between data, information and knowledge.
Marine Corps Intelligence has definitions for data, information and knowledge, as follows:
Data: Numbers and words without relationships (i.e., facts).
Information: Data with relationships.
Knowledge: Inferences drawn from information.
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo (CA):  ONR Workshop (May 2000)
191
Customization of the user-interface is not so much a user-interface issue but a deeper issue of
customization of functionality. In particular, decision-support systems need to be scalable (i.e.,
first mile requirements are different from MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) requirements.
Squad leader just needs a small subset of the decision-support tools available.
Input to decision-support systems should be automated as much as possible using sensors, GPS,
and other means, with dynamic updating capabilities.
Decision-support systems will require a reassessment of who makes what decisions. For
example, the focus of commanders is currently on planning, it should be on execution with
planning assistance from decision-support systems.
Decision making can be learned and the Decision Range is a step in the right direction. The
Decision Range should be enhanced and used at all levels.
Organizations need to be flexible to support hierarchical and flat organizational structures
depending on need. Even in hierarchical organizations the information needs to be accessible at
all levels.
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo (CA):  ONR Workshop (May 2000)
192
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo (CA):  ONR Workshop (May 2000)
193
Theme B:  Appropriate R&D Directions
1. Integrating Simulation and Optimization Techniques
As collaborative decision-support systems become more widespread, the variety of
applications is rapidly increasing. How will future systems combine such approaches
as optimization to provide for the rapid development of alternatives to support the
planning function of a collaborative decision support system? What other
approaches/techniques are likely candidates for linkage to these systems?
2. Integrating External Applications
Collaborative decision-support systems will continue to be crippled by the
requirement for software translators until the initial effort focuses on capturing and
recording information rather than data. These translators enable two-way
communication between legacy systems and the object-serving communication
facilities at the heart of the collaborative agent-based systems. Could a set of tools be
designed which would allow the capture of information on entry into the system?
Could it be designed with an ease of use sufficient for mass appeal? How? When?
3. Assessing Uncertainty, Risk and Opportunity Costs
Measuring risk and opportunity cost are important closely related functions. Risk is
sometimes characterized as the probability that an event will occur multiplied by the
consequences. Opportunity cost is the price of executing a course of action measured
in terms of the actions foregone in doing so. How can these important functions be
usefully incorporated into collaborative decision-support?
Discussion Items:
Funding constraints require leveraging of industry products. Industry appears to be ahead of the
government/military.
The budgeting and acquisition process is too long and insensitive to changes. A spiral model
based on incremental fielding and testing would serve the military better.
Need to increase the visibility of decision-support systems (DSS) research and development
efforts DoD- wide.
Human decision making skills and the role of training need to be further examined. As
decisions move down, paradigms are going to have to change to allow these lower level
individuals to actually make the decisions and remove the layers above the decision makers.
Need for research to examine the integration of simulation and optimization techniques. The
Army is developing a collaboration server facility (written in Java) that allows various planning
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tools to share results over a single comprehensive view, with single element ownership to
facilitate the updating of data objects. What does optimization mean in this context?  It would
probably be a better strategy to apply collaborative agents rather than optimization techniques.
The relationships are usually too complex for the application of standard optimization
techniques. The user is continuously in a dual planning and execution cycle. Mathematical
optimization does not apply under such dynamic conditions.
There is a need for research into discrete value systems (i.e., one dollar does not mean the same
thing to everybody).  We must take into account the notion of time variation (i.e., a change one
month out is inexpensive compared to a change one day out).
There is a need to research the assessment of uncertainty, risk and opportunity costs. We do
not normally assess risk in terms of information system security. Industry undertakes risk
calculations. Perhaps risk should be dealt with at the local level.  Planning level risks are not
adequately accounted for currently.
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Theme C:  System Design Requirements
1. Broad System Design Guidelines
Three fundamental guiding principles have emerged in recent years for the design of
collaborative decision-support systems:  internal representation of information rather
than data;  human-computer collaborative interaction rather than automation;  and,
problem solving tools rather than hard-coded solutions.  What are the current
obstacles to achieving an acceptable measure of success in each of these areas?  Are
there other equally important system design guidelines?
2. Standardization and Agent Languages
In theory, standardization has always appeared to be an effective method for insuring
interoperability among disparate software applications.  In practice standardization
has seldom delivered on its promises.  There are essentially two paths to
standardization:  dominance by a single commercial vendor (e.g., Microsoft); and,
voluntary cooperation by several commercial vendors with or without government
support.  What are the alternatives to standardization (e.g., intelligent interfaces)?
What is the future of agent languages?  Are there software system areas in which
standards are of critical importance?
3. The Knowledge Acquisition Bottleneck
In the 1970s Ed Feigenbaum at Stanford University drew attention to the 'knowledge
acquisition bottleneck' as a significant obstacle in the development of expert systems.
Does the emphasis on ontology for the representation of information in collaborative
decision-support system aggravate or ameliorate this obstacle?  What are the steps in
formalizing the ontology of an application area?  Can any of these steps be
automated?
4. Object-Serving Communication Facilities
Responsive object-serving communication facilities that can operate with reliability in
a distributed environment are a prerequisite for collaborative decision-support
systems.  What are the current technical limitations faced by such facilities, what are
the near term solution opportunities, and what are the emerging longer term
technologies that are expected to mitigate the current limitations?
5. Effective Agent Collaboration and Planning
Agents have been shown to be able to:  monitor events;  communicate with each other
and users in a collaborative mode;  deliver and request services;  send and receive
information from external systems;  reason about the impact of information changes;
access databases;  automatically generate explanations of how they arrived at
conclusions;  undertake planning functions;  and, accomplish low level learning
capabilities. There is at least an equal need for agents that detect the absence of
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information (e.g., no position reports received from a certain region in the battlespace
for the past eight hours) and the absence of normally expected conditions (e.g., no
fuel tankers sighted for days in the vicinity of an enemy armored battalion).  What are
the intrinsic limitations and prospects for the development of 'Not' agents?
Discussion Items:
There is a need for some standards. In particular data must be geo-rectified.
There is a paramount need for graceful degradation and redundancy.
There appears to be a significant effort involved in building information models in the computer
(e.g., finding subject matter experts, dealing with the knowledge acquisition bottleneck, and so
on). What is really needed is a universal ontology to support, for example, meaningful Internet
searches.  Anything going into database should be in object form.
Decision-support systems will have many kinds of agents, some will be mathematics-based
rather than collaborative. In order for agents to meet the requirements of the users they should
have a common method for communicating amongst each other. Our own language is a form of
standardization that is evolving. This allows us to perform a diverse set of functions. However,
agents need to be able to derive information from free-text.
The user-interface of a decision-support system needs to support not only voice and text, but
also biometrics to reflect the state of the user.
Need to understand the actual capabilities and requirements of the user.
• Broad System Design Guidelines – need to get technology out of requirements
generation.
• Need to be able to modify requirements documentation as necessary by priority or
technology.
• Need for an evolutionary acquisition approach to technology (i.e., the acquisition
budgeting process should be changed sooner rather than later).
• Emphasis should be placed on more functional requirements documentation.
Actually we should not refer to decision-support but rather cognitive support. Decision-support
implies that the computer makes decisions, while cognitive support suggests more correctly that
the computer prepares the information so that the human can make more effective decisions.
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Theme D:  Communication Infrastructure
1. Reliable Data Feeds
Reliable electronic pathways and assured access to data and information are essential
if agent-based systems are to provide useful, accurate inferences and implications to
key decision makers and staffs. Currently, these essential conditions do not apply
equally to all activities during a crisis or contingency. Accordingly, in which
functional areas of contemporary contingency execution can we anticipate that these
communication infrastructure conditions will be adequate? Given the answer to the
first question, where can the application of agent-based collaborative systems make
the most useful contributions?
2. Redundancy and Graceful Degradation
That key communications will experience interruptions is certain. How can system
design alternatives mitigate the impact of such interruptions? Can the system
‘remember’ the last situation prior to interruption? What other agent-based
capabilities could be designed to assist with this problem (e.g., linked local nets, etc)?
Is the creation of a ‘system continuity agent’ a realistic possibility? Such an agent
would monitor communication links and seek to establish alternative flows.
3. Alternatives for the 'Last Mile'
The ‘last mile’, ‘last hundred yards’ and ‘last ten feet’ all express the challenge of
establishing and maintaining robust communication links to the engaged units,
especially small units in urban or complex terrain. What new technologies offer
potential solutions to this challenge? What are their implications for the design of
collaborative decision-support systems?
4. Access Authentication and Security
The need for electronic security is receiving increasing attention in both the military
and commercial arenas.  Existing security strategies, methods and policies for the
protection of military data rely heavily on the physical separation of classified and
unclassified systems.  What are the specific security challenges posed by the new
generation of integrated, distributed, collaborative decision-support systems?  What
tasks can be performed by computer-based agents to secure such systems from
unauthorized intrusions?  What are the opportunities (if any) for agent-based
counterintelligence activities?
Discussion Items:
The last mile is really the first mile because information comes from the bottom up. While the
bottom levels have the best information they often lack context.
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Power unit limitations for the first mile are still a major technological problem.
There is a need for wireless, broadband communication facilities to support voice and  data.
Currently there is a disconnect between voice communication from the regimental level
downward and data communication from the division level upward. Data should be pushed all
the way down.
Security needs to be refocused from communications to current data (i.e., the focus of security
in Vietnam was on secure communications).
There is a great potential for electronic warfare within a decision-support environment (i.e.,
from the viewpoint of both sides).
